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ABSTRACT
ME, MYSELF AND I: REFLECTIONS ON SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND
AUTHORITY
SEPTEMBER 2017
JONATHAN SCOTT ROSEN
B.A. HAMPSHIRE COLLEGE
Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Hilary Kornblith
The Rationalist conception of the self identifies the subject, the “I”, as a “captain”
wielding autonomous rational authority over his subservient attitudes and
behaviors—his “crew”. I argue that such a conception of the self is
metaphysically untenable and that its practical and ethical ramifications are
unattractive. In its place I recommend an alternative, Holistic, “Crew of Captains”
conception of the self, and explain its metaphysical, practical and ethical
advantages.
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PREFACE

Most persons who have written about the affects and man’s conduct of life seem
to discuss, not the natural things which follow the common laws of nature, but
things which are outside her. They seem indeed to consider man in nature as a
kingdom within a kingdom. For they believe that man disturbs rather than
follows her order; that he has an absolute power over his own actions; and that he
is altogether self-determined.
--Spinoza, Ethics III, Preface.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
Like non-human animals, human beings take a great interest in the world.
Like them, we seek nourishment, shelter, and reproductive partners. Unlike nonhuman animals, we also take a great deal of interest in ourselves. We wish to
“understand ourselves,” “take ourselves seriously,” “take charge of ourselves,”
“find ourselves,” “improve ourselves,” etc.

Indeed, a glance at the table of

contents of a standard “self-help” book or a typical “wellness” retreat course
catalogue will reveal a plethora of approaches one may take toward the
understanding, development, cultivation and improvement of one’s “self.” As
Charles Guignon has put it: “The central issue for modernity is autonomy, or selfdirection, being the captain of your own ship. What we hope to achieve in life is
not honor as that was traditionally conceived, but rather the dignity that arises
from being a bounded, masterful, autonomous self.”1
What might it mean, to be a “bounded, masterful, autonomous self,” to play
the role of “captain” with respect to our “ships,”2 and on what basis do we believe
we are capable of becoming so? With respect to the first question, I suggest that
1

Charles Guignon, On Being Authentic (Routledge, 2004), p. 150, emphasis his.
Note that I will be employing this “Captain” analogy of self-governance
throughout my discussion. However, instead of referring to the self as the
“Captain-of-Ship,” I will refer to it as the “Captain-of-Crew.” I believe the latter
expression better captures the putative relationship between the self qua captain
and the captain’s subservient parts or “crew members.” It will also better position
me to offer an alternative model of the self that I shall call the “Crew-ofCaptains” model.

2
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we become bounded, masterful and autonomous—or at least, we believe we have
become so—when we have satisfied at least three conditions: (1) When we have
achieved a sufficient understanding of ourselves (our thoughts, feelings and
behavior do not surprise or mystify us and we can reliably predict how we will
behave under possible circumstances); (2) When we have assumed ownership of
or taken command of our actions (our actions are not the result of “external”
forces pushing us around but are in fact up to us); and, (3) When we have
organized or fashioned ourselves into the type of people we wish to be (we
cultivate qualities we approve of and we reduce or modify our undesired
attributes), or, at least, when we are in the process of doing so.
With respect to the second question, I suggest that our confidence in our ability
to become bounded, masterful, autonomous selves derives from our faith in the
Rationalist Story3. The Rationalist Story may be broken into four parts that can
be summarized as follows. Part 1: We human beings have the capacity to take a
“backward step,” that is, to assume a self-conscious reflective stance. Part 2: The
assumption of the self-conscious reflective stance divides the self into what
William James calls a “duplex”; into, on one hand, an empirical, factical,
observable element (what James called the “me”); and into, on the other hand, a
subjective element that can observe and attend to the empirical element (what
James called the “I”).4 Part 3: Not only does self-consciousness divide the self
3

The employment of the term “Rationalist” is not meant to express any
commitments along rationalist/empiricist lines. Rather, the term is meant to
capture the importance of the exercise of rational agency stressed by proponents
of this account. See a similar usage in Cassam (2014) and Gertler (2011).
4
See William James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, (Dover Publications:
NY, 1918), pp. 291-401, and William James, Psychology, The Briefer Course,
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into these two parts, but, in doing so, self-consciousness opens up a space, or a
reflective distance between the “I” and the “me”.5 Lastly, Part 4: In virtue of
attaining such a reflective distance, the subjective self inherits a repertoire of
powers it can exercise with respect to the empirical self.
What kind of powers can the subjective “I” exercise with respect to the
empirical “me,” in virtue of having achieved such reflective distance?6 I refer
again to the three powers mentioned above. First, an ability to acquire selfknowledge. When my attention is primarily focused out on the external world, I
(Dover Publications: NY, 2001), pp. 42-83. Of course the notion of the “Duplex
Self” that arises from self-consciousness does not originate with James. See, for
example, Kant’s notion of the empirical and intelligible (or noumenal) selves
(e.g., Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, (ed.) Mary Gregor, (intro.)
Andrews Reath (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 81-83/ 5:97-99. I will also address
Sartre’s empirical/factical “being -in-itself” (etre-en-soi) versus his transcendental
“being-for-itself” (etre-pour-soi). Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (trans.)
Hazel Barnes, (Washington Square Press, 1993).
5
Christine Korsgaard appears to take credit for the expression “reflective
distance”. See Korsgaard: “Once the space of awareness—of reflective distance,
as I like to call it—opens up between the potential ground of a belief and the
belief itself, or between the potential ground of an action and the action itself, we
must step across that distance with some awareness that we are doing so…”
Christine Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency, Essays on Practical Reason and
Moral Psychology (Oxford, 2008), p. 4; and see also Korsgaard (2009, p. 116).
But see also Velleman: “Most importantly, though, consciousness just seems to
open a gulf between subject and object, even when its object is the subject
himself. Consciousness seems to have the structure of vision, requiring its object
to stand across from the viewer—to occupy the position of Gegenstand [object or
thing].” J. David Velleman, “The Way of the Wanton,” from Practical Identity
and Narrative Agency, (eds.) Kim Watkins and Catriona, (Routledge, 2008, p.
1790. And see Nagel: “This step back, this opening of a slight space between
inclination and decision, is he condition that permits the operation of reason…”
Thomas Nagel, The Last Word, (Oxford, 1997), p. 109. I will examine these, and
additional characterizations of such “space,” as we proceed.
6
The terms I (no quotation marks), “I”, “me,” self, and person will be put to
various uses over the course of this thesis. In Section 2.3, I will offer a more
concise explication of these terms. For the time being, I ask the reader to
recognize the term I, without quotation marks, as signifying the “human being” I
am (the public, human, individual named Jon Rosen). When I am referring to the
Jamesian reflective “I,” I will use quotation marks.
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do not self-consciously reflect on, or evaluate, myself. Once I take the backward
step, however, I can view myself from a distance, just as I view objects in the
world, and—so the Rationalist tells us—I can thereby acquire a good deal of
knowledge about my empirical self, just as I can acquire a good deal of
knowledge about objects in the world. Second, the capacity for “deep”7 agency or
autonomy. When I am unreflectively engaged in worldly affairs and am not
considering my motives or my reasons for action, my behavior largely will be
regulated by a complex of forces at work in or on me, just as the behavior of a
young child or a non-human animal is regulated by such forces. When, however, I
take the backward step, I can self-consciously reflect8 upon my desires and beliefs
and decide whether such desires or beliefs are worth having for reasons I can
endorse, and I can amend or even produce new beliefs or desires. Once I have
thus either produced a new belief or desire, or amended or endorsed an existing
belief or desire, I will have thereby taken charge of or assumed ownership of it,
such that my subsequent actions will flow from and be attributable to me. Third,
the capacity for self-composition or self-improvement. Before I have reflected
upon myself, I will possess little understanding of what kind of person I am, what
my personal attributes are, how they hold together, or what I am capable of. I
may, for example, associate myself with a vague and fluctuating set of attributes:
“I am fairly intelligent, lazy, compassionate, and selfish, etc.” Yet, once I reflect
on myself, not only can I achieve a better grasp of my nature, but, fortified with
7

I take the “deep” qualification from Korsgaard (2009, p. 19-20) and will
elaborate on it in Chapter 5.
8
I specify “self-consciously” reflect because I do not rule out the possibility that
one can reflect un-self-consciously—that is, that one can reflect on oneself
without knowing one is even doing so.
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this knowledge, I can take steps to improve myself. I can, for example, cultivate
features I approve of or minimize those I dislike and I can better coordinate or
integrate such elements and, in this way, gradually transform myself into the kind
of person I wish to be.
The aspiration to achieve and exercise such self-oriented powers should not
strike one as exotic or mysterious. Anyone who has sat on a psychologist’s
couch, who has asked himself “Why do I feel like this?” or “Why did I behave
like that?”—who has tried to curb a habit or otherwise alter his behavior or
character, has wished to exercise such powers. Indeed, the overwhelming appeal
of the modern self-empowerment movement rests on the assumption that such
powers are readily available to us.9 Yet one may wonder to what extent such
powers actually exist. And in virtue of what exactly does the assumption of
reflective distance afford us access to them?
These questions will constitute the primary subject of this thesis. But here, in
broad outline, is the Rationalist picture I will develop and, in large part, refute.
Let us start with Kant, who tells us: “The fact that the human being can have the
“I” in his representations [i.e., is self-conscious] raises him infinitely above all
9

See Guignon: “Self-help and human potential movements reinforce the faith in
control […] by pressuring individuals to take control of their own lives through
self-inspection, self-surveillance, and self-assertion” (2004, p. 166). This sort of
mentality stands out with exceptional vividness in the work of leading self-help
guru, Tony Robins, who reports that “using the power of decision gives you the
capacity to get past any excuse to change any and every part of your life in an
instant. It can change your relationships, your working environment, your level
of physical fitness, your income, and your emotional states. It can determine
whether you’re happy or sad, whether you’re frustrated or excited, enslaved by
circumstances, or expressing your freedom. It’s the source of change within an
individual, a family, a community, a society, our world. […] In a moment you can
seize the same power that has shaped history.” Anthony Robins, Awakening the
Giant Within (Free Press, 2007), p. 35.
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other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person […] i.e., through rank
and dignity an entirely different being from things, such as irrational animals…”10
That is to say, for Kant, our capacity to represent ourselves—to regard ourselves
as an “I,” renders us not only superior to or “above” crude things (the set of which
includes “irrational animals”), but infinitely above them, such that the difference
must be understood not as a matter of degree but of kind. That is, by way of selfconsciousness, a new entity—a “person”—springs into being, and persons, unlike
all other things and irrational creatures, possess dignity and are worthy of respect.
Indeed, according to the Rationalist view, the assumption of self-conscious
personhood endows human beings with a set of capacities or powers that are
unavailable to mere things and irrational animals. Thus, Korsgaard tells us:
(1) A non-human animal acts on what I call ‘instinct.’ Her instincts
are her principles, and they constitute her will. […] You are not so
lucky. As a rational agent, you are aware of the grounds of your
beliefs and actions—or, I should say, the potential grounds. For
being aware of them gives you some distance from them and puts
you in control. Self-consciousness divides you into two parts, or
three, or any number of parts you like… [And] now you must pull
yourself together by making a choice.11
(2) Our capacity to turn our attention on to our own mental
activities is also a capacity to distance ourselves from them. I
perceive, and I find myself with a powerful impulse to believe. But
I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain
distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a
problem. Shall I believe? Is this perception really a reason to
believe? I desire and I find myself with a powerful impulse to act.
But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a

10

Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Robert Louden
(ed.), (Cambridge University Press, 2006) p. 15, §127.
11
Christine Korsgaard, Self-Constitution Agency, Identity, and Integrity, (Oxford
University Press, 2009), p. 212-213.
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certain distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I
have a problem.”12
On Korsgaard’s account, a non-human animal’s behavior is unreflectively
regulated by its instincts, is, as she puts it, “normatively loaded”13. But we human
beings are “not so lucky.” Rather, by means of my capacity for self-consciousness
I can become aware of my instincts and “mental activities”. Insofar as I have
become conscious of my instincts and mental activities, I will have assumed a
reflective “distance” with respect to them. In virtue of having achieved this
distance, my instincts and mental activities cannot compel me to act or to believe.
Rather, I will have assumed power over them, such that I can determine whether
they are worthy of endorsing or following up on in virtue of my reasons.14 As
Nagel puts it, “One is suddenly in the position of judging what one ought to do,
against the background of all one’s desires and beliefs, in a way that does not
merely flow from those desires and beliefs but operates on them” (1997, p. 110,
emphasis mine). That is, having assumed a reflective stance, the outcome of my
deliberations will ostensibly not flow from or be determined by “the background”
of my existing desires and beliefs; rather, I will bring about or author my
deliberative conclusion in virtue of my own self-legislative authority. Velleman,
similarly, tells us:
[T]he agent’s role cannot be played by any mental states or events
whose behavioral influence might come up for review in practical
12

Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), p. 93, italics mine. (Henceforth: SN or 1996b)
13
Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008), p. 3-4.
14
See also Korsgaard (1996, p. 100): “When you deliberate, it is as if there were
something over and above all of your desires, something which is you, and which
chooses which desire to act on” (emphasis hers).
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thought at any level. And the reason why it cannot be played by
anything that might undergo the process of critical review is
precisely that it must be played by whatever directs that process.
The agent, in his capacity as agent, is that party who is always
behind, and never solely in front of the lens of critical reflection,
no matter where in the hierarchy of motives it turns.15
Like Korsgaard and Nagel, Velleman regards the role of the reflective agent as
something that “cannot be played by” our mental states or events (at least those
that one can subject to review); rather, the agent himself must stand behind and
direct such mental states and events. Finally, consider Moran, who baldly
proclaims that:

“[A] non-empirical or transcendental relation to the self is

ineliminable.”16
The general idea, according to the Rationalist Story, might thus be
summarized as follows. My empirical self may be defined and constrained by a
set of conditions built into, or extending from, its nature. However, when I
assume a self-conscious, reflective stance with respect to my empirical nature, a
distance opens up between the subjective “I” and the empirical “me”. This
distance to some degree both exempts the “I” from the conditions that define and
constrain the “me” and affords the “I” a unique set of epistemic, agential, and
constitutional powers that it can exercise with respect to the “me”. Indeed,
according to Korsgaard, once I have fully deployed such powers, I can assume
15

David Velleman, “What Happens When Someone Acts” from The Possibility of
Practical Reason (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 139, italics mine.
16
Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement (Princeton University Press,
2001), p. 90. See, again, Nagel: “The objective self functions independently
enough to have a life of its own. It engages in various forms of detachment from
and opposition to the rest of us, and is capable of autonomous development. […]
[I]t places us both inside and outside he world, and offers us possibilities of
transcendence which in turn create problems of reintegration.” Thomas Nagel,
The View From Nowhere (Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 65-66.
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complete possession and control of myself, such that I will be, “entirely selfgoverned, so that all of [my] actions, in every circumstance of [my] life, are really
and fully [my] own: never merely the manifestations of forces at work in [me] or
on [me]…. [I will have become] completely self possessed…”17
Again, it is easy to appreciate the seductive appeal of such a model of
consummate, captain-like, self-possession. To begin with, such an account seems
to track our own phenomenology: it really feels like we can “get a-hold of
ourselves,” “collect ourselves,” and “direct ourselves.” Moreover, the
achievement of such a state would appear to be of enormous practical value—
would allay one’s fears of, for example, being mystified or surprised by one’s
own behavior, succumbing to unwelcome temptation, or being helplessly plagued
by undesired personal desires or beliefs. Indeed, being the self-reflective, socially
conscious, self-judging creatures we are, perhaps we cannot help but aspire to
some version of Korsgaard’s ideal of self-possession. Yet in the following
chapters, I will argue that such a longed-for ideal of self-possession is not only
metaphysically implausible and therefore untenable,18 but that one’s efforts to
achieve it are often self-undermining and that the practical and ethical
ramifications of such an ambition are, in many respects, unwholesome.
I will proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, invoking the work of James and
Sartre, I will more fully flesh out the “Rationalist” or “Captain of Crew” model of
17

Christine Korsgaard, “Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant,” The
Journal of Ethics (1999), 3: 1-29, p. 22. Note that Korsgaard does not employ the
“I,” “me” terminology, but the suggestion in the quoted passage is that the “I” of
self-reflection will have taken full possession of all the attributes of the “me.”
18
Or, to invoke Blackburn’s less amicable characterization—such an ideal is a
“romantic, existentialist fancy.” See Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions, (Oxford
University Press, 1998), p. 257 and p. 260.
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the self, and, in doing so, spell out the ostensive roles played by the “I” and the
“me” with respect to the collective or corporate “self.” In presenting this model, I
will introduce and characterize the putative unilateral influence that the reflective
“I” can exercise with respect to the facts of the empirical “me”. I will conclude
this chapter with an analysis of the various self-referential terms to be employed
over the course of the thesis, and briefly review some of the interpretive
difficulties to which these terms inevitably give rise. In Chapters 3-5, I will
challenge Part (4) of the Rationalist Story; that is, I will challenge the notion that
reflective distance affords us the aforementioned set of epistemic, agential, and
self-compositional powers. Note, importantly, that while I will defend the thesis
that our capacity for self-consciousness does afford the reflective “I,” as
provisionally understood, such powers, the nature and extent of such powers will
in every case be constrained and conditioned by the facts of the “me”. As such, I
will argue that, when correctly understood, the “I” never acts “on,” or “over” the
“me.” Rather, the operations of the “I” should be understood as expressions or
products of the facts of the “me”. This will lead in Chapter 6 to an all-out
repudiation of the Rationalist, Captain-of-Crew model of the self and a discussion
of what I regard as a far-more-plausible, Humean, “Holistic,” or, what I shall call,
“Crew-of-Captains” model, where the “I” and the “me” should be understood not
as two distinct entities, but rather as two aspects of one “corporate” entity.
Finally, in Chapters 7 and 8, I will address some of the metaphysical and ethical
merits of the Holistic model of the self. That is, I will suggest that the Holistic
model offers an account of the self and of human behavior that makes much more
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metaphysical sense and I will suggest that the Holistic model also allows for a
more accommodative, compassionate and wholesome view of human nature.
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CHAPTER 2
THE RATIONALIST MODEL OF THE SELF: ME, MYSELF AND I

2.1 James and Sartre
A helpful entry point to the Rationalist, or the “Captain-of-Crew” model of the
self will be William James’ characterization of what he elsewhere calls the
“Duplex Self.”19
We may sum up by saying that personality implies the incessant
presence of two elements, an objective person, known by a passing
subjective Thought and recognized as continuing in time.
Hereafter let us use the words ME and I for the empirical person
and the judging Thought. (1918, p. 371, emphasis his)
James’ self can thus be understood in terms of these two elements, the “I” and
the “me” (I shall express the latter in lower-case). The “I” he associates with the
“thinker,” the “subject” of thought, or “pure ego,” which, he tells us “at every
moment is conscious” (2001, p. 62, italics his). The “me,” or “empirical ego,” on
the other hand, is the object of thought, that is, the part of the self of which the
“I” is, or can be, conscious. As James puts it: “In its widest possible sense […] a
man’s Me is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his
psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his
ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses and yacht
and bank account” (2001, p. 44, emphasis his). While the “I” is the thinker and
the observer of the “me,” it is also involved in “attending to” and “appropriating”
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aspects of the “me”—remembering certain elements, caring for them and letting
go of those elements for which it no longer cares. (2001, p. 82)
Let us now turn to Sartre’s account of the self, which in many respects
resembles James’ construal but will more closely approximate the full-blown
Rationalist or “Captain of Crew” model that will be the target of my critique.20
Like James, Sartre divides the self into third and first-personal, aspects. On the
third-personal front, Sartre offers the “factical” aspect, what he calls the “initself”. This factical aspect, like James’ “me,” is composed of one’s facts—
characteristics, dispositions, past actions—items whose being, as he puts it, “is
full of itself.”21 On the first-personal front, Sartre offers his version of the “I,”
what he calls the “for-itself,” that “transcends” the facts and, as such, can never be
identical to or “coincide with” such facts22. Further, like James’ “I,” Sartre’s
transcendental element can attend to and appropriate the facts of “me”. But
Sartre’s “I” can exercise a more robust agency with respect to the “me” than
20

The following review does not pretend to do justice to the complexity and
nuance of Sartre’s treatment. It is only intended to present, in broad outline,
Sartre’s two central aspects of the self. Note also that Sartre does not strictly
employ the terms “I” and “me,” as James does, to refer to the different aspects of
the self, but I believe these terms can be innocently imported.
21
“The in-itself is full of itself, and no more total plenitude can be imagined, no
more perfect equivalence of content to container. There is not the slightest
emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack through which nothingness might slip in.”
(Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre, Hazel E. Barnes
(trans. and intro.), (Washington Square Press: New York, 1956), p. 120-121.
22
See, for example, Sartre’s treatment of the paederast in his discussion of “bad
faith.” “He would be right actually if he understood the phrase ‘I am not a
paederast’ in the sense of ‘I am not what I am.’ That is, if he declared to himself,
‘To the extent that a pattern of conduct is defined as the conduct of a paederast
and to the extent that I have adopted this conduct, I am a paederast. But to the
extent that human reality can not be finally defined by patterns of conduct I am
not one’” (Sartre, 1956, p. 108). Here, “patterns” of conduct may be understood as
elements of one’s facticity.
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James allows23. That is, Sartre’s “I” can establish the correct interpretation of the
facts of the “me,” it can alter the present facts of the “me” and it can determine
the future facts of the “me”. As Sartre puts it: “It is I, always I, according to the
ends by which I illuminate these past events. Thus all my past is there pressing,
urgent, imperious, but its meaning and the orders which it gives me I choose by
the very project of my end” (1956, p. 640).

Indeed, Sartre’s for-itself can

unilaterally influence the facts of the “me”. That is to say, Sartre’s “I” can
influence the “me” in ways that are not conditioned or governed by the facts of
the “me.”

2.2 On The Nature of Unilateral Influence
Indeed, I regard such putative unilateral influence—that is, the possibility that
the “I” can influence the “me” in ways that are not attributable the facts of the
“me”— as the cornerstone of the Rationalist position. For this reason, I will need
to spend a little time clarifying the idea, both its nature and its particular
relevance to the Rationalist position.
Recall, first, how Velleman characterizes the agent as “that party who is
always behind, and never solely in front of the lens of critical reflection, no matter
where in the hierarchy of motives it turns.” Or recall Nagel’s assertion that the
agent’s deliberation can proceed in a way that “does not merely flow from [one’s]
desires and beliefs but operates on them.” Or, again, as Sartre has said: “It is I,
23

James asserts that the “I” can “fix its attention” on a particular thought and in
this way influence the course and therefore the outcome of thought, but he does
not appear to attribute to the “I” the kind of productive or interpretive agency
Sartre endorses. See James (2001), p. 82.
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always I, according to the ends by which I illuminate these past events. Thus all
my past is there pressing, urgent, imperious, but its meaning and the orders which
it gives me I choose by the very project of my end”. Or, finally, as Moran puts it:
“[A] non-empirical or transcendental relation to the self is ineliminable.” As such,
on the Rationalist account, the behavior of the “I,” at least in some respects,
should not be understood as a product or expression of the facts of the “me”—not
as something that “flows” or “derives” from the “me”. Rather, the “I,” at least in
some respects, should be regarded as a director or author of such facts, the
monarchic agent who autonomously operates on or over such facts.
But what might it mean, precisely, for the “I” to exert such unilateral
influence over the “me”? That is to say, what conditions must be satisfied such
that behavior of the “I” with respect to the “me” can be characterized accurately
as “unilateral”? To properly understand the question, let us put it more generally,
viz: What conditions must be satisfied such that it can be truly said of any x that
it exerts unilateral influence over any y? Here it may be helpful to make us of a
familiar illustration. Take two billiard balls, x and y. And imagine billiard ball x
rolling across the table and striking ball y. We can easily observe24 the causal
influence that x will exert on y; that is, on force of impact, y will rebound away
from x. More than this, the causal force that x brings to bear on y will not derive
from y. That is to say, the force of x—understood as the product of its
acceleration and mass—exists independently of y.25 To better see this, note that

24

Humean reservations notwithstanding.
Granted, the extent to which and the manner in which y responds to the impact
of x will depend on various features of y including its own state of motion and

25
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we could remove y from the picture and substitute ball z, without in any way
altering the set of causal powers x brings to bear. I suggest, thus, to the extent
that the causal powers of x do not derive from y, that x will exercise a unilateral
causal influence upon y.
We may therefore characterize such unilateral causal influence as follows:
Unilateral Causal Influence: For any x and y, x exercises unilateral
causal influence upon y insofar as the causal powers x bring to bear
on y do not derive from y.
We are now better positioned to understand what I believe the Rationalist will
need to demonstrate in order to successfully argue that the “I” can exert unilateral
influence upon “me.” That is, the Rationalist will need to show that the “I” can in
fact influence the “me” in some way that is not altogether attributable to the facts
of the “me”. For, if the behavior of the “I” were wholly attributable to, or
conditioned by, the facts of the “me,”—if, as Nagel expressed it, the behavior of
the “I” entirely flowed from the “me”—then the behavior of the “I” would just
constitute a further expression or product of such forces, not a response to or
reaction against such forces.
Such is the Rationalist’s challenge, as I see it. And in the proceeding chapters I
will explore a number of accounts that purport to demonstrate such unilateral
influence. All of these Rationalist accounts will, I admit, powerfully capture our
phenomenology and will for this reason boast great intuitive appeal. In spite of
this, I will argue that, in every instance, the powers of the “I” flow entirely from
and are entirely conditioned by the “me”. As such, I will argue that (1) the “I”
material constitution, but, again, the set of causal powers x brings to bear on y
will not derive from y.
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does not exercise unilateral powers with respect to the “me,” and, further, (2) the
“I” and the “me” should not be regarded as ontologically distinct.

2.3 Initial Clarification of Self-Referring Terms
Before proceeding, it will be necessary to shed some clarifying light on the
set of self-referential terms that will be employed over the course of this
dissertation. Note: I underscore that this will only constitute an initial
clarification—and I cannot emphasize this strongly enough—for, as we proceed,
the meanings of these terms will undergo continuous exploration and refinement,
and, even after the most thorough analysis, the precise definitive boundaries of
these terms will—of necessity, I shall argue—remain obscure and porous.
Indeed, a central aim of this thesis will consist in showing why the definitions of
these terms cannot be satisfactorily demarcated. Nonetheless, I hope that the
following analysis will help alleviate some confusion.

Person and “Person”: I will use the term person or persons (no quotation marks)
primarily to designate human beings, that is, to designate concrete human people.
For example, I may point into a petting zoo populated by a number of pigs,
donkeys, sheep and human visitors and ask, “How many persons are in the zoo?”
If one human being occupied the zoo, the appropriate answer would be: “There is
one person in the zoo.” Now, I will also employ the term “person” (with
quotations) in the Kantian, Rationalist sense to pick out the subject that comes
into being via self-consciousness, that is, the self-regarding, self-reflecting,
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agential “I”.26 As such, to return to our petting zoo, let us assume that one human
occupant were to suddenly die. Under such conditions, assuming, as I will, that a
functioning brain is a precondition for self-consciousness, the petting zoo would
still contain one person, but it would not contain a “person”.

Self: I will understand the word self to refer to the Jamesian or Sartrean complex
of the self-reflecting “I” and the personal, factical features that the “I” has
observed or can observe, the set of which comprises the “me”. Let us call this
complex a “psychological field.” Thus, if you were to ask me to “describe my
self,” I would offer a list of all the attributes of this field I can consciously
recognize, one of which is the fact that “I” observe them. Note, importantly, that
the existence of my self is thus contingent on the existence of the self-reflecting
“I” which observes this self. Thus, insofar as the existence of a reflecting “I” is
contingent upon a living brain, a brain-dead person would lack a self.27
26

Again, we have seen this account put forward by Kant, but see also Locke who
defines a person as “a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection,
and can consider it self as it self the same thinking thing in different times and
places.” (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (ed.) P. Nidditch (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 335) And Korsgaard: “The identity of a person, of an
agent, is not the same as the identity of the human animal on whom the person
normally supervenes” (2009, p. 19, and see also Korsgaard, 1996b, p. 102). See
also Frankfurt: “To be a person, as distinct from simply a human organism,
requires a complex volitional structure involving reflective self-evaluation.” “The
Faintest Passion,” Necessity, Volition and Love (Cambridge University Press,
1999) p. 138. And see a similar account in Lynne Rudder Baker, Naturalism And
The First-Person Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 147-156.
27
So as not to bog down here, I will abstain from an exploration of the differences
between “selves” and “persons”. Though distinctions could be drawn, they would
probably serve to confuse rather than clarify, and not much will turn on this
distinction in my discussion. For an interesting treatment of such a distinction, see
Velleman: “Identification and Identity” from Contours of Agency, Essays on
Themes from Harry Frankfurt. (eds.) Sarah Buss and Lee Overton, (MIT Press,
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Me and “me”: The term me (without quotations) shall be used in the traditional
sense, to pick out either the passive subject of my experience, e.g., “things
happen to me,” or my concrete human personhood: “the person in the picture is
me”. As discussed above, I will also employ the technical, quote-enclosed term
“me” to refer to the entire set of my facts of which “I” can become conscious—
my physical size, my past actions, my attitudes, relationships, etc.

Proper Names and “Proper Names”: Note that proper names, e.g., Jon (no
quotes) will be used, generally, to refer to objective human persons, e.g., “The
lost wallet belongs to Jon,” or “The person in the photo is Jon.” Note, however,
that when it becomes important to specify a self-reflective “person,” I will
enclose the proper name in quotations. So, we might encounter the sentence:
“Forced to decide which career to pursue, “Jon” asked himself which made the
most sense.” Or, “Jon was absentmindedly walking down the street when it
suddenly struck him that he might have hurt his wife’s feelings at breakfast.
Why, “Jon” asked himself, did he have to be such a jerk?”

I and “I”: Finally, the terms I (no quotes), and the term “I” (quotes), will perhaps
pose the greatest definitional challenge, so I emphasize the chiefly prefatory
status of this analysis.
2002), p. 111. See also Velleman’s discussion in “Self-to-Self,” Self to Self,
Selected Essays, (Cambridge, 2006). And see Catriona Mackenzie, “Bare
Personhood? Velleman on Selfhood,” Philosophical Explorations, Vol. 10, No. 3,
September 2007.
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Thus far I have primarily discussed the Jamesian “I” as that which signifies
the subjective, agential locus of self-consciousness, that which observes and
otherwise attends to the facts of the “me”. But we also employ the term I (no
quotations) to identify our objective human personhood; that is, we use the term
to pick out the objective factive human being that we know ourselves to be.28 To
better see this, notice that someone may present a photograph of the petting zoo
and point to the human person with thinning red hair and ask, “Who is that
person in the petting zoo?” Now, I will examine the photograph and respond: “I
am that person,” where the term I is meant to pick out Jon Rosen, the objective
human person standing among the pigs and the geese. Yet notice that I could
have just as easily responded to the question as follows: “The person in the
photograph is me—where, again, the terms me or “me” will also pick out the
observable factual human creature, Jon Rosen. As such, in this case, the terms I,
and me/”me”, will refer to the very same objective creature. Yet notice,
critically, that my very recognition of such facts that [“I am that person”] and
[“That person is me/“me,””] must involve an act of self-conscious selfrecognition. For, I, Jon Rosen, the human being, cannot recognize that the human
being in the photograph is me/“me” unless “I” recognize that the image in the
28

See Strawson: “[W]hen I think and talk about myself, my reference sometimes
extends only to the self that I am, and sometimes it extends further out, to the
human being that I am.” Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary
Metaphysics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), p. 31. See also Liu’s articulation
of this problem: “In self awareness or self-knowledge, both uses [of the I] seem to
be present. “I believe that I am the tallest person in the class”; “I know that I am
not sad about her departure.” How can there be two selves indicated in these selfreports, or is it just one self who knows, perceives, thinks about or is aware of, the
same self? How can the self be both the knower and the known?” JeeLoo Liu and
John Perry (eds.) Consciousness and the Self, New Essays (Cambridge, 2012), p.
3.
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photograph corresponds to a set of facts with which “I” self-identify. As such,
my active employment of both pronouns I and me/”me” to designate my
objective identity will reflexively implicate the subjective, self-identifying “I”.
Or, to put the matter a bit differently, my recognition of my objective existence
as me necessarily implicates my recognition of my subjective-reflective
existence as “I”.29
As such, our terminological boundaries have already begun to blur. Yet this,
as I suggested above, and will go on to argue, is exactly what is to be expected.
Indeed, in the proceeding chapters I will explore a series of accounts where, on
the Rationalist view, the self-reflective “I,” operating as the agential subject of
self-consciousness, is understood to unilaterally influence the facts of the “me”.
In each case, I will argue that the Rationalist mischaracterizes what is actually
going on. That is, in each case I will argue that the behavior of the “I” is entirely
conditioned by the facts of the “me,” and, as such, that we cannot truthfully
speak of the “I” unilaterally influencing the facts of the “me”. Indeed, as I shall
eventually—if perhaps not as successfully—argue, the “I” and the “me” should
not be regarded as distinct entities, at all.

29

See John Perry’s wonderful elaboration on this tricky and fascinating point in
“The Problem of the Essential Indexical,” Nous, Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 1979), pp.
3-21.
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CHAPTER 3
SELF-KNOWLEDGE

3.1 Introduction
“I must first know myself,” Socrates tells us, “as the Delphian inscription says;
to be curious about that which is not my concern, while I am still in ignorance of
my own self, would be ridiculous.”30 Socrates maintained that self-knowledge
was of supreme importance because without it one could not cultivate a good soul
or lead a virtuous life. Perhaps our contemporary interest in self-knowledge is not
as virtue-oriented. As Guignon puts it, we seek self-knowledge today not as much
in the service of goodness or honor, but in order to achieve the dignity of
becoming bounded, masterful, and autonomous. In either case, we regard selfknowledge as a requirement on becoming the type of person we wish to be and
for living the kind of life we wish to live.
Luckily, we are not hopelessly in the dark about ourselves.31 Indeed, some
philosophers have suggested that when it comes to self-knowledge—as compared,
30

Plato, Phaedrus, from Selected Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett
(Modern Library Classics, 2001), 230 a-b.
31
Contrary to views expressed by, for example, Nietzsche: “And so we
necessarily remain a mystery to ourselves, we fail to understand ourselves, we are
bound to mistake ourselves. Our eternal sentence reads: ‘Everyone is furthest
from himself’—of ourselves, we have no knowledge.” Nietzsche, Genealogy of
Morals, (Oxford University Press, 2009) p. 5. And Camus: “For if I try to seize
this self of which I feel sure, if I try to define and to summarize it, it is nothing but
water slipping through my fingers. I can sketch one by one all the aspects it is
able to assume, all those likewise that have been attributed to it, this upbringing,
this origin, this ardor or these silences, this nobility or this vileness. But aspects
cannot be added up. This very heart which is mine will forever remain
indefinable to me.” Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays (trans.
and ed.) Justin O’Brien (New York: Vintage, 1983), p. 19.
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for example, to knowledge of the outside world—we enjoy infallibility. Consider
Descartes, for example, who “affirm[s] with certainty that there can be nothing
within [him] of which [he is] not in some way aware.”32 Or Rousseau, who
declares:
I have but one faithful guide on which I can depend: this is the
chain of sentiments by which the succession of my existence has
been marked, and by these the events which have been either the
cause or the effect of the manner of it. […]. I may omit facts,
transpose events, and fall into some errors of dates; but I cannot be
deceived in what I have felt, nor in that which from sentiment I
have done that have marked the development of my being.33
And Mill tells us that, “with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the
most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing
those that can be possessed by anyone else.”34
Of course such rosy assessments of introspective transparency have fallen out
of popular favor. Freud’s investigations into the unconscious cast a sobering light
on our prospects for self-knowledge35 and a surfeit of empirical studies testifies to
32

Rene Descartes, First Reply to Objections, from The Philosophical Writings of
Descartes Vol. II, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch,
(Cambridge University Press, 1985) p. 77 (107). Though, Descartes appears to
have had some reservations: “[M]any people do not know what they believe,
since believing something and knowing that one believes it are different acts of
thinking, and the one often occurs without the other.” Discourse on the Method
from The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Vol. II, (trans.) John Cottingham,
Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, (Cambridge U. Press, 1985), p. 122 (23).
33
Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Confession of Jean Jacques Rousseau Vol. 1
(London: Privately Printed for Members of the Aldus Society), Book VII, found
in Guignon, (2004) p. 68.
34
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: W. Parker and Son, West Strand, 1859),
Section (IV.4), p. 137.
35
See, for example, Freud: “The unconscious is the larger circle which includes
within itself the smaller circle of the conscious. […] [T]the unconscious is the real
psychic; its inner nature is just as unknown to us as the reality of the external
world, and it is just as imperfectly reported to us through the data of the
consciousness as is the external world through the indications of our sensory
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the fact that our access to the workings of our own minds is neither as immediate
nor as trustworthy as we might like or expect. Nonetheless, we generally sustain a
sanguine optimism with respect to our capacity for self-understanding. And,
indeed, such optimism is at least partly well founded. For, insofar as we are selfconscious, we at least possess access to a kind of knowledge that, by definition,
un-self-conscious creatures are denied. Nonetheless, in this chapter, I will make
the case that the alleged epistemic powers and privileges of the reflective “I” are
far less robust than our optimism warrants. Indeed, I will argue that the “I” (1)
Overestimates the accuracy with which it can identify the existing facts of “me”—
read such feelings, desires, or beliefs, so to speak, “off the page”; (2)
Overestimates the extent to which it can exercise “rational authority” in the
service of determining or “authoring” desires and beliefs; and (3) Overestimates
the extent to which the “I” can render true certain features of the “me” through
the act of “endorsing” or “identifying” with them. In each case, I will argue that
the epistemic powers that the “I” brings to bear on self-analysis are pervasively
influenced by the facts of the “me.”

3.2 On Reading Off The Page: The Accuracy of Self-Directed Attention
We are fortunate to be endowed with perceptual mechanisms that deliver
reliably accurate readings of the external world. If this were not the case, we
would be incapable of successfully navigating the external world: we would bump
into objects we were not seeing correctly, would consistently fail to pick up on
organs.” Sigmund Freud, Dream Psychology: Psychoanalysis For Beginners,
(trans.) M.D. Eder, (intro.) Andrew Tridon, (New York: The James A. McCann
Company, 1920), p. 224, emphasis his.
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auditory cues, etc.36 Of course it sometimes happens that our impressions of the
external world are inaccurate or misleading. Suppose, on a brilliantly sunny day,
I see what resembles an odd-looking man standing at the side of the road. I focus
more attention on the object and I realize that this “man” is really just two tall
mailbox posts standing side-by-side. On such occasions, I am doubly grateful for
the reliable functioning of my perceptual mechanisms: not only are they generally
reliable, but, with a focusing of attention, these mechanisms reliably allow me to
overcome false impressions.37
Can we say the same for self-perception38? In many respects, it seems our selfperceptions are also reliably accurate. This must be the case, because otherwise
we would be strangers to ourselves: we would not be able to know when asked,
for example, whether we were thirsty or tired, happy or sad, or whether we
preferred country music over heavy-metal. As Timothy Wilson puts it: “It would
be extremely maladaptive to be confused about whether or not we feel pain when

36

Note that I’m making a very modest claim here. I am not suggesting that our
perceptual mechanisms always deliver reliable information, or that they render us
capable of understanding the “true nature” of the world, or even that such
mechanisms provide reason to believe that the external world is not a mirage or a
dream. I am simply making the uncontroversial claim that our ability to
successfully navigate the world (whatever it is), to pick up on sensory cues, to
identify objects, and so forth, is ensured by our reliably-functioning mechanisms
of perception.
37
I emphasize in most, but not all, cases. See, for example, the Muller-Lyer
illusion and others cases, where regardless of my increase in attention, or
alteration in perspective, I cannot overcome my misperception. A number of such
visual illusions are provided here: http://www.michaelbach.de/ot/.
38
In using the word “perception” here, I am not expressing any preference for a
particular theory of self-knowledge. I am employing the term only to express the
uncontroversial proposition that we are capable of achieving conscious access to,
i.e., “perceiving,” our own desires, beliefs and sensations.
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touching a hot stove or fear when confronted by a mugger in a dark alley.”39 Of
course, just as we can misperceive aspects of the external world, we can also
misperceive aspects of ourselves. We may, for example, misread a feeling we are
experiencing—perhaps envy for the achievement of a friend, or an inappropriate
romantic attraction. And yet, when we are in doubt about such things, we believe
we can “step back” and take a “good hard look” at ourselves and, in doing so,
reliably overcome such misperceptions, just as we can overcome misperceptions
of the external world.
The common-sense intuition that the mechanics of self-knowledge mirrors the
mechanics of object knowledge has been nicely expressed in what Silvia and
Gendolla40 call the Perceptual Accuracy Hypothesis (PAH)—a hypothesis with
which Silvia and Gendolla disagree but which they acknowledge as “the least
controversial issue in contemporary self-awareness research.”41 PAH makes two
principle claims. Claim (1): The more attention we give to an external object, the
better we come to see, and therefore to know, that object. Silvia and Gendolla
elaborate:

39

From “Strangers to Ourselves: The Origins and Accuracy of Beliefs about
One’s Own Mental States,” from Attribution: Basic Issues and Applications, (ed.)
John H Harvey and Gifford Weary (Academic Press: 1985).
40
See Paul J. Silvia and Guido H. E. Gendolla, “On Introspection and SelfPerception: Does Self-Focused Attention Enable Accurate Self-Knowledge?”
Review of General Psychology, (2001), Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 241-269.
41
Silvia and Gendolla, (2001), p. 242. Silvia and Gendolla cite T.S. Duvall and
R.A. Wicklund as early proponents of this view. See T.S. Duval and R. A.
Wicklund, A Theory of Objective Self-Awareness (New York: Academic Press,
1972). They trace the first explicit formulation of the view to, e.g., F.X. Gibbons,
C.S. Carver, M.F. Scheier, and S.E. Hormuth, “Self-focused attention and the
placebo effect: Fooling some of the people some of the time,” Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, (1979), 15, pp. 263-274.
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[A]ttention allows selective and detailed information about stimuli.
When attention is guided to an object, the object becomes figural
against the background of the perceptual field. Knowledge of the
object thus becomes more detailed and clarified, and the perception
of the object is consequently more accurate.42
Consider the mailbox example mentioned earlier. On first glace, I am pretty sure I
see a man standing on the side of the road. In order to verify the accuracy of my
perception, I take a closer look: I focus more attention on this odd-looking man.
The focusing of my attention further engages my perceptual mechanisms, thus
permitting them to pick up on more informative43 details, and causing the less
informative features to diminish or “recede” into the background. The second
claim made by the Perceptual Accuracy Hypothesis is, (2): Object perception and
self-perception are “dynamically identical.” That is to say, just as the focusing of
one’s attention on an external object renders one’s perceptual mechanisms better
able to make out informative features of that object, thus the focusing of our
introspective attention on our personal characteristics generally ensures that our
self-scanning mechanisms arrive at more accurate readings.
Yet as Silvia and Gendolla and other critics of PAH have pointed out, research
on introspection simply does not bear out this thesis. Indeed, critics of PAH cite
evidence demonstrating that, in a very wide range of cases, self-directed attention
not only fails to enable us to accurately identify our existing attitudes, but that it
42

Silvia and Gendolla, (2001), p. 242. Silvia and Gendolla speak specifically of
visual attention, but I see no reason why PAH wouldn’t extend to auditory or
olfactory attention, or any attention that has been focused for the purpose of
achieving a clear perception. For example, when I listen more closely to a poorly
recorded conversation, I can better make out what the voices are saying—the
static recedes into the “background” of my attention, and the distinct words loom
to the “surface”.
43
By “informative,” I mean, truth bearing, or veridical—that is to say, details that
will enable me to identify the actual nature of the object in question.
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can serve to reinforce false impressions, and even cause us to override more
accurate, spontaneous or unreflective assessments.44 Again, the evidence is quite
extensive, so I’ll just touch on some of the highlights. Consider, first, cases of
affective ignorance, that is, instances where we misread our own presently
occurring emotional states. True, we may not experience difficulty in identifying
instances of shock or horror. But we often fail to identify feelings such as envy,
anger, or arousal45 and we very commonly fail to identify more “background”
feelings of anxiety and depression which, as Haybron points out, are
“comparatively diaphanous, offering us not so much distinct objects within the
field of consciousness as alterations of the field itself, coloring the entirety of our
experience”.46 Consider also the extent to which people fail to acknowledge their
own racial prejudice. Implicit bias tests, for example, routinely disclose the
hidden or “automatic” biases that imperceptibly influence the judgments of self44

For a nice review of such studies, see Shelley E. Taylor and Jonathan D.
Brown, “Illusion and Well-Being: A social Psychological Perspective on Mental
Health.” Psychological Bulletin (1988), Vol. 103, No. 2, pp. 193-210. See also,
Richard E. Nisbett and Timothy DeCamp Wilson, “Telling More Than We Can
Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes,” Psychological Review, (1977),
May, Vol. 84, No. 3; For an interesting discussion of our phenomenology of sight
and thought, see Eric Schwitzgebel, “The Unreliability of Naïve Introspection”,
Philosophical Review, (2008) Vol. 117, No. 2. See also, Alison Gopnik “How We
Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality,”
from Alvin Goldman, ed., Readings In Philosophy & Cognitive Science, (MIT
Press, 1993), pp. 315-346.
45
See Eric Schwitzgebel (2008). See also a study done on the relationship
between homophobia and homosexual arousal: H.E., Adams, L.W.J. Wright, and
B.A. Lohr, “Is Homophobia Associated With Homosexual Arousal?” Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 105, 1996, 440-445.
46
Daniel M. Haybron, “Do We Know How Happy We Are? On Some Limits of
Affective Introspection and Recall,” NOUS 41:3 (2007), p. 398. Haybron cites
recent philosophical studies of mood including C. Armon-Jones, Varieties of
Affect, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), and P.E. Griffiths, What
Emotions Really Are, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
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proclaimed non-racist white subjects.47 Consider, further, studies that explore our
“misattribution” of feelings and preference, that is, both our failure to recognize
and our tendency to confabulate underlying causes of our feelings and
preferences. In one study, subjects were asked to rank four identical pairs of
stockings set on a shelf. Overwhelmingly, subjects displayed a preference for the
stockings set further to the right. When subjects were asked if the positioning of
the stockings influenced their preference, they vigorously denied it.48 Subjects
have also demonstrated a pervasive failure at recognizing changes in their
attitudes, an inability to recognize how they arrive at solutions to creative
problems, and an inability to recognize their propensity for “subjective
optimization” that is, the tendency to retrospectively re-construe or “paint”
disappointing circumstances as preferable or ideal.49
Of course, just as one can usually take a harder look at an object and thereby
overcome a misperception, one might therefore expect that the subjects of such
studies, when informed of the common susceptibility to such biases or causalmisattributions, could take a harder look at their own features and detect (and
thereby overcome) their errors. Yet, studies have shown that, even when so
informed, subjects not only routinely fail to detect their biases, but they
47

A variety of such tests are available on-line at Harvard’s “Project Implicit”:
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/aboutus.html. Wilson offers a nice summary
of these studies (2002), p. 188-194.
48
See Richard E. Nisbett and Timothy DeCamp Wilson, “Telling More Than We
Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes,” Psychological Review, Vol. 84,
No. 3 (1977), p. 243. See also the “Woman on the Bridge” experiment as
described in Donald G Duttan and Arthur P. Aron, “Some Evidence for
Heightened Sexual attraction Under conditions of High Anxiety.” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 30, no. 4 (1974): 510-17.
49
For a nice overview of the empirical data supporting these findings, see Nisbett
and Wilson (1977).
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strenuously continue to deny that their judgments have in any way been thus
influenced or undermined.50 That is to say, due to their “bias blind spots,” such
people’s biases often render them incapable of recognizing their own biases. As
Blackburn has put it: “We can compare the situation to looking at our own eyes in
a mirror. We might see that our eyes are cloudy; but if they are, it will be with
cloudy eyes that we see it.” (1998, p. 261)

3.2.1 On Distance and Objectivity
Why, as such studies indicate, does increased introspective attention
apparently fail to yield the epistemic advantage we expect it should? For insight
into the question, let us return to the Rationalist Story, and consider some
foundational assumptions that I suggest underlie our confidence in the proposition
that self-directed attention should afford such an advantage. First, consider
Velleman’s assertion that
consciousness just seems to open a gulf between subject and
object, even when its object is the subject himself. Consciousness
seems to have the structure of vision, requiring its object to stand
across from the viewer—to occupy the position of Gegenstand
[object or thing] (2008, p. 179).51
In order to see something with our physical eye, Velleman explains, the object of
sight must stand “across from” the eye. Likewise, in order for something to
become an object of our “inner-vision” this object will need to stand before the

50

See Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin and Lee Ross, “The Bias Blind Spot:
Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others,” Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, (2002) March, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 369-381.
51
J. David Velleman, “The Way of the Wanton,” from Practical Identity and
Narrative Agency, (eds.) Kim Watkins and Catriona, (Routledge, 2008), p. 179.
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introspective eye.52 Now notice how Korsgaard builds on these themes of distance
and objectivity. Recall the passage quoted above:
Our capacity to turn our attention on to our own mental activities is
also a capacity to distance ourselves from them. I perceive, and I
find myself with a powerful impulse to believe. But I back up and
bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance.
Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem.
Shall I believe?
Like Velleman, Korsgaard asserts that our very capacity to attend to our mental
activities requires that a “distance” open up between the viewer and her mental
activities. Indeed, on Korsgaard’s account, this distance not only allows us to
bring our mental activities into view, but it allows us to view them with a certain
detachment, such that they no longer “dominate” us. The suggestion is that,
absent such distance, nothing would stand in the way of our impulses dictating
our beliefs or actions, just as they dictate an irrational animal’s beliefs and
behaviors53. Finally, consider how Nagel further amplifies this notion of distance
and objectivity. He asks:
How do I abstract the objective self from the person TN? By
treating the individual experiences of that person [himself, TN] as
data for the construction of an objective picture. I throw TN into
the world as a thing that interacts with the rest of it, and ask what
the world must be like from no point of view in order to appear to
him as it does from his point of view. For this purpose my special
link with TN is irrelevant. Though I receive the information of his
point of view directly, I try to deal with it for the purpose of
constructing an objective picture just as I would if the information
were coming to me indirectly. […] [I]n a general way, I try to do
with his perspective on the world what I could do if information
52

Here I take Velleman to be making a conceptual claim: that is, no x can
perceive a y if no distance stands between an x or a y, for if no distance stood
between an x and a y, x could not achieve a perspective from which it could
perceive y.
53
Recall, as Korsgaard puts it, an animal’s impulses or instincts are “normatively
loaded” (2008, p. 3-4).
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about it were reaching me from thousands of miles away not
pumped directly into my sensorium but known from outside.54
In order to see himself objectively, as a “thing,” Nagel “throws himself into the
world”. Once he has done so, Nagel’s “special link” with TN will have become
“irrelevant,” such that TN’s experiences will not be “pumped directly into [TN’s]
sensorium,” but will come to him in the form of impersonal “data” from
“thousands of miles away,” or, as he puts it from the “outside”. Indeed, from such
an “outside” perspective, as Silvia and Gendolla have put it, “[t]he self is viewed
from the perspective of an actual, hypothetical, or generalized other. The self is
seen as an object in the world distinct from others, an object with boundaries,
fixed properties and the capacity to be controlled” (2001, p. 243, emphasis mine).
Thus, just as increased attention reliably allows us to better make out the defining
boundaries and detect the veridical details of external objects—thus do we expect
that our ability to view ourselves from a distance, to “throw ourselves into the
world,” should allow us to achieve a more accurate and objective perspective on
ourselves. Yet, given the abovementioned empirical evidence, it is clear that the
taking of a backward step does not yield more accurate introspective knowledge
anywhere near as commonly as object knowledge. What has gone wrong? For
insight into the matter, it will be helpful to review some common sources of
distortion, both non-motivational and motivational.

54

Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford University Press, 1986), p.
62, emphasis mine.
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3.2.2 Sources of Distortion – Non-Motivational and Motivational
Consider, first, non-motivational aspects of our psychology. Recall again
Haybron’s characterization of the influence of our moods, suggesting that they
alter the entire field of our consciousness, and, as such, fail to constitute “distinct
objects” that can be located within the field (2007, p. 398). A background,
unrecognized feeling of malaise, for example, can “sour one’s experience far
more than the sharper and more pronounced ache that persists after having
stubbed one’s toe” (2007, p. 398). Indeed, studies indicate that subjects suffering
from depression are far more inclined than non-depressed people to negatively
interpret life events and to retrieve and focus on negative memories in order to
explain their present trauma or to justify pessimistic predictions.55 Further, take
what Cassam calls one’s “intellectual character,” that is, peculiarities of one’s
intellectual constitution—gullibility, carelessness, or inclinations to detect
patterns—that can undetectably corrupt one’s perspective.56 Or consider broad
psychological pathologies. Take someone who suffers from paranoia—let’s call
her Susan—who believes she herself can do no wrong, and that anyone who

55

Sonja Lyubormirsky, Nicole D. Caldwell and Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, “Effects
of Ruminative and Distracting Responses to Depressed Mood on Retrieval of
Autobiographical Memories,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
(1998) Vol. 75. No. 1, pp. 166-177.
56
See Quassim Cassam, Self-Knowledge for Humans, (Oxford University Press,
2014), pp. 200-201, and “Bad Thinkers,” https://aeon.co/essays/the-intellectualcharacter-of-conspiracy-theorists. Cassam also cites Zagzebski’s list of
“intellectual vices” such as negligence, idleness, rigidity, obtuseness, prejudice,
lack of thoroughness, and insensitivity to detail. See Linda Trinkaus Zegzebski,
Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical
Foundations of Knowledge, (Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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criticizes her is “out to get her” and is part of the “conspiracy against her.”57
Clearly, it would be to Susan’s advantage to acknowledge and address her
paranoia. However, to suggest to Susan that she suffers from paranoia will only
trigger the same insecurity that gives rise to her paranoia, and will, as a
consequence, cause her to reject the criticism and regard it as just another detail of
an orchestrated plot against her. That is to say, for the very reason of her paranoia,
Susan will be incapable of recognizing her paranoia.
Finally, some have suggested that the very standpoint of one’s cognitive
apparatus is conceptually inaccessible. Thus Velleman asserts that “a person can
never conceive of his own conceptual capacity from a purely third-personal
perspective, because he can conceive of it only with that capacity, and hence from
a perspective in which it continues to occupy [a] first-person position.”58 Indeed,
Velleman plausibly compares this conceptual impossibility to that of establishing
“a visual perspective from which the point between his eyes isn’t ‘here’”.59 As
such, on Velleman’s account, facts of one’s cognitive or psychological disposition
will not only often undermine the accuracy of one’s initial self-assessments, but

57

This example was modeled after Hilary Kornblith’s similar case of “Jack,” in
“What Is It Like To Be Me?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, (March 1998),
Vol. 76, No. 1, pp. 48-60, p. 51.
58
Velleman, “Identity and Identification,” from Sarah Buss and Lee Overton,
(2002, p. 114). See also Nagel’s discussion of one’s essential “blind spot”:
“[H]owever much we expand our objective view of ourselves, something will
remain beyond the possibility of explicit acceptance or rejection, because we
cannot get entirely outside ourselves, even though we know there is an outside”
(1986, p. 128).
59
“Identity and Identification,” from Sarah Buss and Lee Overton, (2002, p. 114).
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will undermine one’s efforts to recognize the extent to which one’s cognitive or
psychological dispositions have been compromised.60
Now let’s consider ways in which our motivations—our stake in a matter—
commonly prevent us from achieving an unbiased perspective on our existing
values, beliefs and desires. Consider Brian, who desperately wants to please his
homophobic father, and is therefore incapable of recognizing sexual feelings he
has for Todd. Indeed, rather than recognizing such feelings, Brian takes up a
militantly anti-gay position and condemns every form of homosexual attraction as
a perversion. When a therapist asks Brian to take a step back and more carefully
examine his feelings, his fear of his father’s judgment automatically kicks in and
only reinforces his prejudice. Or consider Jerry and Jack, good friends who have
both applied to a prestigious graduate program. Jerry is accepted but Jack is not.
Upon learning of his rejection, Jack claims that, in fact, this program is overrated.
Jerry suggests that Jack is just upset and jealous at having not been accepted,
whereupon Jack “takes a step back” and examines his feelings, but can still detect
no evidence of disappointment and jealousy, because, as a matter of fact, he
“never really cared so much about that overrated program anyways.” As such,
Jack has “subjectively optimized” his circumstances.
Not only is our perspective corrupted by such distortions, but note, crucially,
that it is the very nature of such distorting influences such that they are designed
to function beneath the radar of our conscious awareness and detection. Indeed,
60

See again Blackburn: “We can compare the situation to looking at our own eyes
in a mirror. We might see that our eyes are cloudy; but if they are, it will be with
cloudy eyes that we see it.” (1998, p. 261) See Blackburn (1998, p. 260) for an
excellent treatment of additional non-motivational distorting influences.
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as Timothy Wilson has put it, our confidence in our ability to consciously detect
and overcome such influences “vastly underestimates the role of non-conscious
processing in humans” (2002, p. 21). Wilson asserts that we have developed a
“psychological immune system” (2002, p. 38)61 that protects us from threats to
our psychological wellbeing, and this immune system ensures that our biases are
working appropriately. The central rule of this system is: “Select, interpret and
evaluate information in ways that make me feel good” (2002, p. 39). As such, the
effectiveness of non-conscious processing requires that it function beneath our
conscious radar. For if we suspected that our self-assessments were just the
outputs of our “feel-good” subconscious mechanisms, we could no longer take
such assessments as seriously, and, in that case, our subconscious mechanisms
would have failed to do their job.
And so we can now understand what principally accounts for the inadequacy
of the Perceptual Accuracy Hypothesis. Recall again what is involved in
overcoming our misperception of the man-standing-at-the-side-of-the-road. When
I focus more attention on this object, I more fully engage my perceptual
mechanisms, and, as a result, the object in question passively submits to such
adjustments. That is to say: these objects mount no calculated resistance to my
corrective efforts. Again, I am not suggesting that, in virtue of my corrective
efforts, I will necessarily overcome my misperceptions (recall the Muller-Lyer
illusion and other such illusions). But the objects of perception themselves will
not actively attempt to sabotage or circumvent my corrective efforts, further
61	
   On

the psychological immune system, see also Leon Festinger, A Theory of
Cognitive Dissonance, (Stanford University Press, 1957).	
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camouflaging themselves or shape-shifting to safeguard their misleading
appearance. Yet the same by no means can be said when the objects of perception
are my own features. That is, Korsgaard and Nagel are surely correct in asserting
that my ambition in taking a reflective backward step is to transform the features
of the “me” into objective data on par with mailboxes and traffic cones that will
passively submit to the scrutiny of the observing “I”. And yet, the “me” that I take
to be a passive object of perception will mount a calculated and undetectable
resistance, ensuring that “I” arrive at a conclusion that is sensitive to its needs.
Indeed, as Arpaly has put it: “Almost nothing has been written about the agent
who steps away from her desires and, as it seems to her, chooses calmly between
them, feeling apparent mastery over temptation and emotion, while the very ‘I’
that steps away from the desires is the unconscious dupe of other desires,
emotions, or irrationality.”62 While Arpaly is here speaking specifically of
practical reasoning, the same applies to efforts at self-knowledge. That is to say,
even when the captainly “I” is convinced it has pulled back and is exercising
detached epistemic authority with respect to reading the facts of the “me,” the
very activity of the “I”’s self-detection is often hijacked by the facts of the “me.”

3.3 On Authoring the Page —The Rendering of Facts
I have thus far focused on the question of whether the “I,” in virtue of assuming
a self-conscious perspective on the “me,” can achieve an accurate assessment of
the existing facts of the “me”—can recognize what is already there. And we have
seen how features of the “me” can subvert one’s investigations. Yet one often
62

	
  

Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue, (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 20.
37

	
  
obtains self-knowledge through a different route, that is, through actively
“producing” or “rendering” facts about oneself. In these cases the particular
fact—usually a belief or desire—in question is not an item one simply recalls or
“reads off the page,” but something that one actively authors.63 Suppose, for
example, I am asked the following question: “Is it right to inform my friend that
her husband is cheating on her?” And suppose I haven’t considered the matter and
therefore hold no belief regarding it. As a result, I must take up a “practical” or
“deliberative” stance with respect to the matter: I must “figure out” or “decide”
what I believe. And, here too, in the authoring of my belief, self-consciousness is
said to play an indispensible role, affording the “I” a set of epistemic privileges
and powers.
What specific privileges and powers does the self-conscious “I” wield with
respect to the authoring of a belief?64 One such power is trivially true: that is, by
definition, a creature lacking self-consciousness could not self-consciously
undertake such a process of deliberate belief-formation. That is to say, one often
upgrades one’s beliefs, or comes to believe new things without a self-conscious

63

As Moran puts it: “When we speak of ‘authority’ in connection with firstperson statements of belief and other attitudes […] it is not just the report that the
person is author of, but also, in a central range of cases, the person can be seen as
the author of the state of mind itself, in the sense of being the person who
originates it and is responsible for it.” (2001, p. 113)
64
Here I will bracket a broader question, that is, to what extent is selfconsciousness necessary for belief-formation in general? That is to say, in order
for an organism to hold beliefs in general, must the organism be capable of
knowing that it holds at least some beliefs? For an interesting discussion of this
question, see Hilary Kornblith, On Reflection, (Oxford University Press, 20012)
pp. 55-61.
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awareness that one is doing so.65 But one cannot voluntarily and self-consciously
author a belief without voluntarily and self-consciously doing so. Indeed, this
process of self-consciously authoring beliefs, if anything, argues in support of the
view that one can “take up of the reins” of one’s reflective activity, that one can
actively “conduct” it. Thus, just as in the previous section we allowed for the fact
that self-consciousness renders us capable of knowing that we possess certain
facts (even if our self-conscious analysis of such facts does not ensure an accurate
reading of them), in this case we must at least grant that self-consciousness
renders us capable of voluntarily engaging in the process of producing certain
attitudes. What is left to be determined is the question of what, if any, special
powers the “I” can bring to this process.66
The Rationalist suggests the following: The unique role that the “I” plays in
one’s deliberative process is that of a “rational agent.” That is, for example, when
I am asked, “What do you believe about p?” and I hold no belief about p, I take
the question to be asking, “What I should believe about p?” and I take this
question to be asking, “What is most rational to believe about p?” It is in my
efforts to arrive at the most rational belief about p, both with respect to theoretical
and practical questions, that the “I” is uniquely positioned to appeal to the
“authority of reason”. What renders the “I” uniquely positioned to engage in such
65

That this is the case can be seen for the following reasons. First, if every change
or upgrade in belief availed itself to consciousness, our consciousness would be
overrun with a cascade of beliefs. Second, such a requirement on belief would
generate a regress, e.g., I can only believe it is raining if I am conscious of the fact
that I believe it; I can only believe that I am conscious of my consciousness of my
belief if I am conscious of that belief, and so on.
66
The separate question whether, or to what extent, the “I” can truly exercise such
agency will be taken up in the following chapter.
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activity? To arrive at an adequate response to this question we will need to more
deeply explore nature of rational agency.67

3.3.1 On the Conditions of Rational Agency
The question is: What renders the self-reflecting “I” uniquely suited to engage
in rational agency? For a preliminary understanding, let us first turn to Kant.
Recall Kant’s assertion that: “The fact that the human being can have the “I” in
his representations [i.e., is self-conscious] raises him infinitely above all other
living beings on earth.” Now, Kant also tells us, “a human being really finds in
himself a capacity by which he distinguishes himself from all other things, even
from himself insofar as he is affected by objects, and that is reason”
(Groundwork: 4:452)68. So both the capacity for self-representation—for
representing himself as an “I”—and the capacity for reason, render a human being
superior to all other living things. Yet our capacity for reason possesses a further
distinguishing feature. For, Kant tells us, “Only a rational being has the capacity
to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with
principles, or has a will” (Groundwork: 4:413). That is, whereas unknown “laws”
immediately regulate the behavior of irrational creatures, a human being can both
represent such laws, and can formulate laws or principles according to which she
can regulate her behavior. So, putting these pieces together: We human beings are
distinguished from all other living things in virtue of our capacities to represent
67

Note again that the following analysis will be further developed in the
following chapter.
68
The question of why a person’s capacity for reason distinguishes him “even
from himself” will be explored in Chapter 6.
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ourselves, to represent laws or principles, and to govern our behavior in light of
these laws or principles, as dictated by reason. That is, in light of such laws or
principles, we can infer various consequences of possible choices, run cost-benefit
analyses, or subject various proposals to the Kantian “universalizability” test69.
And yet, according to Kant, at least when it comes to practical questions, a
good deal more is required of us if we wish to successfully engage our rational
faculties. For Kant provides that when we deliberate we “cannot act otherwise
than under the idea of freedom”.70 This “idea of freedom” should be understood
both in descriptive and normative terms. In the first case, as a matter of
descriptive fact, when we deliberate, we cannot help but believe that the very act
of deliberation is up to us. In the second, normative, sense, when we deliberate we
feel obligated to make certain that the course and outcome of our deliberations is
not determined by, as Kant puts it, heteronymous forces—forces arising from an
external, or alien, source—but that it they up to our rational will. As Kant puts it:
“Will is a kind of causality of living beings insofar as they are rational, and
freedom would be that property of such a causality that it can be efficient
independent of alien causes determining it” (1997a: 4:446, emphasis his). That is,
insofar as we desire that we, by means of our rational will, determine the course
and outcome of our deliberations, we must make certain that our reflections are
69

That is, we can undergo that decision-making procedure whereby we determine
whether or not we can will our guiding maxim as universal law. See Kant,
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, (ed.) Mary Gregor), (intro.) Christine
Korsgaard, (Cambridge, 1997a), p. 31, 4:421.
70
See 1997a, 4:448: “[E]very being that cannot act otherwise than under the idea
of freedom is just because of that really free in a practical respect, that is, all laws
that are inseparably bound up with freedom hold for him just as if his will had
been validly pronounced free.” (emphasis his)
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governed by our reason, for “unless reason holds the reins of government in his
own hands, a human being’s feelings and inclinations play the master over him.”71
As such, our self-regulating, self-legislating rational will permits us to overcome
the influence of heteronymous impulses that might otherwise dictate the outcome
of our deliberations. In this way, we can make certain that we—our rational
wills—are making up our own minds.
We have already encountered this general idea in Korsgaard, who assures us
that our deliberations should not, and, indeed, cannot72, be determined by our
“impulses.” Rather, our impulses just provide data we feed to our rational
faculties, data we may or may not regard as germane to our deliberative
conclusions. And yet some Rationalists propose that we must go even further if
we wish to successfully engage our superior rational faculty. Indeed, as Moran
puts it: “In deliberating about some matter I do not even take as fixed whatever
stock of beliefs and desires I may bring to the problem, for entering into the spirit
of rational deliberation means that I acknowledge that reflection on the problem
may lead me to abandon or revise any one of them” (2001, p. 133). That is,
71

Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, (trans. & ed.) Mary Gregor, (intro.) Roger J.
Sullivan (Cambridge, 1996) 6:408.
72
Korsgaard expresses this “cannot” as a “must.” She writes: “Once the space of
awareness—as reflective distance, as I like to call it—opens up between the
potential ground of a belief and the belief itself, or between the potential ground
of an action and the action itself, we must step across that distance with some
awareness that we are doing so, and so must be able to endorse the operation of
that ground as a basis for what we believe or do. This means that the space of
reflective distance presents us with both the possibility and the necessity of
exerting a kind of control over our beliefs […] And it is the same fact that we now
both can have, and absolutely require, reason to believe and act as we do” (2008,
p. 4-5, emphasis mine). See also Nagel: “Having stopped the direct operation of
impulse by interposing the possibility of decision, one can get one’s beliefs and
actions into motion again only by thinking about what, in light of the
circumstances, one should do” (1997, p. 109, emphasis mine).
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according to Moran, when one deliberates on some matter, one must not regard
any of one’s standing beliefs as immune to revision. For, if one were to do so,
then one would “[take] it to be an open question whether this activity will
determine what one actually does or believes” (2001, p. 133). As such, in order to
exercise full-fledged rational autonomy, an agent must believe that (1) He is the
conductor of his deliberations; (2) He can determine the course and outcome of
his deliberations exclusively by means of his rational will; and (3) He can bring a
sufficiently open and unbiased mind to his deliberations, such that his
deliberations will not be undermined by opaque, or unquestionable, beliefs.
One can appreciate the appeal of such a portrait of an ideal rational agent—the
Homo Philosophicus, as Cassam calls her73. Indeed, there are few insults more
stinging than that of being labeled “irrational,” or “unreasonable,” or, even worse,
unknowingly “biased” or “prejudiced.” Further, our capacity for competent,
efficient deliberation seems uniquely to certify our elevated human status, our
superiority to the rest of the “irrational” living kingdom.74 Yet one may wonder
how realistic such a portrait really is. For recall that our review of the literature on
self-perception showed that even when subjects of studies were informed of their
biases and were asked to review their beliefs in light of this fact, they routinely
insisted upon their previously-stated opinions, denying that they were thus biased.
And recall the vast array of non-motivational and motivational influences that
undetectably undermine our critical faculties—influences, indeed, that are
designed precisely to undermine us in ways that elude our detection. As such, if
73

Cassam (2014).
Recall Kant’s “infinite superiority” claims and see Aristotle’s Function
argument. (2002, 1097b-1098a20).
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our examinations of our existing belief states are susceptible of such corrupting
influences, it stands to reason that these distorting influences will just as
agressively undermine our efforts to rationally produce or author our conclusions,
attitudes and actions. Indeed, given the complexity of the deliberative process, the
demands involved in the examination of evidence, the variety and sophistication
of inferences that one must successfully perform, it would seem much more likely
that such influences would exert themselves.75
Now, I am not suggesting that a human being cannot possibly achieve the
status of Homo Philosophicus. And I am not contending that the taking up of the
deliberative stance does not or cannot render us capable of appealing to the
authority of reason. It certainly can and does, however problematically. A further
question is whether or not the success of my rational engagement should be
understood as a kind of achievement—as some feat or accomplishment for which
“I” am genuinely responsible. That question will be a central concern in the
following chapter. Before moving on, however, let us explore one further way we
can establish facts about ourselves—that is, through acts of “self-identification”
or “self-constitution”.

3.4 On Identification
Thus far we have considered two means whereby the assumption of a selfconscious perspective—i.e., the taking of the “backward step”—ostensibly
75

Indeed, even Kant admits that “it is absolutely impossible by means of
experience to make out with complete certainty a single case in which the aim of
an action otherwise in conformity with duty rested simply in moral grounds”
(1997a: 4:407) See also Kornblith, “Distrusting Reason” Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, XXIII (1999).
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permits the “I” to establish the facts of the “me”. In the first case, the backward
step was supposed to objectify my facts and thereby render them more susceptible
of accurate detection. In the second, it was proposed that the “I,” in virtue of its
ability to detach from personal impulses, could appeal to and engage a superior
rational force in the service of authoring beliefs and desires. I will now explore a
third means whereby, on certain Rationalist accounts, the “I” can gain epistemic
purchase on the facts of the “me,” that is, through acts of identification. That is,
according to such thinkers, the very act of “endorsing,” “committing to” or
“deciding in favor of” certain desires or beliefs renders it the case that such facts
are more self-representative, or more “mine,” than they otherwise would be. I will
begin with Frankfurt’s discussion of identification and then move on to
Korsgaard’s account. I will then discuss Schechtman’s related views on
“narrativity” and Moran’s notion of “avowals.” In each case, I will first briefly
present the view and then I will offer commentary.

3.4.1 Frankfurt
Among contemporary philosophers perhaps Harry Frankfurt has been most
instrumental in introducing and developing the notion of “identification”.76 His
view is rather complex, so we will need to lay some groundwork. First, Frankfurt
tells us that “[t]o be a person, as distinct from simply a human organism, requires
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Frankfurt’s views on these matters have changed over time. I will address his
earlier views in this chapter. I will more fully explore his latter views in later
chapters.
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a complex volitional structure involving reflective self-evaluation.”77 This
volitional structure consists in first-order desires (I desire a vodka-tonic); secondorder desires, that is, desires about first-order desires (I desire or don’t desire to
have the desire for the vodka-tonic), and second-order volitions, that is, a
second-order desire that a first-order desire carries one to action. Now, when one
evaluates one’s first-order desires (to drink the vodka tonic), and develops a
second-order desire (not to have this desire because one is an alcoholic and
knows one must abstain from alcohol) and then advocates for this second-order
desire, one is “identifying” with this second-order desire (and, in so doing,
further identifying with or else detaching form the first-order desire). Such
identifications are expressive of one taking an “active” role with respect to a
particular desire or action, rather than occupying the position of a mere “passive
bystander” with respect it.78 As such, in endorsing or identifying with a particular
desire, one assumes responsibility for it and thereby “makes one of [his desires]
more truly his own”.79 Likewise, as mentioned, one can “withdraw from,”
77

“The Faintest Passion,” from Necessity, Volition, and Love, (Cambridge
University Press, 1999) p. 103 FN.
78
Indeed, Frankfurt claims that when it comes to second-order volitions, “it is
impossible for [a person] to be a passive bystander to them. They constitute his
activity—i.e., his being active rather than passive—and the question of whether or
not he identifies himself with them cannot arise.” See “Three Concepts of Free
Action,” from The Importance of What We Care About, (Cambridge University
Press, 1988) p. 59-60 (emphasis his).
79
Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will” from 1988, p. 18. Frankfurt elaborates: “The
pertinent desire is no longer in any way external to him. It is not a desire that he
‘has’ merely as a subject in whose history it happens to occur, as a person may
‘have’ an involuntary spasm that happens to occur in the history of his body. It
comes to be a desire that is incorporated into him by virtue of the fact that he has
it by his own will. […] Through his action in deciding, he is responsible for the
fact that the desire has become his own in a way in which it was not
unequivocally his own before.” “Identity and Wholeheartedness,” from 1988, p.
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“externalize,” or “alienate,” a desire, in such a way as to render this desire no
longer his own (or, at least, less truly his own). Thus, Frankfurt tells us: “It is
these acts of ordering and rejection—integration and separation—that create a
self out of the raw materials of inner life. They define the intrapsychic
constraints and boundaries with respect to which a person’s autonomy may be
threatened even by his own desire” (1988, p. 170). As such, according to
Frankfurt, when we undertake this process of “ordering and rejection” we are
literally creating our identities, determining which desires or beliefs represent us.
And this process is of paramount importance, for, as he says, “it is a salient
characteristic of human beings, one which affects our lives in deep and
innumerable ways, that we care about what we are” (1988, p. 163).
Such is Frankfurt’s view. And I will allow that it does track our
phenomenology. After all, we sometimes do review our spectrum of attributes and
wish to embrace, be moved and defined by, some attributes, while wish to reject
or not be moved or defined by, others. I may wish, for example, that my desire to
be helpful or generous were more self-representative than my selfish desire to
serve myself, or that my desire to be accepting and tolerant was more selfrepresentative than my tendency to be judgmental or confrontational. And we
believe that such acts of endorsement (identification) or rejection (externalization)
should make a difference with respect to the kind of people we really are.

170. See also: “A person who cares about something is, as it were, invested in it.
By caring about it, he makes himself susceptible to benefits and vulnerable to
losses depending upon whether what he cares about flourishes or is diminished.
We may say that in this sense he identifies himself with what he cares about”
(From, “On the Necessity of Ideals,” 1999, p. 111).
	
  

47

	
  
While Frankfurt’s analysis tracks our hopeful intuitions, however, it is
doubtful whether our optimism is justified. Notice, first, that the identification
with a desire, however active, by no means guarantees the self-representational
authority of that desire; nor should the externalization of a first-order desire
necessarily certify its non-representational status.80 Let us call this the
Authentication Problem. So, consider Brian who discovers in his adolescence that
he is attracted to Todd. Due to his horror of such desires, or his horror of his
father’s disapproval, Brian develops a second-order desire not to possess his firstorder desire. In this case, Todd will identify with his second-order desire and disidentify with or alienate his first-order desire. But clearly Brian’s identification
with the second-order desire does not render it more self-representing; nor does it
render his first-order desire less self-representing.
Yet a deeper problem lurks. For if a belief or desire must depend on a higherorder belief or desire to vouch for its self-representational authority, a regress will
ensue—each desire requiring the certifying authority of a higher-order desire, ad
infinitum. To halt such a regress, one will need to invoke a desire one has not
endorsed, and yet, in virtue of its lack of endorsement—given Frankfurt’s
conditions on self-representational authority—nothing will vouch for its authority,
and this, in turn, will threaten to delegitimize the self-representational status of the
entire chain of desires.
Responding to these concerns, Frankfurt suggests that one can both terminate a
regress and certify the representational authority of a desire if one can make a
80

Frankfurt concedes this point. As he puts it: “I have maintained that the
question of whether a passion is internal or external to a person is not just a matter
of the person’s attitude toward the passion.” (1998, p. 64).
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“decisive commitment” to it. Under such conditions, as he puts it, the
commitment will “[resound] throughout an endless array of higher orders” (1998,
p. 21). But what, precisely, is so special about the decisive nature of such a
commitment? That is, as Watson has put the problem: “What gives [a decisive
commitment] any special relation to ‘oneself’? It is unhelpful to answer that one
makes a ‘decisive commitment,’ where this just means that an interminable ascent
to higher order is not going to be permitted.”81 Frankfurt suggests that what gives
such a decisive commitment a special relation to the self is that one can make a
wholehearted commitment to it; that is to say, one can make such a commitment
without reservation. Indeed, Frankfurt compares the process of wholeheartedly
identifying with a particular desire with the process of performing arithmetic
calculations. He says:
[B]oth in the case of desires and in the case of arithmetic a person
can without arbitrariness terminate a potentially endless sequence
of evaluations when he finds that there is no disturbing conflict,
either between results already obtained or between a result already
obtained and one he might reasonably expect to obtain if the
sequence were to continue. Terminating the sequence at that
point—the point at which there is no conflict or doubt—is not
arbitrary. For the only reason to continue the sequence would be
to cope with the actual conflict or with the possibility that a
conflict might occur. Given that the person does not have this
reason to continue it is hardly arbitrary for him to stop. (1998, p.
169)
Frankfurt’s suggestion, thus, is that an agent’s decision carries special or nonarbitrary authority just when that agent, in making his decision, is met with no
resistance. Yet Frankfurt’s further refinement of the conditions for authentic
identification still fails to adequately address Watkins’ concern. For, indeed, what
81

Gary Watson, “Free Agency” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXXII, No. 8,
April 24, 1975, p. 218.
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prevents a person from being misguided even here, that is, even with respect to
the “wholeheartedness” of his decision? Recall the aforementioned bevy of
empirical evidence testifying to our tendencies toward self-misrepresentation. As
such, there seems nothing in principle to prevent one from misjudging oneself
even with respect to the question of one’s wholehearted commitment.82

3.4.2 Korsgaard
Let us now examine Korsgaard’s Frankfurt-friendly take on the process of
identification and see whether she can overcome the Authentication Problem.
Like Frankfurt, Korsgaard believes that all persons are continuously engaged in a
project of constructing and refining their “practical identity,” that is, “a
description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find
your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking” (1996b,
101). Moreover, Korsgaard asserts, with Frankfurt, that what renders a particular
feature “mine” is my active endorsement of, or identification with, a belief, desire,
or principle. By what means does one actively endorse or identify with a
particular belief or desire? I quote the following lengthy passage in full:
A rational will is a self-conscious causality, and a self-conscious
causality is aware of itself as a cause. To be aware of yourself as a
cause is to identify yourself with something in the scenario that
gives rise to the action, and this must be the principle of choice.
82

Indeed, Frankfurt concedes this as well. He tells us: “Indeterminacy in the life
of a real person cannot be overcome by preemptive decree. To be sure, a person
may attempt to resolve his ambivalence by deciding to adhere unequivocally to
one of his alternatives rather than to the other; and he may believe that in thus
making up his mind he has eliminated the division in his will and become
wholehearted. Whether such changes have actually occurred, however, is another
matter.” “The Faintest Passion,” from (1998, p. 101). Again, Frankfurt will refine
these views in his later work that I will address in Chapter 5.
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[…] You have some principle which favors A over B, so you
exercise this principle a, and you choose to do A. In this kind of
case, you do not regard yourself as a mere passive spectator to the
battle between A and B. You regard the choice as yours, as the
product of your own activity, because you regard the principle of
choice as expressive, or representative, of yourself. You must do
so, for the only alternative to identifying with the principle of
choice is regarding the principle of choice as some third thing in
you, another force on par with the incentives to do A and to B,
which happened to throw its weight in favor of A, in a battle at
which you were, after all, a mere passive spectator. But then you
are not the cause of the action. Self-conscious rational agency,
then, requires identification with the principle of choice on which
you act. (1999, p. 26, bold mine)
To grasp what Korsgaard is getting at here, it will be necessary to quickly return
to Kant. Recall that, on Kant’s account, one must deliberate under the “idea of
freedom.” That is, from a practical standpoint, the self-conscious rational agent
cannot help but regard herself as the active cause or conductor of her own
reflective process, and, as such, as the producer or author of her practical
conclusions. These are not activities toward which a person can stand as a
Frankfurtian “passive bystander”; rather, they are actions that one must selfconsciously conduct. Now, to the extent that an agent cannot help but view herself
as such, she must likewise regard her reflections, and her ultimate endorsement of
a particular principle for action, as something that has been up to her, as
something for which she is responsible.83 As such, Korsgaard proclaims, “Selfconscious rational agency, then, requires identification with the principle of
choice on which you act.” And yet it is unclear how Korsgaard’s analysis can
address the Authentication Problem, that is, the question: By what means does the
active identification with a particular desire or principle render it the case that this
83

	
  

Again, I will be developing these ideas at greater length in the next chapter.
51

	
  
desire or principle is authoritatively self-representating? Or, to put it a little
differently: In virtue of what does one’s active identification with a particular
principle or attitude render this principle or attitude “more one’s own” than a
principle or attitude that she has not endorsed?
To understand Korskaard’s curious response to this question, we will need to
step further back and acquaint ourselves with some more of her conceptual
machinery. Note, first, that, on Korsgaard’s view, while irrational animals are
capable of mere “behavior” or “movements,” a person is capable of “action,” and,
“[w]hat distinguishes action from mere behavior and other physical movements is
that it is authored – it is in a quite special way attributable to the person who does
it, by which I mean, the whole person” (Korsgaard, 1999, p. 3). What renders a
person “whole”? Korsgaard explains that what renders a person, or any organized
entity, whole, is the property of being united. As she puts it: “The actions which
are most truly a person’s own are precisely those actions which most fully unify
her.”84 Thus a person is whole insofar as her parts—her impulses, desires, and
beliefs—are unified.85 Moreoveer, following Kant, Korsgaard asserts that one’s
parts can only be unified by means of one’s autonomous, authoritative, rational,
will. Only in this way can the person, and not heteronymous elements working in
her or on her, draw her together and determine her behavior. As such, Korsgaard
tells us:
84

Korsgaard’s derives her conception of “unity” partly by appeal to Plato’s
discussion of the ideal city in The Republic (see especially 443d-e). Here, Plato
argues that a city will not be able to properly function if its parts are not united
under the authority of its rulers.
85
See Kant’s similar view of “self-mastery” which involves “bring[ing] all his
capacities and inclinations under his (reason’s) control and so to rule over
himself” (MM 6:408).
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The actions which are most truly a person’s own are precisely
those actions which most fully unify her and therefore most fully
constitute her as their author. They are those actions which both
issue from, and give her, the kind of volitional unity which she
must have if we are to attribute the action to her as a whole person.
(1999, p. 3)86
Thus, on Korsgaard account, in order for a human being to be capable of action,
her parts must be united, and the very act of deliberation, of organizing oneself
according to a principle, just consists in the gathering together and the uniting of
one’s parts. The very act of deliberation thus constitutes one’s personhood, and,
insofar as this is the case, the “[b]eliefs and desires you have actively arrived at
are more truly your own than those which have simple arisen in you (or happen to
inhere in a metaphysical entity that is you).”87

3.4.2.1 Critique of Korsgaard
So, let us examine what I take to be two of Korsgaard’s most critical and
related claims. One is that the agent must identify with her principle of choice
because she must view her principle of choice, and indeed every element of her
deliberative process, as being active, or up to her. The second claim is that, in
virtue of the fact that the act of deliberation constitutes the self by means of
uniting its “parts,”—in virtue of this fact, the very determination of a particular
principle as self-representing, will somehow render that very fact more genuinely
86

See also: “When you deliberate about what to do and then do it, what you are
doing is organizing your appetite, reason and spirit, into the unified system that
yields an action that can be attributed to you as a person. Deliberative action pulls
the parts of the soul together into a unified system. (1999, p. 22)
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Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), p. 379. She says elsewhere: “[A] desire or belief that has simply
arisen in you may be reflectively endorsed, and this makes it, in the present sense,
more authentically your own.” (1996) p. 394, note 34.
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self-representating, i.e., “more truly one’s own” than it otherwise would have
been. Let us consider some objections to these two claims.
In the first place, it should be noted that the self-conscious deliberative
procedure Korsgaard recommends is certainly not a necessary condition for
arriving at a rational, self-representing principle. Consider, as Arpaly has,
instances of “dawning”—sudden epiphanies or realizations that come as though
involuntarily, but strike us as perfectly rational and representative of our true
thoughts or feelings. One, for example, may “suddenly realize” that one can no
longer tolerate one’s job; or it may suddenly dawn on one that one loves one’s
acquaintance. Indeed, as Arpaly puts it, “Dawning processes are perhaps the main
way in which people change their minds, especially concerning subjects they
regard as important—the very subjects regarding which an attempt to argue with
them and talk them out of the error of their ways is likely to encounter the sternest
irrational resistance.”88 And yet we do not regard the spontaneous, seemingly
involuntary nature of such a dawning phenomena as undermining its selfrepresentational authority.
Second, there seems nothing in Korsgaard’s account that renders it superior to
Frankfurt’s with regard to guaranteeing the self-representational authority of
one’s conclusions. For, indeed, we may grant much of what Korsgaard says—that
is, we may grant that it is by means of the deliberative procedure that we
consciously attempt to “pull ourselves together,” or “unify our parts.” But again,
there seems to be nothing that safeguards our deliberative activity from being an
88

Arpaly (2003) p. 55. See also Nisbett and Wilson (1977), p. 240-241 who offer
a nice review of the mysterious process whereby artists and scientists
involuntarily arrive at solutions to problems.
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exercise in fantasy or wish fulfillment. Indeed, consider, as Arpaly does, Mark
Twain’s Huckleberry Finn deciding not to turn Jim—a black slave—in to Miss
Watson, Jim’s owner. At one point Huck decides that it would be best to turn Jim
in, that such a decision would be most consistent with what his “conscience” tells
him, and thus would best express who he truly is. Yet when Huck has the
opportunity to turn Jim in, he fails, attributing his failure to his weak will,
claiming he doesn’t have “the spunk of a rabbit.” Again, Huck has arrived at his
conclusion, at his chosen behavior, through a painful, self-conscious, deliberative
procedure. But Huck’s failure stems at least in part from the fact that his
considered opinion—the opinion that seemed most rational and most selfrepresentative—in fact does not reflect his true desires, and hence is not
authoritatively self-representing. For, unbeknownst to himself, over the course of
Huck’s travels with Jim, Huck has developed feelings—among them, respect—
for Jim, and such feelings actually express Huck’s true nature. Thus Huck may
have endeavored to master certain impulses in order to “unify” himself and to
seize upon some principle that is genuinely self-identifying. But his efforts neither
appeared to conduce to self-unity (after all, he ultimately “broke down”), nor to
identify a correctly self-identifying principle.

3.4.3 Schechtman and Moran
Frankfurt’s and Korsgaard’s accounts of identification place special emphasis
on the role of endorsement. We seize upon a particular attitude; we desire that
such an attitude be self-representative, and we render such an attitude “mine” or
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“more mine” by means of our active endorsement and identification.89 But we
have seen that, in spite of such acts of decisive endorsement, we may be mistaken
as to whether a belief or desire is genuinely self-representing. Yet there are other
routes one can take to establish one’s ownership of a particular desire or belief—
routes which may be more assured. On these accounts, identification will lay not
in the intellectual endorsement of an attitude, but rather in the deeper recognition
or assimilation of an attitude. Let us therefore briefly consider such views as
developed by Schechtman and Moran.
On Marya Schechtman’s “narrative” account, “a person creates his identity by
forming an autobiographical narrative—a story of his life.”90 Here again, a person
actively contributes to or shapes his or her self-conception, and this shaping is
narrative in form “insofar as the incidents and experiences that make up his life
are not viewed in isolation, but interpreted as part of the ongoing story that gives
them significance” (1996, p. 97). Now, Schechtman does not suggest that a person
can make up one’s story arbitrarily or whole cloth; rather, one’s story must
respect a set of “reality constraints”—both observational and interpretive, such
89

Note that both Frankfurt and Korsgaard’s accounts allow for degrees of
endorsement. As I pointed out above (note 78), Frankfurt says as much,
conceding that there can always be an element of indecisiveness or ambivalence
in one’s commitment. Korsgaard suggests the same: “Since some ways of acting
unify their agents better than others, the extent to which a movement is an action
is a matter of degree: some actions are more genuinely actions than others (2008),
p. 45. See also her discussion of “Standards for Action” (1999), p. 12-15.
90
See Marya Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves (Cornell University Press,
1996), p. 93. For another excellent treatment of the necessity of both implicit and
explicit storytelling, see Damasio (2010), esp. 311: “Implicit storytelling has
created our selves, and it should be no surprise that it pervades the entire fabric of
human societies and cultures.” For a strong objection to the necessity of
narrativity for the constitution of personhood, see Galen Strawson, “Against
Narrativity,” Ratio (new series) XVII 4 December 2004, pp. 428-452.
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that, as she puts it: one’s story must “fundamentally cohere with reality” (1996, p.
119).91 Yet, in the authoring of one’s story, Schechtman claims that the very
recognition and articulation of one’s particular features renders these components
more “hers” than those elements she has not yet recognized. As she puts it: “The
elements of a person’s narrative he cannot articulate are his, but […] they are only
partially his—attributable to him to a lesser degree than those aspects of the
narrative he can articulate” (1996, p. 117). Thus, consider again Brian who may
have very little knowledge of the fact that he is romantically desirous of Todd.
According to Schechtman, the more Brian consciously grasps the fact of his
desire and the more clearly he can discern its features and work them into his
consciously constructed narrative, the more he will own this fact, and, thus, the
more self-representational this fact, and its attendant desires, will be. In virtue of
what does Brian’s recognition and articulation render his desire more self
representative? Schechtman plausibly argues that a person’s unrecognized and
unarticulated features will influence him in an impulsive, mysterious, rigid and
automatic fashion, whereas once one better recognizes these attitudes one can
better tame or control them.92
Finally, let us consider Richard Moran’s concept of “avowals”. Moran
contrasts a “theoretical”/“descriptive” stance one can take toward oneself with a
“first-personal”/ “practical” stance one can assume. To better highlight the
91

Indeed, on Schechtman’s account, such constraints even include the style of
one’s self-narrative. A self-narrative written in a style “wildly different from those
standard in our culture—for example, a self-conception that is not even narrative
in form [would not be considered] identity-constituting at all” (1996, p. 105). I
will more fully explore the nature of these constraints in Chapter 5.
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differences between these stances, Moran casts them in a therapeutic context. A
person, for example, may discuss her case with her analyst, and achieve a
spectator’s theoretical grasp of a number of facts about herself. But, Moran asks:
“[w]hat would be missing from a restoration of self-knowledge that remained
theoretical and descriptive in this sense?” (2001, p. 89) Moran suggests that any
such approach would
neglect, at the very least, the crucial therapeutic difference between
the merely ‘intellectual’ acceptance of an interpretation, which will
itself normally be seen as a form of resistance, and the process of
working through that leads to a fully internalized
acknowledgement of some attitude which makes a felt difference
to the rest of the analysand’s mental life. The goal of treatment
[…] requires that the attitude in question be knowable by the
person, not through a process of theoretical self-interpretation but
by avowal of how one thinks and feels. (2001, p. 90)
The suggestion here is that a patient may intellectually recognize a particular
belief or desire as one she has, but insofar as her grasp of this belief or desire is
“only theoretical,” it will remain impersonal or detached. Not until the patient can
emotionally “own up to” the attitude in question can she fully assimilate or
integrate it. To better see this, consider a patient—we will call her Martha—who
has been informed of her childhood abuse at the hands of her father. Moran
suggests that Martha “may not doubt this. But without her capacity to endorse or
withhold endorsement from that attitude, and without the exercise of that capacity
making a difference to what she feels, this information may as well be about some
other person, or about voices in her head” (2001, p.93). Here again, note Martha
already possesses an intellectual grasp of the fact of her abuse; she does not doubt
this fact; but she has not emotionally accepted it such that her understanding will
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make a “felt difference”. Only once she has done so will she achieve a “fully
internalized acknowledgement.” Here again, note that what distinguishes Moran’s
notion of endorsement from Frankfurt’s and Korgaard’s is that, in Martha’s case,
she already intellectually recognizes and affirms a fact about herself, but it is the
emotional contribution that brings about her fully internalized acknowledgement.
Only then can she fully own it and thereby fully psychologically integrate this
fact.

3.4.3.1 Critique of Schechtman and Moran
In discussing the views of Frankfurt and Korsgaard, one concern was that one
might misidentify one’s authentic first-order or higher-order desire. After all, on
their accounts how one wishes to identify may well express a form or fantasy or
wish-fulfillment. What recommends the accounts of Schechtman and Moran is
that they appear to dramatically reduce this possibility. That is, on Schechtman’s
account, one has already identified a personal feature or attitude that truly is selfrepresenting, and one is just coming to more fully recognize or understand this
feature or attitude, such that it can be more fully self-integrated. Similarly, on
Moran’s account, one already intellectually recognizes and identifies with a
particular fact but has yet to emotionally accept or own up to it, and here, again,
the act of emotional assimilation facilitates a more thorough integration of the
attitude in question. Now, one may contend there is room for error even here.
After all, Brian, for example, may more fully understand and emotionally inhabit
his self-imposed prejudice against homosexuality, all in an effort to suppress or
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hide from his true desires. As such, to more fully recognize and inhabit his
prejudice would seem to further alienate him from his true and hence more selfrepresentative desires.93 Yet it is certainly possible that one can at times grasp
one’s genuine, self-representative facts, and that such deeper acknowledgment
can indeed make the kind of difference these authors suggest. After all, as
discussed above, we are not completely blind to ourselves and we can sometimes
achieve a better grasp of our attitudes through a deeper understanding or through
an emotional acknowledgment of them.

3.5 Conclusion
While I have argued in this chapter for a set of negative epistemic claims, it
should be clear that I am not endorsing any sort of radical skepticism. As opposed
to Nietzsche and Camus, I believe that the “I” can attain a more accurate
assessment of the facts of the “me.” While this may not take place as regularly as
we might like, it certainly can take place. Likewise, I have not ruled out the
possibility that the “I” can harness the “authority of reason” in its pursuit of
unprejudiced beliefs and desires—even though, again, the rational fidelity of such
pursuits is commonly corrupted by unrecognized influences. I have also allowed
that the “I” can identify with a belief or desire, as Korsgaard and Frankfurt have
suggested, even if the “I” is often mistaken about the self-representational status
of the belief or desire in question. Finally, I have accepted that the “I” can
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Schechtman and Moran may contend here that Brian could not authentically
recognize such a prejudice. I will explore this possibility in Chapter 5.
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recognize or avow the facts of the “me” in such a way as to facilitate a more
complete integration of such facts.
In all of these respects, the “I” can indeed make at least some headway,
however limited and however hobbled, by the epistemic resources at its disposal.
A further question is whether any of these operations, their success or failure, is
genuinely attributable to, or “up to,” the agential “I,” or whether these phenomena
should rather be understood as further expressions of the facts of the “me.” We
will explore this question in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
AGENCY

4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I examined a number of proposals suggesting that the
“I” can exercise a set of epistemic powers with respect to the “me”. The general
idea was that the “I,” in virtue of its distance from the facts of the “me,” could
detect, determine, or enhance one’s understanding or assimilation of one’s facts. I
argued that inasmuch as such powers are available to us, they are susceptible to
the distorting influence of the facts of the “me”, and that, as Arpaly puts it, the “I”
often acts as an “unconscious dupe” of such intrusive influences. Now, I believe it
is safe to assume that none of us would ever wish to behave as an “unconscious
dupe”—indeed, that the very prospect of behaving as such should induce a wave
of panic. After all, as Guignon has asserted, one condition on being a “bounded,
masterful self,” is the capacity to captain one’s own crew, to assume ownership of
and bear responsibility for one’s behaviors and one’s attitudes, or, collectively,
one’s “facts”. But what exactly might it mean to do this? That is to say, what
might it mean for a person to author, to own, or otherwise command one’s facts,
as opposed to being a mere expression or composite of one’s facts? This question
will be the subject of this chapter. That is, the subject of this chapter will center
on the question of what it might mean to function as a responsible agent.
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4.2 Minimal or Shallow Vs. Deep Agency
To get started, let us distinguish between two sorts of agency—“minimal” or
“shallow” agency and “deep” agency. With respect to the former, I will join the
philosophical consensus in understanding shallow agency as a property that
distinguishes “actions” (behaviors that are “up to” an entity—e.g., a man jumps
from here to there), from mere passive “movements” that “happen to” an entity94
(e.g., a gust of wind blows a man from here to there).95 In the former case, as
Aristotle tells us, the “origin of [one’s] moving”—or, as I shall call it, the
“moving principle”—is internal to, as opposed to external to, the organism96.
Take, for example, a sunflower. I may grab hold of the sunflower and turn it in
the direction of the sun; or else the sunflower itself will turn in the direction of the
94

I am using the term “entity” here because, per my characterization of minimal
agency, I see no impediment to inanimate objects exhibiting minimal or shallow
agency. An alarm clock, for example, will ring at a certain hour, and the principle
of movement involved in the ringing will be endemic to the alarm mechanism. As
such, it appears quite natural to me to attribute minimal agency to mechanisms
like alarm clocks.
95
As Frankfurt puts it, agency comes down to the question of “the difference
between passivity and activity.” He elaborates: The “difference between passivity
and activity is at the heart of the fact that we exist as selves and agents and not
merely as locales in which certain events happen to occur” (1998, ix). See
Wittgenstein’s famous characterization of this problem as one that captures the
distinction between my hand “going up” and my “lifting” my hand. See
Wittgenstein (2001) §611-630. See also, Korsgaard: “[A]n action requires an
agent, someone to whom we attribute the movement in question to its author”
(2009, p. 18). And “The authoredness of it—is the essence of action.” (2009, p.
83). For a nice survey of these accounts, see, for example, John Hyman and Helen
Steward (eds.), Agency and Action, (Cambridge University Press, 2004); James
Stacey Taylor (ed.) Personal Autonomy, New Essays on Personal Autonomy and
Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, (Cambridge University Press, 2005);
and Buss and Overton (2002).
96
See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (trans.) Christopher Row and Sarah Broadie,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): “And a person acts voluntarily in the
cases in question; for in fact in actions of this sort the origin of his moving the
instrumental parts is in himself, and if the origin of something is in himself, it
depends on himself whether he does that thing or not.” (1110a15-20).
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sun. In the first case, it is clear that I—something external to the sunflower—am
the origin of the sunflower’s movement, and, as such, that the principle of motion
is external to the sunflower. In the latter case, the origin of movement—the
network of dynamic biological properties endemic to the sunflower—has at least
played a part in the turning of the sunflower (the attractive and regulative force of
sunlight, of course, will have also played a part). Now let us consider Frankfurt’s
kindred example of a child moving a spider’s legs by means of attached strings
versus the spider moving its own legs.97 In the first case, again, the mover of the
spider’s legs is obviously not the spider, but the child; in the latter case, the mover
of the spider’s legs clearly is the spider itself—that is to say, the dynamic
complex of physiological conditions endemic to the spider. And so, on such a
basis, we will discover among living organisms a pervasive (perhaps ubiquitous)98
capacity for shallow, or minimally agential, behavior.
Yet there is also a general philosophical consensus—again beginning at least
with Aristotle99—that human beings can exercise a more sophisticated or, as
Korsgaard puts it, a “deeper” kind of agency. Korsgaard explains:
[A]lthough there is a sense in which what a non-human animal
does is up to her, the sense in which what you do is up to you is
deeper. When you deliberately decide what sorts of effects you
will bring about in the world, you are also deliberately deciding
what sort of a cause you will be. And that means you are deciding
who you are. So we are each faced with the task of constructing a
peculiar, individual kind of identity—personal or practical
97

Frankfurt (1988, p. 88).
Insofar as all living things must display the key characteristics of life—the
ability to grow, reproduce, metabolize energy, etc.—all such creatures would
express an internal moving principle. See a list of these attributes here:
https://www.reference.com/science/characteristics-living-thingsd5fc0441ef59f417
99
See Aristotle (2002, III.2).
98

	
  

64

	
  
identity—that the other animals lack. It is this sort of identity that
makes sense of our practice of holding people responsible, and of
the kinds of personal relationships that depend on that practice.
(2009, p. 19-20)100
There is a good deal packed into in this passage; I will limit my focus to what I
regard as the two principal components of Korsgaard’s conception of “deep”
agency, that is, the “Second-Order” component and the related “Responsibility”
component. First, recall that, with Kant, Korsgaard regards a non-human animal’s
behavior as “normatively loaded”: that is to say, an animal’s instincts or impulses
immediately determine its behavior; the animal possesses no sufficiently welldeveloped self-conscious rational faculty, no transcendent, captainly “I”, whereby
it can recognize and mediate between its impulses and actions. 101 Persons, on the
other hand, in virtue of their capacity to assume a self-conscious, first-personal,
rational perspective, can mediate between impulse and action. Persons can reflect
on their impulses and their motives and decide whether one is worthy of belief, or
worthy of desires, on the basis of reasons. Indeed, recall that on Korsgaard’s
account, in order for a human being to act, she must act for reasons. This
100

See also Korsgaard’s further characterization of the “depth” of self-conscious
human agency (2009, p. 19, my emphasis): “We are self-conscious in a particular
way: we are conscious of the grounds on which we act, and therefore are in
control of them. When you are aware that you are tempted, say, to do a certain
action because you are experiencing a certain desire, you can step back from that
connection and reflect on it. You can ask whether you should do that action
because of that desire, or because of the features that make it desirable. And if
you decide that you should not, then you can refrain. This means that although
there is a sense in which what a non-human does is up to her, the sense in which
what you do is up to you is deeper.”
101
As Kant puts it: “All animals have the capacity to use their powers according
to choice. Yet this necessity is not free, but necessitated by incentives and
stimuli. Their actions contain bruta necessitas.” Lectures on Ethics Collins, (ed.)
Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind; (trans.) Peter Heath (Cambridge: 1997) 27:344,
p. 125.
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reflective activity constitutes the “second-order” component of deep agency.
Which brings us to the “Responsibility” component. The idea is that, when I
assume the role of a self-conscious “I” mediating among my facts, “I” am not, and
cannot be, identical to any of the mental states or mental facts upon which “I” am
reflecting or acting. As Velleman has put it, the role of the “single party” agent
cannot be played “by anything that might undergo the process of critical review,”
because such a role “is precisely that it must be played by whatever directs that
process” (2000, p. 139). Indeed, Velleman provides that the agent’s “intervening
between these items is not something that the items themselves can do” (2000, p.
125, emphasis mine). Now, insofar as “I,” the “single party” play this role, “I” can
author, or take possession of, my facts in such a way that the course and outcome
of my deliberation will not constitute a mere expression, product, or outgrowth of
my facts. Rather, the course and outcome will be “traceable directly to [me]”.102
In doing so, as Korsgaard puts it, I can “[insert] myself into the causal order”.103
That is, “I” qua agent, through rational deliberation, can determine the causal role
that I qua empirical human being play in the natural, causal order. Thus, per the
Rationalist account, we may understand an instance of human behavior as an
expression of full-fledged104 “deep” agency if it involves second-order reflection
102

Velleman: “[W]hat makes us agents rather than mere subjects of behavior […]
is our perceived capacity to interpose ourselves into the course of events in such a
way that the behavioral outcome is traceable directly to us.” David Velleman, The
Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 128,
emphasis mine.
103
Korsgaard puts the point with characteristic boldness: “The ideal of agency is
the ideal of inserting yourself into the causal order, in such a way as to make a
genuine difference in the world” (2009, p. 87)
104
I have added the qualification “full-fledged” because different rationalists may
possess different criteria for what constitutes deep agency. All of them will insist
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and if one has self-consciously “authored” or “owned” her own attitudes or
actions in such a way that her active causal contribution can be attributed not to
forces at work in her or on her—but to her, “herself”.105
Clearly, a good deal more will need to be spelled out here. Namely (1) what is
involved in second-order “authorings” or “endorsements” of attitudes or actions;
and (2) on what basis and to what extent might such authorship or endorsement
render an agent responsible—that is, responsible in a way that sunflowers and
spiders cannot be said to be responsible—for their behavior. To elucidate these
ideas I will focus on two sorts of deep agency, what I will call “Productive”
agency and “Complicit” agency. Accounts of productive agency will involve the
actor authoring, producing, or originating (I will regard these terms as
synonymous) an attitude or action. Accounts of complicit agency will involve an
actor assuming ownership of existing attitudes or actions through her reflective
endorsement of, or commitment to, them. Both sorts of deep agency will involve
the “I” attempting, rationally and unilaterally, to intermediate among the facts of
the “me” in such a way that, per the Rationalist account, will suffice for
responsibility. Of course, I will challenge such accounts. That is, critically, I will
not doubt that one can assume a second-order, agential stance with respect to
that second-order reflection is a necessary condition; all may not insist on
responsibility being a necessary condition. Indeed, the conditional version of
rationalism I will support here will advocate for the former but not the latter.
105
Questions involving “agency” inevitably bleed into questions involving “free
will,” and the question of what metaphysical conditions must be satisfied such
that an agent acts “freely.” These investigations generally invoke two possibilities
(1) Whether alternative possibilities are authentically open to an agent—otherwise
known as PAP (the Principle of Alternative Possibilities), and (2) Whether the
agent can be understood as the “source” of her own behavior. Here I will focus
principally on “source” condition because it is more relevant to my thesis.
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one’s facts. This, I will take for granted. Rather, I will contest that, when one is
engaged in self-reflection, the “I” should not be understood as autonomously and
unilaterally acting on one’s facts; rather the “I”’s activity should be understood as
an expression of such facts or mental states. As such, I will argue against the
responsibility condition.

4.3 Productive Agency
To more fully flesh out the nature of productive agency, let us turn to some
characterizations in the literature. We will begin with Kant, who tells us:
[E]ven if one believes the action to be determined by
[natural]causes, one nonetheless blames the agent, and not on
account of his unhappy natural temper, nor on account of the
circumstances influencing him, not even on account of the life he
has led previously; for one presupposes that it can be entirely set
aside how that life was constituted, and that the series of conditions
that transpired might not have been, but rather that this deed could
be regarded as entirely unconditioned in regard to the previous
state, as though with that act the agent had started a series of
consequences entirely from himself. (1998: A555/B583)
Kant is describing a very natural tendency: When we blame a person for his
action, we tend not to regard his action as a direct product or outgrowth of his
facts or “the circumstances influencing him”—e.g., his history, his upbringing, his
temperament, and the particular conditions bearing on him at the particular
moment he performed his action. Rather, we tend to attribute the action directly to
him—to the unitary self-reflective agent—, as if he, qua agent, has “started a
series of consequences entirely from himself” (or “inserted himself into the causal
order”) and has done so in a way that is “efficient independent of alien causes.”
Recall, further, Sartre’s assertion that “[i]t is I, always I, according to the ends by
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which I illuminate these past events. Thus all my past is there pressing, urgent,
imperious, but its meaning and the orders which it gives me I choose by the very
project of my end.” Here again, the suggestion is that the “I” can to some extent
determine its ends independent of the factual history of the “me”. And of course
we find sympathetic accounts in the contemporary literature. Richard Moran, for
example, asserts: “When we speak of ‘authority’ in connection with first-person
statements of belief and other attitudes […] it is not just the report that the person
is author of, but also, in a central range of cases, the person can be seen as the
author of the state of mind itself, in the sense of being the person who originates
it and is responsible for it” (2002, p. 113, emphasis mine). And Korsgaard affirms
that while our practical identities are to some degree given to us by our cultures,
societies, role structure, accidents of birth and natural abilities, we also “enter into
them. And this means that desires and impulses associated with them do not just
arise in us.” In fact, she continues, “The motives and desires that spring from our
contingent practical identities are […] in part the result of our own activity”
(1996b, 239-240, emphasis added). Thus, according to the Rationalist account, at
least in some cases, the authoring of a particular attitude should not be understood
as an outgrowth or expression of factual circumstances at work in or on a person,
but, rather, as the conjuring, or production, of the person herself.
But what kind of “hand” can we have in our exercise of agency, such that the
production of a particular attitude can be attributed to “us” and not just to facts or
circumstances at work “in” us or “on” us? For some helpful insight into the
question, let us turn to these passages by Korsgaard and Moran.
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Korsgaard: [T]here is surely a difference between a case in which
the event most immediately determining your movements is, say,
that you are pushed from behind, and a case in which the event
most immediately determining your movements, is a thought of
your own. To take the most obvious case: most people do not feel
that their freedom or power of self-determination is threatened by
the possibility that their movements are determined by their own
thoughts about what they ought to do. Rather, they feel that their
freedom or power of self-determination is threatened by the
possibility that this may not be the case. So perhaps we should
claim that we are active to the extent that our movements are
caused by our conceptions of what we ought to do. (2008, p. 11)
Moran: My beliefs don’t just happen to me; rather I am responsible
for the reasons which I take to support them. This is part of what
makes them mine.106
Notice that Korsgaard draws on the familiar distinction between something that
pushes us—say a pair of human hands, a gust of wind, or even a strong impulse of
fear or desire—and our own thoughts or “conceptions”. These former “pushes,”
Korsgaard suggests, threaten our agency because they are external to us, or are, as
Kant puts it, “heteronymous”. Yet Korsgaard plausibly asserts that we do not
regard our own thinking as external or heteronymous. After all, our thoughts do
not seem to “impose themselves” on us or “just happen” to us: we think them. As
Descartes has famously put it, “[i]t does not seem to me a fiction, but a truth
which nobody should deny, that there is nothing entirely in our power except our
thoughts; at least if you take the word ‘thought’ as I do, to cover all operations of
the soul… not only meditations but acts of will.”107 As such, according to the
Rationalist account, it is in virtue of our active thinking that we take control of the
106

See Contours of Agency (eds.) Sarah Buss and Lee Overton, (Cambridge: MIT
Press), 2002, p. 195.
107
See Descartes’ letter to Reneri for Polot (April 1638), from Descartes:
Philosophical Letters, trans. Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p.
51. Passage found in Matthews (1992, p. 103).
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raw material of our facts—our impulses, our desires and fears, and beliefs—and
determine whether, for example, a particular impulse is worthy of being taken as a
reason for a desire or a belief. Indeed, it is by means of such thinking, as Moran
puts it, that an agent can “[orient] himself toward the question of his beliefs by
reflection on what’s true, or [orient] himself toward the question of his desires by
reflecting on what’s worthwhile or diverting or satisfying” (2002, p. 64).
Now, I grant that much of this account will square with our intuitions. It
certainly seems to us that it is in virtue of our thinking that we “take command” of
our attitudes and actions. And we do so, as the above-mentioned authors suggest,
by directing our thought on our attitudes and determining whether they are worth
following up on.108 Yet, clearly the merit of this proposal turns on a crucial
question, namely, whether we are indeed “orienting ourselves” to the facts of the
case, or whether, indeed, the facts of the case are “orienting us”. Note that this
question is of critical importance, and this for the following reason: If the latter is
the case, that is, if the facts of the case are orienting us, then our deliberative
proceedings should not be understood as a product of the “I,” but rather as a
consequence of the facts of the “me”.

108

See O’Connor: “It does not seem to me (at least ordinarily) that I am caused to
act by the reasons which favor doing so; it seems to be the case, rather, that I
produce my own decisions, in view of those reasons.” Timothy O’Connor, Agent,
Causes, Events (ed.) T. O’Connor (New York: Oxford University Press), 1995, p.
196.
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4.3.1 The Case of John’s Career
Let us thus turn to the case of John’s Career and consider a number of
proposals whereby John will ostensibly “orient himself” to the facts of the case
and thereby “produce” a propositional state—in this case, a belief about what
career will be in his best interest to pursue.
John has just finished his undergraduate degree and is trying to decide which
career to pursue. At this time, to employ Korsgaard’s conceptual framework, John
associates himself with Practical Identity 1: I’m a person who honors my parents’
wishes and who therefore endorses the following Principle of Choice (a): “Honor
your parents’ wishes.” And suppose, following up on this principle, John, while
not particularly interested in a medical career, has nonetheless honored his
parents’ wishes and applied to, and been accepted by, a prestigious medical
school. In the meantime, an admissions scout from an MFA program has
discovered John’s paintings hanging on a coffee shop wall and has offered John a
full scholarship. As a matter of fact, John also associates himself with Practical
Identity 2: I’m part of a group of artistic bohemians who abides by Principle of
Choice (b): “Follow your passion.” And John knows he will probably derive
much more personal satisfaction from a career in the arts. Finally, John also
identifies with Practical Identity 3: I’m a grown man and I am my own person,
and, as such, I can and should make up my own mind on the basis of my own
reasons. As such, John 3 respects Principle of Choice (c): “Never be swayed by
mere impulses. Always make up your own mind, and do so on the basis of your
own reasons.” Now, on Korsgaard’s account, for John—and not merely the facts
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at work within John—to determine which future path he should take, John,
operating as John (3), will need to take a step back, review both career paths and
then arrive at a principled decision as to which choice he should ultimately
endorse. But how exactly will John go about doing this?
Suppose John first conducts a cost-benefit analysis. John composes a list of
considerations that weigh in favor of and against each candidate career choice.
Having composed the list, John reviews both sets of considerations in an effort to
ascertain their merits. Suppose John encounters the consideration: “If I don’t earn
the medical degree, I will have rejected my parents’ advice and will thereby
disappoint them, not to mention wasted all the money they invested in my
undergraduate program.” This consideration strikes John as a very good reason to
pursue the medical career. In fact, the moment the prospect of disappointing his
parents occurs to John he is overcome with a wave of dread and feels a powerful
impulse to pursue the medical career, however uninspiring. Yet at that very
moment the voice of John’s Practical Identity (2) kicks in: “Hold on! What about
your creative passion? Do you feel no obligation to follow your artistic calling?
Imagine how empty, how pitiful you will feel if you follow the conventional
straight and narrow, just for fear of disappointing your parents!” Again, this
thought strikes John as eminently reasonable. Moreover, the prospect of living in
such a “compromised” fashion induces another wave of dread and generates an
impulse to reject the medical profession. Yet now the voice of John (3) strongly
asserts itself: “Oh, c’mon! You’re getting all bent out of shape here, bullied about
by your emotions.
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impartial look at each career path and corresponding principle of action. Just look
at the facts and arrive at an objective conclusion.” And so John (3) attempts to do
just this. He takes a deep breath, rubs his eyes, and asks himself, afresh, which is
really the most reasonable: (1) Honoring his parents vs. (2) Following his
passions. He may even ask himself, as Korsgaard (via Kant) suggests, which
principle would best apply, in general, to any college graduate in his position—
such that he can will one principle or another to operate as a “law”. Yet the
moment John (3) attempts to arrive at such a verdict, he is stampeded by the same
mob of anxieties that plagued him before, and he finally collapses in a heap of
futility and despair.
I hope that this portrait of John’s unsuccessful efforts at practical reasoning
will strike a familiar chord. After all, deliberation—especially concerning
complex questions of great importance—can be extremely difficult, and we rarely
meet with as much success as we wish. Nonetheless, note that John is clearly and
actively doing all sorts of things. He has focused on the career question before
him; he has written down the list of considerations as they occurred to him; and he
has tried impartially to ascertain the merits of each consideration and the merits of
each principle, in general. All of these activities might properly be understood as
John’s efforts to orient himself to the facts of his case, or, as Moran put it, to
“orient himself to his reasons.” And yet, to what extent has John truly
“interposed” himself109 in his mental processes? That is to say, to what extent has

109

Recall Velleman’s passage: “[W]hat makes us agents rather than mere subjects
of behavior […] is our perceived capacity to interpose ourselves into the course of
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John, operating as John (3) intervened among his facts in a way such that his
activity should be attributed “him” and not to his facts?
Let us take a closer look. Notice, first, that John’s idea to write up a costbenefit analysis just occurred to him. As a matter of fact, when John needs to
make up his mind about difficult matters, usually does any number of things.
Sometimes he calls a friend, or goes for a walk, or writes in his journal, or takes a
nap, or composes a cost-benefit analysis. In this case, the appeal of composing a
cost-benefit analysis just spontaneously occurred to him and won him over. Note,
secondly, that as John composed his lists of considerations, these considerations
just rose up in his mind; he “asked himself” what were the costs and benefits of
each proposal, just as one may pose a question to a Magic Eight Ball, and the
responses just rose up to the “window” of his attention. Further, in focusing on
each consideration and attempting to evaluate their merits, or their
“reasonableness,” note that the course of John’s cogitations, or “mental ballistics”
as Strawson puts it,110 proceeded rapidly and out of view and were likely
influenced by any number of preferences, fears and desires, of which John is not
conscious. As such, the deliverances of such cogitations, again, just occurred to
him, as did their attendant emotions.111 Moreover, note that John did not

events in such a way that the behavioral outcome is traceable directly to us” (The
Possibility of Practical Reason, 2000, p.128, emphasis mine)
110
See Galen Strawson, “Mental Ballistics and Second Order Belief,”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society N.S., (2003) 103: 227-56.
111
Nietzsche is especially good here. See (2001, p. 112, §111): “The course of
logical thoughts and inferences in our brains today corresponds to a process and
battle of drives that taken separately are all very illogical and unjust; we usually
experience only the outcome of the battle: that is how quickly and covertly this
ancient mechanism runs its course in us.”
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voluntarily invoke his practical identities; they arose as if in response to the
prompting of occurring fears and desires. For example, John’s recognition of what
he regards as the sell-out tedium of a medical career excited his “retaliatory”
longing to pursue the passions of the artistic career (Practical Identity 2), which,
in turn, prompted his fear of disappointing his parents and brought back into play
Practical Identity 1. Indeed, even the voice of Practical Identity (3) seemed to wax
and wane in relation to the other voices. As such, while John did perform various
activities in an effort to “orient himself to reasons” or to “author his own
reasons,” very little of this activity proceeded according to the direction a distinct,
self-conscious authoritative “I”; rather, it proceeded spontaneously, “beneath the
hood,” so to speak, of John’s conscious mediation.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Now, suppose John begins to suspect this. That is, suppose John begins to
sense that, even when he has attempted to “pull back” and don the mantle of the
supervisory “I,” this “I”, as Arpaly has puts it, has been acting as a “dupe” of
“other desires, emotions, or irrationality”. Or, he suspects, as Arpaly puts it, that
“the mere first person experience of [his] having control over [his] mental life is
not by itself a surefire indication that [he] actually has control over [he] mental
life, in any meaningful sense of ‘self-control’” (Arpaly, 2003: 19). And suppose
this revelation induces a fresh wave of panic. After all, like many of us who desire
to become “bounded, masterful, autonomous selves,” John wishes that he
“himself”—that is, John operating as John 3—should serve as the responsible
chaperone of his mental activities. And so, in fit of frustration, John resolves to
really bear down and do whatever is required of him to assume firmer hold of the
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deliberative reins, making absolutely certain that it is he himself and not forces
within him that will determine the course and outcome of his deliberations.
How will John go about doing this? Let us explore two natural-seeming
proposals: “Scratch” and “Decision.”

4.3.2 Scratch
In the first case, to make sure “he himself” and not just “forces within him”
has determined the course and outcome of his deliberation, let’s suppose that John
resolves to take a much larger step back. That is, suppose John recognizes that
his previous effort to occupy the perspective of Practical Identity (3) was a failure.
After all, recall that when he attempted rationally and impartially to resolve the
tensions between Practical identities (1) and (2), John succumbed to a tempest of
emotions. So this time John resolves to summon all his strength and evacuate, as
much as possible, the emotion-laden Practical Identities (1) and (2) and fully
inhabit Practical Identity (3) such that he can engage his “pure reason” which, as
Kant has suggested, can “of itself, independently of anything empirical, determine
the will” (1997b, 5:42). From such an untarnished, luminous, vantage point, from
such a “neutral substratum,”112 as Nietzsche puts it, John will make certain that his

112

See Nietzsche’s criticism of such a “neutral substratum” in discussion of lambs
and birds of prey (2006, p. 26, §13). “For just as the popular mind separates the
lightning from its flash and takes the latter for an action, for the operation of a
subject called lightning, so popular morality also separates strength from
expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong
man, which was free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such
substratum…”
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deliberations proceed free of any subversive inputs issuing from the other two,
seditious, practical identities.
Yet, as discussed in the previous chapter, we should rightly be skeptical of
John’s prospects. Recall the formidable impediments that plague any effort to
achieve an accurate grasp of one’s facts. Recall the various experiments in which
subjects were informed of common epistemic blind spots and were asked to
review their reflections to make certain that they themselves had not succumbed
to them—only to deny their susceptibility to such blind spots and arrive at the
very same epistemically compromised conclusions. As such, in spite of John’s
most conscientious efforts to overcome the influence of biases stemming from his
“intellectual character,” or his “contingent profile of concerns,” as Blackburn puts
it113 his analysis will still, in all likelihood, yield to a number of undetected (and
undetectable) prejudices. Furthermore, as previously discussed, John’s attempts to
establish or infer new facts about himself—whether, for example, he really should
prefer one principle over another—will also likely succumb to such influences.114
Yet concerns loom from other directions. Consider the following normative
worry. First, recall that on Korsgaard’s view, a person must act for a reason;
indeed, as Korsgaard has said, one’s reasons must go “all the way down” (2003,
p.118). But by what means will John discover reasons that will ultimately justify
one practical identity or principle of choice over another? That is, how, by appeal
113

See Blackburn (1998, pp. 241)
Again see Nietzsche: “[M]ost of a philosopher’s conscious thought is secretly
directed and forced into determinate channels by the instincts. Even behind all
logic and its autocratic posturings stand valuations, or stated more clearly,
physiological requirements for the preservation of a particular type of life.” (2002,
p. 7, §3) and also (2002, “On The Prejudices of Philosophers,” p. 5-24)
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to “reason alone,” might John impartially weigh the merits of his two competing
principles, (1) Honoring one’s parents, and (2) Following one’s passion? Surely,
reason will permit John to amass a great deal of data; it will permit him, as Hume
suggests, to perform various inferences, mathematical calculations and exercises
of demonstrative reasoning;115 it will allow him to ascertain causes and effects
associated with various proposals and “[regard] the abstract relations of [his]
ideas” (T: 2.3.3, p. 265).	
   It will permit him to calculate various probabilities, and
make various projections. But, having amassed all such data, where will John
discover a final, impartial reason that will establish, all things considered, the
preferability of one principle over the other? Note, as Blackburn says, that for a
reason to derive from Reason alone, it must be “capable of appealing to all
reasonable people simply in virtue of their rationality, and independent of any
particular desire or interest they happened to have” (Blackburn, 1998, p.253). And
yet, as Nagel has pointed out, eventually the question of why one set of
considerations will win out over another set will eventually “have no answer or it
will have an answer that takes us outside of the domain of subjective normative
reason and into the domain of formative causes of [one’s] character” (1986, p.
117). That is to say, since nothing “impartially” recommends one principle over
another,116 John eventually will have to tap into his “contingent profile of

115

David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, (ed.), David Fate Norton and Mary
J. Norton, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), (2.3.3, p. 265). Henceforth:
“T”.
116
At least, it is very difficult to understand how any reason could possibly,
impartially, determine whether it is, in general, preferable for a person to honor
her parents or to pursue her passion. As Hume has famously remarked: “’Tis not
contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of
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concerns,” or, as Williams puts it, his “motivational set”.117 As such, John’s
preference will eventually “bottom out” in the question of how much he loves his
parents and fears disappointing them, or how passionately he feels about a career
in the arts and fears a less-than-passionate life. Yet note that such fears or desires
themselves are likely not the product of conscious reflection. That is, John’s
desire for his parents’ approval is not something John has “authored” or
“produced” as a result of practical deliberation; nor is the pleasure he takes in his
artistic work or his asphyxiating fear of abandoning such work. Rather, such
preferences have accrued to him by way of nature and upbringing, and are as unattributable to his authoritative self-conscious deliberative will as his distaste for
olives or his fear of the dark. In fact, over the course of John’s life, John has
unselfconsciously built up a vast number of dispositions118—longings, fears,
prejudices—irrespective of self-conscious rational scrutiny and endorsement. As
such, to the extent that John’s reflection is influenced by his un-authored

my finger.” (T, 2.3.3, p. 267). And Blackburn has put it, “There is no necessary
object of concern” (1998, p. 253).
117
(Williams, 1981) Frankfurt has also put this thought nicely. Speaking of the
Kantian “pure” will, he writes: “This pure will is a very peculiar and unlikely
place in which to locate an indispensable condition of individual autonomy. After
all, its purity consists precisely in the fact that it is wholly untouched by an of the
contingent personal features that make people distinctive, and that characterize
their specific identities […] The pure will has no individuality whatsoever.”
(Frankfurt, 1999, p. 132). See also Williams: “[P]ractical deliberation is firstpersonal, radically so, and involves an I that must be more intimately the I of my
desires.” (Williams, 1985, p. 67)
118
See Michael Smith’s illuminating treatment of his “dispositional conception of
desire”. Michael Smith, “The Humean Theory of Motivation,” Mind, New Series,
Vol. 96, No. 381 (Jan., 1987) pp. 36-61, esp. pp. 50-54.
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preferences, his practical deliberation cannot properly be understood as a pure
product of rational autonomy.119
Indeed, the influence of un-chosen dispositions will give rise to a further,
familiar, metaphysical problem, what I will call the “Problem of Self-Creation”.
Nagel has put the problem thus:
By increasing our objectivity and self-awareness, we seem to
acquire increased control over what will influence our actions, and
thus to take our lives into our own hands. Yet the logical goal of
these ambitions is incoherent, for to be really free we would have
to act from a standpoint completely outside ourselves, choosing
everything about ourselves, including all our principles of
choice—creating ourselves from nothing, so to speak.
This is contradictory: in order to do anything we must already
be something. (1988, p.118)120
That is to say, as discussed above, insofar as John wishes to exercise rational
autonomy over his deliberations and, in so doing, produce or author his resultant
attitudes whole cloth, he will also need to author those preferences that feed into
and influence his deliberations (for, otherwise, un-authored preferences will
influence his process). Yet the prospect of “getting behind” one’s entire ensemble
of existing preferences is problematic, for, from such a neutral position, from such

119

See Arpaly’s rather extreme view: “[E]very step I take in deliberation is
informed in a non-deliberative way by beliefs and desires that do not participate
in it” (2003: 59).
120
See Blackburn’s and Williams’ versions of this “Self-Creation” argument.
First Blackburn: “You, when you deliberate, are whatever you are: a person of
tangled desires, conflicting attitudes to your parents, inchoate ambitions,
preferences and ideals, with an inherited ragbag of attitudes to different actions,
situations, and characters. You do not manage, ever, to stand apart from all that”
(1998, p. 252). Williams: “The I that stands back in rational reflection from my
desires is still the I that has those desires and will, empirically and concretely act;
and it is not, simply by standing back in reflection, converted into a being whose
fundamental interest lies in the harmony of all interests. It cannot, just by taking
this step, acquire the motivation of justice” (1985, p. 69).
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a “view from nowhere,”121 one would possess no preferential basis according to
which his deliberative process could even get off the ground. Thus, as Nagel puts
it: “In order to do anything we must already be something.” Or, as Frankfurt has
put it, once we occupy such a preference-shorn standpoint, there is “no fixed point
from which a self-directed volitional process can begin” (1999 p. 110). As such,
Frankfurt asks: “What preferences and priorities are to guide him in choosing,
when his own preferences and priorities are among the very things he must
choose?” And he answers: “It appears that he is left with so little volitional
substance that no choice he makes can be regarded as originating in a nature that
is genuinely his. With respect to a person whose will has no fixed determinate
character, it seems that the notion of autonomy or of self-direction cannot find a
grip” (1988, 177-178). 122 Thus we find that the “I,” in an effort to cut loose its
empirical strings, eventually discovers it has lost its volitional basis: in realizing
its freedom, it has immobilized itself.

4.3.3 Brute Decision
It thus appears that the effort to “evacuate” John 1 and John 2 and fully
occupy the purely rational John 3 in an effort to render a decision will, at the very
least, encounter formidable resistance. But perhaps John can circumvent these
121

Nagel (1986). See, also Galen Strawson’s concise treatment of this in his
articulation of his “Basic Argument”. Galen Strawson, “The Impossibility of
Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for
Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 75, No. ½ (Aug. 1994) pp. 5-24.
122
See also Williams: “I am, at the time of mature reflection, what I have become,
and my reflection, even if it is about my dispositions, must at the same time be
expressive of them. I think about ethical goods from an ethical point of view that
I have already acquired and that is part of what I am.” (1985, p. 51)
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concerns and determine his attitudes via another route. That is, perhaps John can
just override the arduous process of deliberation and simply, spontaneously, make
it the case, just like that, that he believes one career to be preferable, or else make
it the case, just like that, that he desires one career over the other, by means of
“brute volition”.
At least when it comes to the determination of beliefs, Ginet123 has suggested
that we commonly do this very thing. Consider the following case124. You have
headed out on a road trip, and an hour into the trip, you wonder if you have left
the oven on. You know it is indeed possible that you have left it on (though you
rarely do leave it on, you have in fact done so enough times to legitimize your
worry), but it is also likely that you have in fact turned it off. It is too late to turn
back and you know of no one who can check for you. And so, for the sake of
psychological expedience, you “just decide” to believe that you have turned the
oven off. In this case, you will render it the case that you possess a certain
attitude—your belief—purely by dint of will, that is, by means of a voluntary
decision. In a like manner, John might “just decide,” by dint of will, to believe
that a particular career path is preferable.
Yet this proposal has prompted a number of objections. Alston, for example,
suggests that in such cases one is in fact subconsciously responding to evidence
that favors one prospect over the other.125 Moreover, on Alston’s view, it is
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Carl Ginet, “Deciding to Believe.” In Knowledge, Truth, and Duty, (Ed.)
Matthias Steup, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 63-76.
124
This case is based on Ginet’s example discussed in 2001.
125
For a similar argument, see Nottleman (2006, p. 572-573). For an argument
that Ginet’s agent is only “accepting” and not “believing” a proposition, see
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simply a contingent fact of our human, cognitive wiring that we cannot “just
decide” to believe a proposition. As he puts it: “When I look out my window and
see rain falling, water dripping off the leaves of trees, and cars passing by, I no
more have immediate control over whether I accept those propositions than I have
basic control. I form the beliefs that rain is falling, etc. willy-nilly.”126 As such,
Alston contends, we are just wired in such a way that we cannot exercise
deliberate control over our beliefs.
Others127 have made a stronger case, arguing that the voluntary, decisive
formation of a belief is a conceptual impossibility. Let us consider one such
argument developed by Patricia Hieronymi. Hieronymi claims that “you cannot,
properly speaking, form and execute an intention to believe. You can, at best,
form and execute an intention to bring it about that you believe” (2009, p.157).
To make her case, Hieronymi first distinguishes beliefs from supposings or
imaginings in virtue of the fact that “to believe that p is to be committed to p as
Andrei A. Buckareff, “Acceptance and Deciding to Believe,” Journal of
Philosophical Research, Volume, 29, 2004.
126
William Alston, “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification.”
In Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p.
115-152. Alston distinguishes “basic” from “immediate” voluntary control as
follows. Basic control is a type of control we exercise when we when we simply
decide to perform an action, and our action follows immediately upon our
decision. He suggests that we can exercise immediate non-basic control over
beliefs that arise as a result of “one uninterrupted intentional act” (that is, beliefs
which arise, not merely as a result of a decision, but as a result of one or a series
of actions).
127
For a good sampling, see: Bernard Williams, “Deciding to Believe” from
Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974) p.136-151;
Dion Scott-Kakures “On Belief and Captivity of the Will.” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 54 (1994): 77-103 and Pamela Hieronymi,
“Controlling Attitudes.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2006), p. 45-74. See
also Hieronymi “Believing at Will,” from Belief and Agency, David Hunter, ed.,
The Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 35 (2009), p. 153.
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true—to take p to be true in a way that leaves one answerable to certain questions
and criticisms […] to standards of justification, warrant, or consistency that
govern belief” (2006, p. 49).128 Further, Hieronymi distinguishes between two
kinds of “reasons for belief”—reasons that bear directly on the truth of p, or, as
she puts it, constitutive reasons, and reasons that do not vouch for the truth of p
but may suggest that p is a beneficial belief to hold, what she calls extrinsic
reasons (pragmatic reasons to believe p would thus qualify as extrinsic—as in the
Ginet case mentioned above). Hieronymi explains that when one “intends to
believe p” one must obviously not already believe p, for if one already believed a
proposition, one could not simultaneously “intend” to do so.

Rather, on

Hieronymi’s account, when one “intends to believe p” one desires to believe p on
the basis of extrinsic reasons—that is, on the basis of reasons that argue for the
desirability, not the truth, of p. And yet, one “cannot become committed to an
answer to a question by finding convincing reasons that you, yourself do not take
to settle that question” (2009, p. 165). That is to say, it appears to be a conceptual
truth that if I am seeking an answer to a question of whether p, and if I encounter
reasons or evidence that I do not take to directly address the question of whether
p, I cannot take such reasons or evidence to answer the question. For this reason,
Hieronymi claims that, “you will not, by finding convincing reasons that you take
only to show that believing p is worth doing, therein become committed to the
128

On the question of the “truth-directedness” of beliefs, see, for example, Nishi
Shah and David Velleman, “Doxastic Deliberation.” The Philosophical Review,
(Oct. 2005), Vol.114, No. 4. See also David Velleman “On the Aim of Belief,”
from The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)
and Nishi Shah “How Truth Governs Belief” The Philosophical Review, (October
2003)Vol. 112, No. 4.
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truth of p” (2009, p. 165). Indeed, one might in fact commit oneself to the
proposition that p is worth believing, and subsequently cause oneself to believe p,
but, in such a case, Hieronymi asserts that the eventual acquisition of the belief in
p (that is, the commitment to the truth of p) should be understood “not as a part of
the action you have decided upon, but rather as the product or consequence of that
action—an action best described as bringing it about that you believe or making
yourself believe” (2009, p.163).
While these may not be knockdown arguments, I suggest that, both for
contingent and conceptual reasons, the proposal that one can “just believe” or just
“make oneself believe,” a proposition, does not seem promising. Rather, the
extent to which we believe a proposition seems constrained by our appreciation of
the truth. Will we fare any better when it comes to “making ourselves desire” just
like that? That is, can we render it the case that we desire x? Unfortunately, this
seems even less plausible. After all, it just seems obvious that I cannot decide that
I prefer anchovies to mushrooms on my pizza, or that I prefer Britney Spears to
Beethoven. Or, indeed, I may certainly decide to render it the case that I desire
such things, but this decision won’t, there and then (or, in the latter case,
hopefully ever), render it the case that I actually do possess such desires.
Perhaps Velleman can be of some assistance here. In his essay, “What
Happens When Someone Acts,” Velleman suggests that among an agent’s most
fundamental desires is the desire to act in a way that appears the most reasonable.
So, if an agent comes to realize that an initially less desirable option A ultimately
is more reasonable than initially more desirable option B, the agent can “throw his
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weight behind the motives that provide the strongest reasons,”129 in favor of
option A, and thus render his weaker desire the stronger. “For when a desire
appears to provide the strongest reason for acting,” Velleman explains, “then the
desire to act in accordance with reasons becomes a motive to act on that desire,
and the desire’s motivational influence is consequently reinforced” (1992, p. 141).
So, suppose Greg is on a gluten-free diet and a friend presents him with the option
of having a slice of birthday cake or an apple. The cake may initially appear more
desirable, but, after reflecting on his health, and the consequences of eating
gluten, and his resolution to stop eating it, set against the momentary pleasant
satisfaction of eating the cake, Greg concludes that the prospect of eating the
apple is more reasonable than that of eating the cake. Since Greg desires to act
for the best reasons, and since eating the apple presents itself as the most
reasonable option, Greg “throws his weight” behind his minimal desire to eat the
apple, and, in doing so, renders the apple the more desirable option.
Now, I will have significantly more to say about cases like this in Chapter 7.
But, for now, let us note just a few things. To begin with, note that, per
Velleman’s account, Greg has not actually rendered it the case that option A is
more desirable, just like that. Rather, what has rendered A more desirable has
been Greg’s coming to the conclusion that A is more reasonable and this
conclusion connecting up in the appropriate way with a pre-existing desire—that
is, a desire to act on the basis of the best reasons. Note, second, that it is just a
matter of luck that Greg’s desire to do the most reasonable thing is sufficiently
strong such as to render the apple more desirable (after all, we may easily imagine
129 	
  Velleman	
  (1992,	
  p.	
  141)	
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a scenario in which Greg’s desire to do the most reasonable thing yields to a
stronger desire for the comfort and satisfaction of eating the cake). Third, note the
ambiguity involved in Velleman’s characterization of Greg “throwing his weight”
behind his more reasonable desire to eat the apple. Again, I will have more to say
about this in Chapter 7. But for now, I will suggest that what actually takes place
is as follows. Greg’s desire to do the most reasonable thing is activated by his
conclusion that the most reasonable thing to do in this case is to eat the apple, and
this desire automatically reinforces his additional desire to eat the apple.130 As
such, “Greg himself,” does not “throw his weight” behind his desire to eat the
apple; indeed, the “transfer of power” does not require the involvement of “Greg”
“throwing his weight” at all. Finally, notice that, in concluding that eating the
apple is the more reasonable thing to do, Greg has in fact not actually developed a
stronger desire for the apple, per se. Rather, the object of Greg’s desire has just
been to “do the most reasonable thing” which happens to involve eating the
apple—the apple itself may not strike him as any more desirable. Indeed, I can
imagine a scenario where I conclude that the most reasonable thing to do would
be to listen to Britney Spears music for two hours (suppose, for example, I need to
take my kids clothes shopping at the mall), but, having arrived at such a
conclusion, I will still find the pumped-in music deplorable. As such, I have
argued that it is one’s conclusion to do the reasonable thing—as opposed to any
activity on the part of a distinct “agent”—that renders one capable of desiring p;
130

Indeed, this seems to follow from Velleman’s remark that “the desire’s
motivational influence is consequently reinforced.” Such a “hydraulic”
characterization seems to contradict his assertion that the agent himself has to do
any “weight throwing”.
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or else that one’s desire to do most rational thing does not render the object of
desire “more desirable,” simpliciter. In any case, in no sense do we find an
autonomous agent rendering it the case that she decides to desire p just like that.
***
I have thus argued that “Scratch,” or the endeavor to “get completely behind”
oneself in order to author or produce an attitude, is enormously difficult, if not
conceptually incoherent. I argued that, given that our doxastic mechanisms are
either contingently or conceptually “wired” to our appreciation of truth, we cannot
“just decide” to believe a certain proposition. And I have suggested that we are no
more capable of “just deciding” to produce or enhance a desire, for our desires
are, by and large, hardwired, and not susceptible of voluntary decision or
manipulation. Indeed, even Velleman’s formulation suggests that our “deciding to
desire p” is contingent upon the collusion of our conclusion that p is “more
reasonable,” and the triggering of a sufficiently powerful pre-existing desire to act
on one’s “superior rational force”.
Yet perhaps one does not need to “author” or “produce” an attitude in order to
exercise responsible agency. Perhaps our “insertion into the causal order” can be
located in a different place, that is, in our exercise of “complicit” agency, where
one can “assume ownership” of one’s attitudes and actions. So, let us now take a
look at some such “ownership” accounts. I will focus, first, on the compatibilist
accounts of Fischer and Ravizza and Lynne Baker. I will then revisit Moran’s
notion of avowals.
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4.4 Complicit Agency: Fischer and Ravizza on Ownership
Fischer and Ravizza agree that a person’s orientation to reasons is a necessary
component of “ deep” agency. But Fischer and Ravizza do not focus on a person’s
capacity to produce or author an attitude, a capacity for what they call “Regulative
Control”131. Rather, on their account, an agent’s responsibility-conferring selfconscious intervention requires only what they call “Guidance Control,” a control
that requires of one’s reasons-response mechanism (i) That it be appropriately132
responsive to reasons (1998, p. 89); and (ii) That it be “one’s own” (1998, p. 99).
How does a person come to “own” her reasons-response mechanism? Fischer and
Ravizza provide that a person does so when she satisfies three conditions: (i) An
individual must see herself as the source of her behavior; (ii) She must accept that
she is a fair target of the reactive attitudes that result from how she exercises her
agency in certain contexts; and (iii) Her view of herself must be based, in an
appropriate way, on the evidence (1998, p. 210-214).
Now, I will concede straightaway that Fischer and Ravizza’s view has much to
recommend it. Indeed, for reasons I will more fully develop in chapters Seven and
Eight, I believe their compatibilist account of responsibility may represent all that

131

Strictly speaking, their notion of regulative control involves being able “to do
otherwise,” in the sense that an agent is metaphysically free to choose other than
the way she actually chooses (something that determinism rules out). I suggest
that regulative control might also be understood as a kind of Productive Agency,
that is, the capacity to decide one’s outcome irrespective of one’s antecedent
personal facts.
132
Note that I will be making specific reference here to Fischer and Ravizza’s
characterization of “moderate reasons-responsiveness” as opposed to both “strong
reasons-responsiveness,” which they consider “too strong” a condition for moral
responsibility (1998: p. 89) and “weak reasons-responsiveness” which they
consider “too weak” a condition for moral responsibility (1998: p. 89).
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we, time-bound, flesh and blood creatures can reasonably expect to achieve and
exercise. After all, the ambition to take ourselves completely “in our own hands”
or to “create ourselves from scratch” does seem unrealistic, if not incoherent. Yet
we certainly can, and indeed, we must, as Fischer and Ravizza claim, “assume
ownership” of, or “assume responsibility” for, our attitudes and our actions.
Indeed, so long as we wish to participate in our social world with its customs of
promise-keeping, law-abiding and forgiveness, we must do so.
In spite of the ostensive virtues of Fischer and Ravizza’s account of
responsibility, one may nonetheless find it unsatisfying or “shallow,” as
Smilansky puts it133 (or, indeed, regard it as a form of “subterfuge,” as Kant see
it).134 And this for a number of reasons. To begin with, again, Fischer and
Ravizza’s account does not provide for the “production” or “authoring” of one’s
behavior or attitude, and some135 regard this as a necessary condition for ultimate
blame and credit grounding responsibility. Further, the very assumption of
ownership clearly does not link up in any sufficient way with genuine
responsibility. As Nietzsche has famously put it: “We laugh at him who steps out
of his room at the moment when the sun steps out of its room, and then says: ‘I
will that the sun shall rise’; and at him who cannot stop a wheel, and says: ‘I will
that it shall roll’; and at him who is thrown down in wrestling, and says: ‘here I lie

133

Such is Smilansky’s (2003) criticism.
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  Kant	
  (1997,	
  5:96,	
  p.	
  81)	
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Such did Kant. Also see Strawson (1994), Pereboom (2001), Smilansky
(2003).
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but I will lie here!’”136 Indeed, my “assuming ownership” of my special
disorientation or my deformed feet clearly does not render me any more genuinely
responsible for having developed such liabilities. Yet, of course Fischer and
Ravizza’s account does not focus on the rising of the sun, or on such specific
bodily or psychological afflictions, but rather on one’s “reasons-response
mechanism”. As such, any proper criticism will need to focus here. So focus here,
I shall.
Note first their three conditions on assuming ownership of one’s reasonsresponse mechanism, that (i) An individual must see herself as the source of her
behavior; (ii) She must accept that she is a fair target of the reactive attitudes that
result from how she exercises her agency in certain contexts; and (iii) Her view of
herself must be based, in an appropriate way, on the evidence. Of course much
will ride on condition (iii), that is, the question of whether an agent’s view of
herself has been based, in an appropriate way, on the evidence. For one might
very well form a view of oneself that satisfies (i) and (ii), but that is insufficiently
or incorrectly based on the evidence, or based on the wrong kind of evidence. As
such, Fischer and Ravizza’s account will require a clear specification of what it
might mean for a person’s view of herself to be “appropriately based” on the
evidence. Unfortunately, Fischer and Ravizza do not offer much help here; rather,
they remark that “[t]he specification of the relevant notion of appropriateness here

136

Nietzsche, Daybreak, (eds). Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, (trans.)
Hollingdale, R.J., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 77, §124.
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is a delicate and difficult matter” (1998, p. 213), and that “the relevant notion of
appropriateness must remain unanalyzed” (1998, p. 236).
Fischer and Ravizza’s failure to provide such an adequate specification
prompts a number of concerns, especially when it comes to manipulation cases.
That is, in cases that involve hypnosis, or drug-induced states, or the work of a
mad neuroscientist, Fischer and Ravizza concede that an agent cannot properly
recognize the effect of such manipulations, and hence, cannot responsibly “own”
her reasons-response mechanism. Thus they concede that someone who, for
example, has been “electronically induced to have the relevant view of himself
[…] has not formed his view of himself in the appropriate way” (1998, p. 236).137
To see why this presents a problem, take the case of Hypnotized Bill. Bill has
been hypnotized to believe (1) That he is a re-incarnation of Napoleon and, as
Napoleon, that he is the source of his own behavior; (2) That people will accuse
him of foolishness and will tell him that he has been hypnotized into believing
that he is Napoleon, and they will do this because they are afraid and envious of
his supreme authority; and (3) That, as a result, such teasing is sure-fire evidence
of the fact that he really is Napoleon and that his conviction is not the product of
hypnosis. Under such conditions, Bill/Napoleon will indeed regard himself, as he
marches through town, as the “source of his behavior,” and as “a fair target of the
reactive attitudes that result from how he exercises his agency in certain
contexts.” And yet, insofar as Bill’s beliefs have been implanted in him, it is clear
that Bill’s view of himself has not been based appropriately on the evidence and,
137

Fischer and Ravizza assert that one who is “electronically induced to have the
relevant view of himself […] has not formed his view of himself in the
appropriate way” (1998, p. 236).
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thus, that Bill is in no position to genuinely assume ownership of his reasonsresponse mechanism. Indeed, as noted, Fischer and Ravizza concede this point.
But in conceding this point, Fischer and Ravizza expose the chief vulnerability
of their position. That is, if we allow that such a case of manipulation undermines
one’s ownership of one’s reasons-response mechanisms, one may wonder whether
the cumulative effect of enculturation, habituation, or peer pressure, may pose a
similar threat. For recall that in manipulation cases what principally threatens the
status of one’s “ownership” is precisely the fact that, due to the manipulated or
“implanted” nature of one’s reasons-response mechanism, one cannot properly
claim ownership of one’s reasons-response mechanism. That is, in such a case,
one cannot responsibly assume ownership of one’s reasons-response mechanism
because to do so one would involve the implementation one’s very reasonsresponse mechanism, the corruption of which, again—due to the nature of its
corruption—one cannot detect.138 Indeed, as we discovered in our examination of
the pitfalls of self-knowledge, we are very commonly led to conclusions by means
of pressures, suggestions or unconscious mechanisms that we have not, and, in
many cases cannot recognize.139 Of course there is no shortage of cases where
persons young and old have been raised in a closed environment and have been
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Recall Blackburn: “We can compare the situation to looking at our own eyes in
a mirror. We might see that our eyes are cloudy; but if they are, it will be with
cloudy eyes that we see it” (1998, p. 261). And see Wittgenstein, speaking of a
similar problem: It is “[a]s if someone were to buy several copies of the morning
newspaper to assure himself that what it said was true.” Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations, (trans.) G.E.V. Anscombe (Blackwell Publishing
Ltd.), §256.
139
Derk Pereboom nicely develops this case in his “Four Case Argument”. See
Derk Pereboom (2001: pp. 112-126)
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trained to embrace certain propositions, and, in addition, to believe that they
themselves have responsibly arrived at their own feelings and conclusions. As a
particularly vivid example, consider the case of “The Most Hated Family in
America” 140—the Phelps family, who are the principle members of the Westboro
Baptist Church. The Phelps children are brought up to believe that, for example,
the United States is an immoral country due to its tolerance for homosexuality. As
such, family members gather and picket military funerals, blazoning signs that
deprecate American soldiers and homosexuals. Moreover, the Phelps’ family
members—children, adolescents and adults—by no means believe they have been
brainwashed; rather, they believe they have arrived at their own conclusions of
their own volition; they believe they are appropriately responsive to evidence, as
presented by their elders, by scripture, and by their own judgment. How, then, can
Fischer and Ravizza distinguish cases of hypnosis from cases of ordinary
enculteration? In response to this concern, Fischer and Ravizza assert that “it is
tolerably clear that ordinary practical reasoning is in some way interestingly
different in kind from practical reasoning in which crucial inputs have been
implanted through direct manipulation, or the inputs are being processed through
direct electronic manipulation.”141 Tolerably clear, perhaps, to them. But without
specifying what precisely distinguishes the “induced inputs” of an external
mechanism from the enculturated “non-induced inputs” that factor into one’s
“natural” course of practical reasoning, it seems they cannot sufficiently

140

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Most_Hated_Family_in_America.
Fischer and Ravizza offer this response to Bratman, from “Replies,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Sep., 2000), p. 476.

141

	
  

95

	
  
distinguish cases of a person genuinely “owning” his reasons-response
mechanism from cases where such efforts are defective or bogus.142
I suggest, further, that Fischer and Ravizza’s failure to distinguish such cases
underscores at least two deeper problems with their compatibilist account. First of
all, recall, as Fisher and Ravizza have conceded, that one’s subjective
“assumption of responsibility” does not automatically render one responsible.
For, again, the very assumption of responsibility for one’s reasons response
mechanism may be informed by a reasons response mechanism that has been
“implanted” in an inappropriate way. Yet, as suggested above, this appears to
introduce a vicious circularity: one’s efforts to assume ownership of one’s
mechanism will be undermined by the very mechanism one invokes to assume
such ownership. Further, insofar as an individual cannot produce his own reasons
response mechanism—as Fischer and Ravizza affirm, and as I argued in the
previous section—it seems erroneous to hold an individual responsible for his
reasons-response mechanism, whether or not he correctly assumes ownership of
it. Indeed, as Smilansky has argued, “[o]ur decisions, even as ideal compatibilist
agents, reflect the way we were formed, and we have had no opportunity to have
been formed differently” (2003, p. 268). As such, Smilansky continues, Fischer
142

As Zimmerman has put it: “[T]he distinction between evidence-sensitive and
merely causally induced patterns of attitude-acquisition lies at the center of any
genuinely source-historicist constraint on the development of autonomous agency
from heteronymous beginnings.” David Zimmerman, “Reason-Responsiveness
and Ownership-of-Agency: Fischer and Ravizza’s Historicist Theory of
Responsibility”, Journal of Ethics, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2002), p. 214. See a similar
iteration of this argument developed by Todd R. Long, in “Moderate ReasonsResponsiveness, Moral Responsibility, and Manipulation” in Freedom and
Determinism, (ed.) Joe Keim-Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Savie Shier
(MIT Press, 2004).
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and Ravizza’s account “cannot form a sustainable barrier, either normatively or
metaphysically, that will block the incompatibilist’s further inquiries, about all of
the central notions: opportunity, blameworthiness, desert, fairness and justice”
(2003, p. 267).143 So, yes, we can certainly assume responsibility, as Fischer and
Ravizza recommend, but, the very assumption does not supersede the conditions
that have given rise to our reasons-response mechanism, given rise to our desire to
assume responsibility for it, and given rise to very act of assumption, itself.
Indeed, Fischer and Ravizza concede these difficulties and admit that they are
“not offering a knockdown argument for the compatibility of causal determinism
and taking responsibility” (1998, p. 236).144

4.4.1 Baker’s Reflective Endorsement
In her essay, Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism (2006), Lynne
Rudder Baker provides a similar compatibilist account of agency and offers a
suggestion that addresses Fischer and Ravizza’s “ownership” dilemma. To
develop her view, Baker invokes Frankfurt’s above-described notion of
hierarchical freedom and contends that “one important feature of Frankfurt’s view
of the hierarchical will that has gone largely unremarked is that it requires that the
agent have a first-person perspective. A person must be able to conceive of her
desires as her own—from the first-person—if she is to desire to have a certain

143

Smilansky continues: “It is unfair to blame a person for something not
ultimately under her control, and given the absence of libertarian free will,
ultimately nothing can be under our control.” (2003, p. 268)
144
For further discussion of Fischer and Ravizza’s “ownership” problem with
respect to manipulation cases, see McKenna (2000, p.104). See also Mele (2000).
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desire”(2006, p. 315).145 Baker spells out her Reflective-Endorsement view as
follows:
(RE) A person S is morally responsible for a choice or action X if X
occurs and:
(i) S wills X
(ii) S wants that she*146 will X [i.e., S wants to will X].
(iii) S wills X because she* wants to will X, and
(iv) S would still have wanted to will X even if she had known the
provenance147 of her* wanting to will X
Baker summarizes her view as follows: “If I can say, ‘These desires reflect who I
am, and this is the kind of person that I want to be,’ then (surely!) I am morally
responsible for acting on those desires—whether determinism is true or not”
(2006, p.318).148
How will RE allow Baker to address the “ownership” problem that arose in
Fischer and Ravizza manipulation cases? Here, Baker appeals most directly149 to
the specifications of condition four, that is, S will still be responsible for her
145

Baker claims, further, with Frankfurt, that “a first-person perspective is the
defining characteristic of persons” (p. 315).
146
Baker uses a * to denote “the agent” as the agent conceives herself from the
first-person perspective. As noted, I have used quotation marks to establish the
distinction.
147
The term “provenance” is shorthand for a two-fold condition: (i) S knows that
her* wanting to will X has causal antecedents that trace back to factors beyond
her* control, and (ii) S knows of the causal antecedents that trace back to factors
behind her* control that they are in the causal history of her* wanting to will X
and that they are beyond her* control.
148
See a similar articulation in Frankfurt (1988, p. 24): “Suppose that a person has
done what he wanted to so, that he did it because he wanted to do it, and that the
will by which he was moved when he did it was his will because it was the will he
wanted. Then he did it freely and of his own free will.”
149
Baker also contends that a neuroscientist could not program into a person or a
machine a first person perspective. As she puts it, a “first-person perspective
cannot be acquired by neural manipulation “(p. 316; see also p. 322). See Baker
(1981) for further arguments against the possibility that computers could acquire a
first-person perspective. She has recently abandoned this idea (personal
communication).
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action X assuming she would have wanted to will X even if she had known the
provenance of her* wanting to will X.150 That is, according to (iv), Hypnotized
Bill would still satisfy condition (iv) of RE just so long as (a) Bill knew he had
been thus programmed and (b) having recognized his programming, Bill still
would have wanted to will X. Indeed, to head off further objections, Baker
invokes her “Completeness Clause,” stipulating that an agent will still be
responsible for her endorsement of P as long as “[t]here is no further knowledge
of the circumstances of the agent’s endorsement of his willing [P] that would lead
the agent to repudiate his endorsement of his willing [P].” (2006, p. 318)
On the face of it, Baker’s “Completeness Clause” does seem to address the
ownership dilemma. After all, so long as an agent knew everything that
significantly contributed to his or her decision making process, no epistemic
deficiency could undermine the legitimacy of his or her assumption of
responsibility. Yet her proposal raises some concerns. First, I suggest that her
epistemic requirements are unreasonably high. As Nagel says, “The mind’s work
is never done” (1986, p. 129). That is to say: how might an agent possibly know
at t1 whether there might exist further knowledge of the circumstances of her
endorsement of p that, at t2, would lead her to repudiate her endorsement of p?
Indeed, imagine someone doing everything she could to “cover all her bases,” and
affirming that no further revelation could possibly change her mind, only later to
discover some crucial facts about herself or circumstances that would have
materially factored into her considerations. Given that she had done her due
150

Baker’s response is in fact motivated by an argument developed by Derk
Pereboom (2008: pp. 112-116).
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diligence, should she then be let off the hook for her earlier endorsement? Indeed,
recall the children of the Westboro Baptist church, who in fact confidently boast
that “these desires reflect who I am, and this is the kind of person that I want to
be, and no amount of further research could possibly permit me to change my
mind!” Yet, in spite of such a child’s passionate attestations, given the extent of
her brainwashing, it seems unfair to view her as responsible for her attitudes and
actions.151 Indeed, imagine such a child growing up, and coming to realize she had
been thus brainwashed. Should she blame her younger self for the views she held?
Again, our intuitions seem to rule this out. As such, given our own necessarily
limited perspective, RE seems to warrant at best a conditional attribution of
blame.152

4.4.2 Moran’s Avowals
Finally, let us revisit Moran’s account of “avowals”. Recall that Moran
contrasts two stances a person can assume toward his own behavior or thought
process: the spectator’s theoretical or descriptive stance and the agent’s
deliberative or first-personal stance.

151

And recall the case of Martha —a

One might very well hold her “accountable,” but not “ultimately responsible.”
I will discuss the distinction in chapter 7 and 8.
152
See Nagel’s discussion of this very problem in 1996, p. 126-134 and his
practical solution. He writes: “[Human beings] want to be able to stand back from
the motives and reasons and values that influence their choices, and submit to
them only if they are acceptable. Since we can’t act in the light of everything
about ourselves, the best we can do is to try to live in a way that wouldn’t have to
be revised in light of anything more that could be known about us” (p. 127). And
yet, again Nagel recognizes that “however much we expand our objective view of
ourselves, something will remain beyond the possibility of explicit acceptance or
rejection, because we cannot get entirely outside ourselves…” (p. 128).
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therapeutic patient who has been informed of the fact that she harbors deep
hostility for her abusive father. Now, Moran suggests that Martha “may not doubt
this. But without her capacity to endorse or withhold endorsement from [her
belief], and without the exercise of that capacity making a difference to what she
feels, this information may as well be about some other person, or about voices in
her head” (2001, p.93). Thus, according to Moran, to “avow” an attitude requires
more than that a person merely intellectually recognize that the attitude in
question is one she possesses; rather, she must make an active, first-personal
commitment to the attitude in question such that it makes a felt difference. And,
according to Moran, it is up to a person whether she makes such a commitment or
withholds it. Indeed, as he puts it, “in both the case of actions and attitudes, selfconsciousness makes a difference to what the person’s responsibilities and
capacities are, with respect to his involvement in their development” (2000, p.32).
Now, in Section 3.33 I acknowledged that an avowal will effectively allow a
person to more “fully own” a particular attitude or action. As such, if our patient,
Martha, were to avow and more fully commit to her hatred of her father, I
concede that such an avowal would allow for a fuller integration of her feelings,
and that this would indeed be of therapeutic value. And here, too, I will
acknowledge that such avowals do require an active commitment and that such a
commitment will make a difference. Indeed, note that whenever we make a
confession, or issue a genuine apology, or utter the words “I do,” at a wedding
ceremony, our utterances very often make a profound and felt difference. The
question I wish to raise is whether our very commitment—that is, the actual
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“merging” of our theoretical recognition of the truth of p, and our emotional
“owning up to” the truth p is really “up to” our self-conscious agency, as Moran
asserts.
To help clarify the issue, let us more fully flesh out the case of Martha. Let us
suppose that Martha has sought psychiatric help because she feels “emotionally
dead.” During each session, Martha’s therapist compiles a profile of Martha,
filling it out with theoretical data, such as: 1. Martha was born in 1967 to a mother
and an alcoholic father; 2. Martha’s favorite color is green; 3. Martha was
sexually abused by her father; 4. Martha harbors feelings of guilt and anger due to
her father’s behavior. During her therapy sessions, Martha registers all of these
items of data from a position of intellectual neutrality. She merely “logs” them, as
distinct bits of information. Now, given such detached neutrality, Martha’s
recognition of the facts of her case will be of negligible therapeutic value, for
again, as Moran says, if Martha “become[s] aware of it only because [she] fully
believes the interpretation given by [her] analyst, the attitude does not thereby
become a conscious one. There is still work to be done” (2001, p.30). But the
question is: how will Martha make the crucial transition from her theoretical,
intellectual recognition of the data to a first-person felt commitment to the data in
such a way that will make a “felt difference”?
To clarify the matter, consider following diagram:
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At time t Martha regards the data: “I harbor guilt and anger for my father” as
simply an item of neutral data, of no more importance than, “My favorite color is
green.” Martha cannot emotionally “connect” to the data because she is cut off
from her emotions (hence the dotted line). Yet by t2, the theoretical data and
Martha’s dislocated emotions have linked up, such that Martha can now, so to
speak, own up to the fact: “I was molested by my father” in a first-personal, felt
way that will be of therapeutic value. But how exactly will this linking-up take
place?
First, let us consider three possibilities, which, on Moran’s account, we must
rule out. We must rule out (1) the possibility that Martha’s cognition of data (D)
will reach a critical mass, and at that point force Martha to t2. We must also rule
out (2) the possibility that an unexpected emotional upsurge (E) will force her to
t2. And we must rule out (3) an automatic or causal convergence of the mass of
data, on one side, and the emotional charge on the other (D+E), such that the
combination of these two forces compels Martha to engage in a first-personal way
with the data. We must rule out 1-3 because to attribute the transition from t to t2
to either a critical mass of theoretical data or to a spontaneous emotional upsurge,
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or to an automatic or causal link up between the two, would be to suggest that
such a transition would not be “up to” Martha in the sense Moran specifies, but,
rather, that it would just “happen to” her.
So what needs to be the case such that Martha’s transition can be understood
as something that is “up to her” in the way Moran suggests? Again, Moran’s
answer to this question is of the familiar Rationalist variety: Moran suggests that
the self-conscious rational agent can mediate between D and E. That is to say, on
Moran’s account, “Martha,” as a self-conscious subject, occupies a position that is
distinct from D and E, such that she herself (not D or E) can link up D and E. And
yet, in light of the considerations offered above, it is difficult to understand how
she can affect such a transition.
After all, given the conditions of Martha’s case, we must rule out the
possibility that she can affect the transition by means of purely rational analysis—
for rational analysis alone will be insufficient to mobilize her emotional
commitment. And, for the reasons discussed above, we should also rule out the
possibility of her doing so by means of brute decision; that is, it seems
implausible to suggest that Martha can “just decide” to link up D and E. Indeed,
we may more clearly appreciate the implausibility of such a proposal by means of
a simple consideration of the facts of Martha’s case. That is, recall that Martha
already acknowledges her belief that she was betrayed by her father (as
mentioned, she accepts this as one of many theoretical facts about her), but, for
any number of reasons—perhaps the workings of her unacknowledged fears and
defense mechanisms—she has thus far been unable to own up to or avow her
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belief in a way that makes a felt difference. As such, the very fact that Martha has
been unable spontaneously to avow her belief in the desired fashion argues in
favor of the proposition that the matter is not simply a question of brute decision.
To thus suggest that Martha could, if she wanted, in a single bound, “leap over”
the distance between her desire and her ability to avow her belief would be to
deny the functional relevance of all the factors that have contributed to her
existing condition. Moreover, Moran himself rejects the possibility of such
voluntarism, claiming that “[t]he agency a person exercises with respect to his
beliefs and other attitudes is obviously not like that of overt basic actions like
reaching for a glass” (2001, p.114), and, further, that “the person’s role in forming
his attitudes is not to invoke a kind of willful or wishful capacity for self-creation”
(2001, p.63). Yet, absent such a capacity, it is difficult to understand how Martha
will self-consciously bring about required commitment. Indeed, I will suggest that
for such reasons, Martha’s commitment will not be something that is “up to” her
self-conscious mediation, as Moran alleges. Rather, the connection will take
place—bringing about her commitment—when, over the course of her therapy,
her overall system becomes “ready” to do so, reaches a “critical mass” and the
convergence automatically takes place.

4.5 Phenomenology and Time
I have thus far argued that, contrary to the efforts of the “I” to author, assume
ownership of, or even commit to, the facts of the “me”, in each case, the behavior
of the “I” is governed by the facts of the “me”. I recognize that these proposals
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may contradict our intuitions. After all, few features of our human experience
seem more inescapably obvious than that we are, in fact, single-party leaders of
our deliberative activity, “determining” the course and outcome of our
deliberations. As such, recall Kant’s assertion that we must act “under the idea” of
freedom, and Korsgaard’s claim that “we must regard ourselves as agents, that
being our situation, and not negotiable, for to be human is to have no choice but to
choose” (2009, p.87, emphasis mine).153 As such, this “sense” of freedom strikes
us as an inalienable condition of our human predicament, and persuades us,
perhaps more than anything, that I am behaving just as I think I am. That said, in
this section, I am going to push for an even more counterintuitive and perhaps
unpalatable claim. That is, I will argue that if we closely examine our
phenomenology

of

deliberation—especially

under

time

constraints—our

phenomenology actually does not bear out our conception of ourselves as
autonomous agents.
I thus offer Briefcase—an incident from my life. One sunny morning I left my
San Francisco apartment at 8:30 to catch an 8:40 bus that would get me to work
by 9:00. Arriving at the bus stop, and taking my seat on one of the orange, foldout
benches, I noticed an unattended, expensive-looking briefcase perched against the
front door of my apartment building. The moment I caught sight the briefcase, a
153

See also Nagel (1997, p. 118): “We cannot evade our freedom. Once we have
developed the capacity to recognize our own desires and motives, we are faced
with the choice of whether to act as they incline us to act, and in facing that
choice we are inevitably faced with an evaluative question. Even if we refuse to
think about it, that refusal can itself be evaluated. In this sense I believe Kant was
right: The applicability to us of moral concepts is the consequence of our
freedom—freedom that comes from the ability to see ourselves objectively,
through the new choices which that ability forces on us” See also, Sartre (2004, p.
350 and 360).
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flood of thoughts began to course through my mind. The thoughts might be
represented as follows: 1. How has it happened that this fancy briefcase ended up
in this position? 2. Has perhaps a forgetful person—maybe even one of my
neighbors—left it there? 3. Might this person be rushing back to the apartment
building right now to retrieve the briefcase? 4. Could it be that someone found or
even stole the briefcase and set it down there, hoping the owner would retrieve it?
5. Has a friend left the briefcase there for someone else to pick up (the building
had no buzzer)? 6. But who would possibly agree to such a crazy arrangement? 7.
If any of possibilities 2-5 are correct, and someone is in need of the briefcase,
should I rush up and grab it? 8. After all, if I don’t retrieve the briefcase, and do it
right away, someone else, and probably someone less conscientious, is bound to
grab it. 9. Now I can see the bus coming up the street. I must make up my mind
very quickly about whether to get the briefcase. 10. If I miss my bus I could take a
taxi to work, but it is rush hour and I might not be able to flag a taxi in time. Is it
worth the risk? 11. Why haven’t I grabbed the briefcase yet? Why have I let so
much time elapse? And what does this say about me? Am I inconsiderate? Am I
lazy? Am I irresponsible? Why haven’t I felt sufficiently motivated to retrieve the
briefcase? 12. Why am I wasting crucial time worrying about what my waste of
time says about me? 13. Could there be a bomb in the briefcase? 14. Could this be
some strange trick or prank?

15. After all, really, what are the chances of

someone either accidentally leaving a briefcase out on the sidewalk like this, or
leaving it on the sidewalk for the reasons mentioned? 16. But, then again, what’s
the probability of this being a prank? 17. Am I just trying to talk myself out of
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retrieving the briefcase because I don’t want to deal with it? 18. If I don’t grab the
briefcase, will I regret not having done so? 19. Suppose it was my briefcase,
wouldn’t I hope that a responsible person such as myself would grab it? 20. But
now the bus is one block away. If I run across the street to retrieve the briefcase I
will almost certainly miss my bus and, in all probability, will be late for work. Is
it worth the risk? 21. Aw, hell, I might as well run the risk; I’ll go grab the
briefcase. 22. I go and grab the briefcase.154
Let us consider just a few of the particular features of my thought process. To
begin with, notice I did not choose to engage in the process itself. Rather, the
process “took me over,” and, so to speak, “threw me downstream,” the moment I
set eyes on the briefcase. Further, notice that questions concerning the briefcase
engaged my attention due to my natural susceptibilities to circumstances like this;
for example, my disposition to be helpful, especially when it comes to things like
lost wallets, keys and briefcases, especially as I myself have often lost such items
and strangers have returned them to me. Of course I had hoped to pass my time at
the bus stop otherwise engaged—perhaps reading the novel I had brought. But I
could not control the extent to which the briefcase-related thoughts commanded
my attention and coursed through my mind. Notice, further, that as my thoughts
raced, I was cognizant of the fact that, for every moment I did not run across the
street to retrieve the briefcase, I left open the possibility that someone else—
someone less conscientious—could do so, and I chastised myself for the fact that I
had not run across the street and retrieved the briefcase. Yet even as I fretted over
154

It turned out, incidentally, that someone had lost the briefcase; someone had
found it and then just set it up against the doorstep of my apartment building. The
owner, who did not live in my building, was very grateful that I returned it.
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the fact that I had not taken action, I was unable to regulate the force, or the
“valences,” of the conflicting voices in my head. Indeed, it became quite clear to
me that while there were “warring voices” in my head, and while all of these
voices genuinely expressed my concerns, there was no “I”—that is, no “single
impartial party” no unitary, transcendent “I”, overseeing and conducting this
process. As Dennett has put it, I could not act as “parade marshal for the queue of
considerations-to-be reviewed, putting each in its proper place in line.”155 Indeed,
this “parade” advanced according to “its own” predilections, at its own speed, and
in whatever direction it chose. As such, while there was no question that the
thoughts coursing through my head were “mine,” at the same time it was
anguishingly clear that “I”—a dislocated agent—was not “in control” or, indeed,
even “actively thinking” them.
Now, one may contend that instances such as this are exceptional, that,
generally speaking, when we deliberate, we are not subject to such temporal
pressures, and that, as such, under ordinary circumstances, we correctly
experience ourselves as “taking control” of the process. Yet we may account for
such contrasting phenomenology in a number of ways.156 First, note that when we
are very strongly inclined in one direction or another, we do not experience a
tension or a schism among our competing beliefs or desires and as a result we do
not experience a sensation of internal conflict or fragmentation. We do not take
ourselves to be at the mercy of, or pushed around by, competing thoughts or
desires. Rather, in virtue of the “univocality” or alignment of our disposition we
155

Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room, The Varieties of Will Worth Wanting
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1985, p. 86.
156
I will further develop these ideas in Chapter 7.
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may, indeed, feel like a “single party” determining our course. Indeed, under such
circumstances, as Frankfurt has put it, our conviction may “resound endlessly”
through us (1998, p. 21). Second, when we have the luxury of more time, and can
more patiently consider our options, we naturally feel more at ease, less rushed
and more in control. Yet this does not suggest that we are exercising supervisory
control over the order or the intensity of our competing considerations; they are
just progressing at a more leisurely rate and are attended by an overall feeling of
comfort or ease.

4.6 Agency Conclusion
Note that the central focus of this chapter has not been the question of whether
or not we engage a kind of “deep” agency unavailable to creatures lacking in selfconsciousness. This has never been in dispute. Rather, my focus has been the
Rationalist characterization of two central features of deep agency—the SecondOrder Component and the Responsibility Component. I have not challenged the
second-order component. I take it as incontestable that persons reflect upon, and
attend to, themselves—their attitudes and actions. Rather, I have challenged the
second, “Responsibility” component of deep agency, that is, the Rationalist
proposal that the “I” can attend to the facts of the “me” in a way that does not
derive, or flow from, the facts of the “me”—in a way, that is, where the “I” can
“unilaterally” influence the facts of the “me.” I have argued to the contrary,
suggesting that the behavior of the “I” is constrained by a vast network of
personal facts—constrained, that is, by antecedent desires, dispositions,
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preferences, truth-tracking mechanisms, etc. Indeed, I have even militated against
what I take to be the lynchpin of the Rationalist position, so forcefully
emphasized by Descartes, that it is a “truth which nobody should deny, that there
is nothing entirely in our power except our thoughts”. Indeed, I have argued that
while it feels as if we are generating our thoughts, commanding them, or
“employing” them such as one may put to use a fork and a knife, such actually is
not the case. Again, as Arpaly has put it: “the mere first person experience of
[one] having control over [one’s] mental life is not by itself a surefire indication
that [one] actually has control over [one’s] mental life, in any meaningful sense of
‘self-control’” (Arpaly, 2003: 19). Indeed, as Nietzsche, following Schopenhauer,
has said, “a thought comes when ‘it’ wants, and not when ‘I’ want. It is, therefore
a falsification of the facts to say that the subject ‘I’ is the condition of the
predicate ‘think’” (2002, p. 17, emphasis his).157
Yet perhaps we have overrated the importance of the kind of responsibility
ostensibly licensed by deep agency. Perhaps, at least when it comes to making a
difference with respect to ourselves, improving ourselves, regulating our
behavior, and pursing our projects, we can dispense with the autonomous “I”.
Perhaps, when it comes to such activities, an “I” that is empirically situated is all
we really need. Such will be the subject of the following chapter.

157

See Schopenhauer: “Thoughts come not when we want them, but when they
want to.” Parerga and Paralipomena Vol. 2 (trans. E.F. J. Payne) (Clarendon
Press: Oxford, 1974) par. 37 p. 51.
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CHAPTER 5
SELF-COMPOSITION

5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 I explored the question of whether the “I,” in virtue of its distance
from the facts of the “me”, could bring a unique repertoire of epistemic powers to
bear on these facts. In Chapter 4 I explored the question of whether the “I,” in
virtue of this same distance, could produce or assume ownership of the facts of
the “me” in a way that was not entirely parasitic on the facts of the “me”. In both
cases, I argued that whatever powers the “I” brought to bear on the facts of the
“me” overwhelmingly derived from the facts of the “me”. That said, I did not rule
out the possibility that I could achieve self-knowledge; nor did I reject the
proposition that I can take action upon my facts, however such “taking action” is
to be understood.
For some, such powers, unique to self-conscious agents, might be regarded as
fully adequate, all one really needs to pursue one’s projects. After all, we very
commonly engage in self-reflection, come to realize that we do not approve of
some personal quality, perhaps an aspect of our physical appearance, our
character, or our skill-set; and we certainly can take concrete steps to improve in
these departments. We can go on diets, visit therapists, hire coaches, meditate,
develop means of controlling our temper, etc. We often fail to achieve our
objectives, but sometimes we succeed, and sometimes we succeed to a
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phenomenal degree, and when we do so, our achievement can give rise to feelings
of thrilling self-empowerment, assuring us that “anything is possible,” that “if
there’s a will there’s a way,” that, indeed, we are self-creating Masters of
ourselves and of our destinies.
Such optimism perhaps finds its most rousing endorsement in Sartre’s
existential dictum, l'existence précède l'essence, the proposition that a human
being does not arrive with a “nature” that determines or otherwise constrains his
personal development, and that, to such an extent, “there is no explaining things
away by reference to a fixed and given human nature”.158 Rather, on Sartre’s
view, it is entirely in our power, and, indeed, it is our responsibility, to shape
ourselves into the kind of people we wish to become. Korsgaard has endorsed a
kindred view, affirming that “[t]he form of the human is precisely the form of the
animal that must create its own form” (2009, p. 130). And, she has asserted with
characteristic brio: “As a rational being, as a rational agent, you are faced with the
task of making something of yourself, and you must regard yourself as a success
or a failure insofar as you succeed or fail at this task” (2009, p. xii).159
Again: “[Y]ou must regard yourself as a success or a failure insofar as you
succeed or fail at this task.” This, indeed, is a formidable prospect, enormously
encouraging or oppressive, depending on one’s bent. Yet one may wonder how
158

The whole passage reads: “If existence really does precede essence, there is no
explaining things away by reference to a fixed and given human nature” (157, p.
356).
159
Nietzsche offers a similar exhortation, recommending that we must “survey all
the strengths and weaknesses of [our] nature and then fit them into an artistic plan
until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the
eye.” Nietzsche, (2001) §290, p. 163.
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much self-determining influence one can reasonably be expected to shoulder.
Unsurprisingly, I will assume a critical stance here, arguing, as I have before, that
such powers are in fact rigidly constrained and, as such, that one should only very
provisionally hold oneself responsible for the success or failure of one’s selfprojects. I will proceed as follows. First, I will examine our means of determining
or emending our existing attributes, what I shall call acts of “Self-Composition”.
Here, I will briefly revisit ideas of early Frankfurt and Schechtman and then move
on to Frankfurt’s notion of “volitional necessities”. Following this, I will explore
the means by which, according to Korsgaard, we establish our “integrity,”
organizing ourselves, or “pulling the parts of ourselves together,” so as to become
fully integrated, or “united” persons.160 I will refer to such endeavors as acts of
“Self-Integration”. In all such cases, I will argue that, while we can indeed
exercise a good deal of influence over our facts, the extent to which we can do so,
our very means of doing so, and even our desire to do so, derive from and are
constrained by our facts, and, further, that what we ultimately become has little to
do with our self-conscious, deliberate efforts. As such, I will endorse Arpaly’s
claim that “[i]t is the exception, rather then the rule, that a person’s character is
substantially self-made, which is why a self-made good character is so impressive
in the first place.” (2003: 141-142)

5.2 Self-Composition - Early Frankfurt and Schechtman
Recall Frankfurt’s “hierarchical” conception of self-identification. Here, one
evaluates a first-order desire and develops a second-order desire to either endorse
160

	
  

This, as well, will involve some review.
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or reject this desire. If one decides to endorse the first-order desire, one thereby
“identifies” with it and, in doing so, “makes [it] more truly his own”. Or else one
can “withdraw from,” and therefore “externalize,” or “alienate” a desire, in such a
way as to render this desire no longer his own (or, at least, less truly his own). As
Frankfurt tells us “[i]t is these acts of ordering and rejection—integration and
separation—that create a self out of the raw materials of inner life.” Indeed,
Frankfurt continues, these acts “define the intrapsychic constraints and boundaries
with respect to which a person’s autonomy may be threatened even by his own
desire” (1988, p. 170). That is, according to Frankfurt, when we undertake this
process of “ordering and rejection” we are literally creating our identities,
determining which desires or beliefs truly represent us.
Yet, as discussed in section 3.31, Frankfurt’s account of identification-as-selfconstruction is vulnerable to a number of objections. In the first place, recall that
identification with a particular desire will by no means guarantee the selfrepresentational authority of that desire. I may, for example, wish to desire
someone romantically, yet the mere desire to desire her as such by no means
renders it the case that I truly do, or that I even could, desire her, as such. Nor will
the externalization of a desire necessarily verify its non-representational status.
That is, my desire to externalize or alienate my hostility for my father by no
means guarantees that such hostility is any less self-representative, any less my
“own”.161 As such, in both cases, regardless of my hopes and intentions, my acts
of “identification” may not in any way establish “intrapsychic constraints and
161

See Velleman’s treatment of Freud’s “Rat-Man” case in “Identification and
Identity,” from Buss (2002).
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boundaries”. Indeed, as discussed earlier, even when one regards one’s
commitment as

“wholehearted,” the self-representational authority of one’s

desire may be misleading, an expression of fantasy or wishful thinking.162
We encountered similar ideas in Schechtman’s narrative account. Here, recall
that, according to Schechtman, a person “creates his identity” through an act of
interpretive self-construction, “forming an autobiographical narrative—a story of
his life.” One figuratively or literally composes a “conventional, linear narrative”
(1996, p. 96) where “the incidents that make up his life are not viewed in
isolation, but interpreted as part of the ongoing story that gives them their
significance” (1996, p. 97). As time passes, persons weave their more dramatic, or
salient, events into a meaningful narrative, or autobiography, according to which
they can explain, for example, why they behaved, as they did, why they felt as
they did, and how they became the people they are today. Indeed, Schechtman
regards this activity as a necessary component of creating and sustaining our
personhood. 163 Yet, according to Schechtman, not any story will do. Rather, in
order for one to responsibly engage in narrative self-construction, one must
respect what she calls “reality constraints”164. As she puts it, “[a] narrative that
reveals the narrator to be deeply out of touch with reality is thus undermining of
162

As Velleman puts it: “When Frankfurt describes us as identifying with some of
our motives and alienating others, his description rings true, I suspect, because it
accurately describes this common defensive fantasy [of identifying with just one
aspect of our being such as our love for our parents]. We do indeed identify with
some of our motives, but we thereby engage not in self-definition but selfdeception. We identify with some of our motives by imagining ourselves as being
those motives, to the exclusion of whatever might complicate or conflict with
them.” (2002, p. 109)
163
See Strawson’s (2004) objections to Schechtman’s narrative account.
164
As she puts it, such constraints must “fundamentally cohere with reality”
(1996, p. 119).
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personhood and hence cannot—at least with respect to those elements of the
narrative which seem grossly inaccurate—be identity-constituting” (1996, p. 120).
Such reality constraints require one to recognize “matters of observable fact,” and
matters of “factual interpretation” (1996, p. 125-126). One, for example, will need
to properly recognize facts of past experiences (one was in fact born in a specific
country and on a particular date; one did, in fact, attend a particular school, and
develop measles); and one’s interpretation of factual observation must obey
certain standards of plausible inference (paranoiac delusions and conspiracy
theories, for example, are ruled out). Further, one’s self-conception must respect
one’s “robust inclinations”—enduring propensities or preferences (a short-temper;
independent thinking; romantic fidelity; punctuality) that must be “relatively
stable, coherent and powerful” (2004, p. 415).165 Indeed, commenting on
Frankfurt’s views on identification, Schechtman contends that one’s robust
inclinations “are to be given presumptive authority even when we do not identify
with them, and so the threshold for excluding them will be higher” (Schechtman,
2004, 426). That is, Schechtman’s approach places less emphasis on “settling” the
tensions introduced by our conflicting inclinations, in favor of “establishing safe
boundaries within which these conflicts can be allowed to play themselves out”
(2004, p. 426). Thus, on Schechtman’s account, to compose a responsible
narrative requires that one hew both to objective facts about the external world
and to hardwired facts of one’s own nature.

165

Schechtman (2004, p. 415). Schechtman provides, in addition, that such
inclinations must “not have their origin in an obvious physical or psychological
pathology.” (2004, p. 415).
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5.2.1 Frankfurt’s Volitional Necessities
That one’s self-constructive efforts must obey a set of core characteristics or
“robust inclinations” is underscored in Frankfurt’s discussion of “volitional
necessities”. To set the stage, Frankfurt asserts that:
[t]he idea that the identity of a thing is to be understood in terms of
conditions that are essential for its existence is one of the oldest
and most compelling of the philosophical principles that guide our
efforts to clarify our thought. To grasp what a thing is, we must
grasp its essence—viz., those characteristics without which it is not
possible for it to be what it is. Thus, the notions of necessity and
identity are intimately related. (Frankfurt 1999, p. 113)
Indeed, Frankfurt claims, pace Sartre, that a person’s character is no exception to
this rule, that it in part obeys set of inviolable “volitional necessities”—cares or
desires that one not only cannot desire to violate, but that, for him, are
“unthinkable” (1988, p. 187). As Frankfurt puts it: “Our essential natures as
individuals are constituted, accordingly, by what we cannot help caring about.
The necessities of love, and their relative order or intensity, define our volitional
boundaries. They mark our volitional limits, and thus they delineate our shapes as
persons” (1999, p. 138). Thus we may imagine, as Frankfurt does, a woman who
has agreed to put her child up for adoption, and who may believe she wishes to do
so, but who “cannot bring herself” to go through with it. Or we may imagine,
again as Frankfurt does, a soldier who, in spite of his most thoroughgoing
training, is unable to bring himself to execute orders to discharge nuclear
weapons. Frankfurt explains that “[h]e cannot perform any of them, because he is
prevented by a volitional constraint; that is, he cannot will to perform them. Even
though he may think it would be best for him to perform one of the actions, he
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cannot bring himself to perform it. He cannot volitionally organize himself in the
necessary way. If he attempts to do so, he runs up against the limits of his will”
(1999, p. 111, emphasis his).166

In such cases, again, involuntary cares are

resistant to any oppositional forces, and, as such, qualify as definitive, inviolable,
features of one’s identity.167

5.3 Korsgaard on Self-Integration
With Frankfurt and Schechtman, Korsgaard also acknowledges that a person’s
effort at self-composition must respect fundamental constraints, or “internal
standards,” that is, standards that “[arise] from the nature of the object to which it
applies, from the functional or teleological norms which make it the object that it
is.”168 Yet Korsgaard’s standards do not involve “volitional necessities” rooted in
Frankfurtian cares, or “robust inclinations” of the Schechtman sort. Rather,
Korsgaard suggests a human being can only render herself a “person,” and can
only determine what kind of “person” she is—by means of her norm-governing
practical reason. As she puts it: “Human beings therefore have a distinct form of
identity, a norm governed or practical form of identity, for which we are ourselves
responsible” (2009, xi). Indeed, as we have seen, on Korsgaard’s view, in order
166

See these examples at (1999, p.111).
As Frankfurt puts it elsewhere: “Now the character of a person’s will
constitutes what he most centrally is. Accordingly, the volitional necessities that
bind a person identify what he cannot help being. They are in this respect
analogues of the logical or conceptual necessities that define the essential nature
of a triangle. Just as the essence of a triangle consists in what it must be, soothe
essential nature of a person consists in what he must will. The boundaries of his
will define his shape as a person.” (1999, p.138)
168
Korsgaard (2009, p. 14). See also, Korsgaard (1997, 215-254, especially pp.
249-250).
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for a “person” to be able to perform actions that can be attributable to her as
opposed to her parts, she must play an overarching, “monarchic” or “aristocratic”
role with respect to her parts, “[pulling] the parts of the soul together into a
unified system”169 and thereby safeguarding her “volitional unity” Korsgaard
(1999, p. 28)170. And she does this via the exercise of rational authority. That is,
without exercising such rational, authoritative, self-command, Korsgaard warns
that a person’s behavior and, indeed, her very identity, will succumb to the force
of her mutinous desires.
To make her case, Korsgaard offers the example of Jeremy, a “democratic”
soul who lacks the authority of such an overarching, unifying, rational power, and
whose life is thus “completely dependent on the accidental coherence of his
desires”:
Jeremy, a college student, settles down at his desk one evening to
study for an examination. Finding himself a little too restless to
concentrate, he decides to take a walk in the fresh air. His walk
takes him past a nearby bookstore, where the sight of an enticing
title draws him in to look at the book. Before he finds it, however,
he meets his friend Neil, who invites him to join some of the other
kids at the bar next door for a beer. Jeremy decides he can afford to
have just one, and goes with Neil to the bar. While waiting for his
beer, however, he finds that the noise gives him a headache, and he
decides to return home without every having the beer. He is now,
however, in too much pain to study. So Jeremy doesn’t study for
his examination, hardly gets a walk, doesn’t buy a book, and
doesn’t drink a beer. (1999, p. 19)

169

Korsgaard (1999, p. 22)
Korsgaard elaborates: “To be a thing, one thing, a unity, an entity; to be
anything at all: in the metaphysical sense, that is what it means to have integrity.
But we use the term for someone who lives up to his own standards. And that is
because we think that living up to them is what makes him one, and so what
makes him a person at all” (1996b, p. 101, emphasis added).
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Korsgaard notes, further, that “it’s only an accident that each of Jeremy’s
impulses leads him to an action which completely undercuts the satisfaction of the
last one. But that’s just the trouble, for it’s only an accident if this does not
happen. The democratic person has no resources for shaping his desires to prevent
this, and so he is at the mercy of accident” (1999, p. 20). That is, a defective
“democratic” person lacks an overarching rational captain to pull his parts
together into a cohesive whole. On the other hand, a “monarchic” or “aristocratic”
person can self-consciously “shape his desires” and thereby render it the case that
his behaviors obey his over-arching, supervisory will. Indeed, were one to lack
this ability, Korsgaard warns, one’s desires could tear a person apart and open up
a psychological “fault line” (1999, p. 20).171
Of course, for many of us, the prospect of exercising such an aristocratic
power of “self-possession” whereby one may be “entirely self-governed, so that
all of [one’s] actions, in every circumstance of [one’s] life, are really and fully
[one’s] own: never merely the manifestations of forces at work in [one] or on
[one]…”172 will be greatly appealing. Yet, I suggest that Korsgaard’s aristocratic
vision is vulnerable to several objections. To begin with, let us return to the case
of Jeremy, this time assuming he does in fact possess an aristocratic, or
monarchic, soul. How will his day proceed?
Jeremy wakes up and writes a list of things he would like to do
today. He’d like to study for three hours without interruption, take
an hour’s walk that ends up at a book store, buy a copy of Camus’
171

Korsgaard elaborates that the defect of non-aristocratic characters “is like a
geological fault line, a potential for disintegration that does not necessarily show
up, and so long as it doesn’t, these people have constitutional procedures and so
they can act” (1999, p. 20).
172
Korsgaard (1999, p. 20).
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The Stranger and finally have a beer with some friends at a bar. So
Jeremy sits down and begins studying. He feels the inviting air
outside and considers going for a walk now, but he suppresses the
urge and finishes up his studying. Then he goes for a walk and
considers stopping at a nearby bookstore instead of the one that is
an hour away, but he overcomes the urge and continues on to the
proper bookstore. As he is looking for his book, a friend asks him
to join him right away at the bar. Jeremy politely declines, finds his
book and only then joins his friend at his bar.
Jeremy thus appears to be in absolute command of his faculties; he is a man who
cannot be tempted away from his resolutions by competing desires, who does
everything that he, the ruler of his soul, sets out to do. He is, in short, the type of
person many of us try, but almost invariably fail, to be. Why do we fail? For a
helpful clue, consider the following case proposed by Paul Edwards173.
Let us suppose both A and B are compulsive and suffer intensely
from their neuroses. Let us assume that there is a therapy that
could help them, which could materially change their character
structure, but that it takes a great deal of energy and courage to
undertake the treatment. Let us assume that A has the necessary
energy and courage while B lacks it. A undergoes the therapy and
changes in the desired way. B just gets more and more compulsive
and more and more miserable. Now it is true that A helped form
his own later character. But his starting point, his desire to change,
his energy and courage, were already there.
As Edwards points out, A’s and B’s “starting points,” that is, their initial “energy
and courage,” crucially factored into the success of their respective undertakings.
Now, I propose that one’s ambition to wield aristocratic authority over one’s
desires is no exception. That is, some people possess motivation and strength of
character or willpower sufficient to exercise such authority. Others—most—do

173

Dennett (1985, p. 84) takes this passage from Edwards’ essay “Hard and Soft
Determinism” that originally appears in Hook (1961).
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not.174 Of course, a person who does not at first possess sufficient motivation and
strength of character can surely attempt to cultivate sufficient motivation and
strength of character. But notice that the very commitment to cultivate sufficient
motivation and strength of character involves the same difficulty: that is, one will
require sufficient motivation and strength of character to succeed in the endeavor
to cultivate sufficient motivation and strength of character.175 Of course if one
could voluntarily generate sufficient motivation and strength of character, one
could bring this regress to a halt. And yet, if one possessed such a capacity, one
presumably would not have encountered the problem in the first place. Further, as
discussed in Section 4.33, it seems highly unlikely that, through some sort of
mental volition, I could generate enthusiasm for something for which I actually
don’t care or that I could will myself to love a person that I don’t like—no matter
how “reasonable” I deemed such desires. So, while we may be able to exercise
limited control with respect to defying or suppressing our existing desires, I
suggest that the efficacy of this controlling part will itself be constrained by
underlying traits—elements over which we, in turn, can exercise only limited
control. Thus, I suggest that our “aristocratic” self that attempts to “rule” over our
parts will just constitute another part of us, and the role it plays in “pulling our
parts together” will be no less contingent than the roles played by the other parts.

174

See also Nietzsche (1997, p. 64): “[T]hat one wants to combat the vehemence
of a drive at all, however, does not stand within our power nor does the choice of
any particular method; nor does the success or failure of this method. What is
clearly the case is that in this entire procedure our intellect is only the blind
instrument of another drive…”
175
On will as a finite resource, see The Willpower Instinct, Kelly McGonigal
Ph.D. (New York: Penguin, 2012), especially p. 54-80.
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To put it a bit differently, I contend that we cannot exercise aristocratic control
over the part of us that seeks to exercise aristocratic control.176
What about Korsgaard’s “fault-line” and the danger of self-disintegration?
Korsgaard’s suggestion seems to be that only an over-arching monarchic captain
“pulling the parts of the soul together” can ensure that a person’s character won’t
simply founder and deteriorate under the pressure of conflicting desires. Yet some
have argued that Korsgaard exaggerates the threat of such self-decomposition.
Schechtman, for example, attests that such accounts of self-integration are guilty
of “over-estimating the danger of internal civil war” (Schechtman, 2004, p. 425426). On Schechtman’s view, our hardwired robust inclinations are perfectly
capable of doing the work of holding ourselves together. Further, as Blackburn
has put it, a well-integrated or harmonious person, like a harmonious ship, will
realize its harmony not through the command of an overseeing unitary caption,
but through the “fortunate composition of [her] crew members: these will be
crews in which the propensities are to the gay, benevolent, temperate, industrious,
cheerful, hopeful, resolute” (Blackburn1998, p. 245). Finally, Daniel Dennett,
perhaps the most vocal critic of the overriding, unitary, Captain, puts it as follows:
In our brains, there is a cobbled together collection of specialist
brain circuits, which, thanks to a family of habits inculcated partly
by culture and partly by individual self-exploration, conspire
together to produce a more or less orderly, more or less effective,
more or less well-designed virtual machine, the Joycean machine.
By yoking these independently evolved specialist organs together
in common cause, and thereby giving their union vastly enhanced
powers, this virtual machine, this software of the brain, performs a
sort of internal political miracle. It creates a virtual captain of the
crew, without elevating any one of them to long-term dictatorial
176

See another interesting analysis of this problem of “self-mastery” in Leiter
(2007, esp. p. 14).
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power. Who’s in charge? First one coalition and then another,
shifting in ways that are not chaotic thanks to good meta-habits
that tend to entrain coherent, purposeful sequences rather than an
interminable helter-skelter power grab.” (Dennett 1991, p. 228)
On Dennett’s account, our sense of captain-hood is really an illusion, a “virtual”
captain of crew, produced by a Humean177 multiplicity of cognitive processes that
“conspire together” to constitute our “more or less orderly, more or less effective,
internal political machine.” Such processes, just like our internal biological
functions, are regulated not by “us”—self-conscious captains, residing over and
above our biological and psychological faculties—but rather by a network of
adaptive mechanisms that operate primarily beneath our conscious awareness.
Note, importantly, that Dennett does not deny our powers of self-control and
deliberation; he just suggests that the “self” driving and regulating these
operations is not a unitary Executive Controller, but, rather, a multiplicity of parts
working together “in ways that are not chaotic thanks to good meta-habits that
tend to entrain coherent, purposeful sequences”.178
Finally and briefly, one might argue that Korsgaard has unfairly coronated
reason as the only means of uniting our disparate parts. True, the net of reason
177

Hume: “I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing
but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with
an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement” (T: 1.4.6, p.
165).
178
As Dennett puts it elsewhere: “So wonderful is the organization of a termite
colony that it seemed to some observers that each termite colony had to have a
soul (Marais, 1937). We now understand that its organization is simply the result
of a million semi-independent little agents, each itself an automaton, doing its
thing. So wonderful is the organization of a human self that to many observers it
has seemed that each human being had a soul, too: a benevolent Dictator ruling
from Headquarters.” Dennett (1991, p. 416) See also Damasio, chapter 9, “The
Autobiographical Self” from Self Comes to Mind (New York: Random House,
2011)
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casts widely over a range of our facts. But as the later Frankfurt has said, our
passions also serve to unify the elements of our character, to constrain the will,
and can often have “final say” with respect to determining our actions and making
us the kind of people we are and wish to be. Indeed, as he puts it, it is our
involuntary caring that can be “indispensably foundational as an activity that
connects and binds us to ourselves. It is through caring that we provide ourselves
with volitional continuity, and in that way constitute and participate in our own
agency” (2004, p. 17).

5.4 Self-Composition – Conclusion
In Chapter 3, I did not reject the proposal that the self-conscious “I” could
access a perspective on the facts of the “me”. What I did argue was that the extent
to which the “I” could gain such access and the accuracy of such knowledge was
overwhelmingly dependent on the facts of the “me”. In Chapter 4, I did not reject
the proposal that the self-conscious “I” could act on or influence one’s facts. What
I did argue was that the behavior of the “I”—the extent and nature of its
contribution and influence—was, again, wholly parasitic on the facts of the “me”.
Here, again, I am not disputing the proposition that we can go to work on
ourselves, amend ourselves or hold ourselves together. Again, we can, to some
degree, do all such things. Yet I have pushed for the same basic thesis; that is, the
extent to which one can do so is entirely constrained by the facts of one’s
constitution. As such, in all three cases, I have suggested the behavior of the “I” is
overwhelmingly constrained by the facts of the “me”. That is, I have challenged
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the proposition that the “I” can exert, as I put it, “unilateral influence” on the facts
of the “me”.
Yet recall that I identified the capacity of the “I” to exert “unilateral influence”
on the facts of the “me” as an indispensable component, indeed, as the very
cornerstone, of the Rationalist position. And recall, per the Rationalist account,
that the “I” obtains such a capacity in virtue of the reflective distance it can
ostensibly assume with respect to such facts. That is, it is in virtue of such
distance that the “I,” as Korsgaard puts it, is no longer dominated by such facts,
and, as such, can attain leverage over them, intermediate among them, influence
them, produce them.179 Yet, I have contested that over a broad range of cases such
unilateral or autonomous powers are nowhere to be found, that, in all such
instances, the behavior of “I” can only be understood as an expression of such
facts—indeed, that the “I” acts, as Arpaly puts it, as their “dupe”. And yet, if such
is the case, that is, if the autonomy of the “I” with respect to the facts of the “me”
is illusory, we might likewise wonder whether any leverage-conferring distance
actually stands between the “I” and the “me,”—whether, indeed, the “I” and the
“me” should be recognized as distinct existences. Such will be the subject of the
following chapter.

179

Recall again Korsgaard’s remark: “Our capacity to turn our attention on to our
own mental activities is also a capacity to distance ourselves from them. I
perceive, and I find myself with a powerful impulse to believe. But I back up and
bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse
doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem.”
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CHAPTER 6
THE HOLISTIC MODEL – A CREW OF CAPTAINS

6.1 Introduction
The preceding three chapters have constituted the “negative” portion of this
thesis, a critical assessment of central aspects of the Rationalist model of the self.
I have (1) Presented a number of scenarios according to which, on Rationalist
grounds, the “I” can bring a set of epistemic and agential powers to bear on the
facts of the “me”—powers, that is, that do not derive from and are not constrained
by the facts of the “me” and (2) I have disputed the characterizations of these
scenarios in an effort to demonstrate that, in each case, the causal powers of the
“I” do in fact derive from and are constrained by the facts of the “me”. As such, I
have objected to the proposition that the “I” can exercise “unilateral” causal
influence over the facts of the “me”. Yet, if such is the case, then one might
wonder how to properly understand the existential relationship the “I” bears with
respect to the “me”. That is to say, if the behavior of the “I” must be understood
as an expression of the facts of the “me”—if, functionally, the “I” and the “me”
are inseparable—then to what extent can we justifiably regard the “I” and the
“me” as existentially distinct? Or, to express the question a bit differently:
Allowing that it is possible—pushing Arpaly’s claim to the extreme—that the “I”
always acts as a dupe of the “me,” might we not justifiably infer that the “I” and
the “me” are not distinct, at all? Such will be the central contention of this
chapter, and, as such, will constitute what I regard as the “finishing blow” to the
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Rationalist conception of the self. I will proceed as follows. First I will offer a
brief historical overview of the sequestering and coronation of the captainly,
rational “I,” focusing on Plato, Descartes and Kant, and then culminate in a brief
recap of our contemporary accounts. In reviewing this history I will focus on an
enduring argument that invokes what I shall call the Distinct Object Thesis.
Following this historical overview, I will present three models of the self intended
to capture candidate metaphysical relationships shared by the “I” and the “me”—
Unilateral, Complimentary and Holistic—and then explain my preference for the
latter, Holistic, model. In the concluding two chapters, in an effort to more fully
spell out and render palatable the Holistic model, I will develop its various
metaphysical and ethical implications, arguing, ultimately, that the Holistic model
offers a more accurate and ethically beneficial view of the self.

6.2 The Autonomous, Captainly “I”—A (Brief) Historical Overview180
(1) Plato
It is perhaps in Plato where we encounter the first detailed Western
formulation of the Rationalist Story, so here will be a natural place to begin. In
Phaedrus,181 Plato compares the human soul to a chariot with two winged steeds.
One “honorable,” “upright and clean-limbed,” white steed is the “spirited” part of
the soul. This part is “a lover of glory, but with temperance and modesty,” and
180

This overview is obviously not meant to be comprehensive; I am just tracking
some prominent historical strains of argument.
181
See Plato’s Phaedrus, (trans.) R. Hackforth (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1972). The passages in the Phaedrus concerning the chariot
analogy occur at 246a-247d and 253d-257b. My brief discussion of this allegory
derives from Hackforth’s commentary.
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“needs no whip, being driven by the word of command alone” (253	
   d-‐e	
   ). The
other, black, horse embodies the “appetitive” part of the soul; it is “crooked of
frame, a massive jumble of a creature, hot-blooded, consorting with wontonness
and vainglory, shaggy of ear, deaf, and hard to control with whip and goad.”
Finally, the driver personifies Reason, the “reflective or calculative part of the
soul”182 that must master the dark and lustful steed that threatens to break loose
and run amok.
Yet it is in the Republic where we first encounter a direct reference to a ship
captain, here described as the philosopher or “star gazer” (Republic, 488a-489)
who must fend off the efforts of unqualified crewmembers vying for control. This
captain-philosopher—the “human being within the human being”183—serves as
the authoritative ruling part of the tripartite soul, regulating and unifying the
lower appetitive and spirited parts so that they can best function for the benefit of
the whole. Indeed, this ruling part is said to coordinate the elements of human
psychology and of the city, so that, “from having been many things [they become]
entirely one, moderate and harmonious.” (Republic	
  443d-‐e )
It is in the Phaedo, however, where we encounter Socrates’ most direct effort
to justify the autonomy of the rational soul. Here Socrates argues against
Simmias’ popular Pythagorian “Attunement” or “Harmonic” proposal,184
according to which the activity of the soul is said to supervene on, but not reduce

182

Hackforth’s commentary, p. 72.
Republic 589b
184
The argument takes place in the Phaedo, 84c-96a
183
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to,185 the arrangement of the underlying physical parts of a person, just as the
harmonies of a lyre supervene on but do not reduce to the underlying arrangement
and behavior of its strings.186 In opposition to this view, Socrates rhetorically asks
if “it is any other part of a man than the soul that governs him, especially if it is a
wise one?” (Phaedo 94b). Obtaining Simmias’ agreement, Socrates argues that, if
such is the case, the behavior of the soul cannot correctly be understood as an
expression or product of the lower elements. For, after all, the soul “directs all the
elements of which it is said to consist, opposing them in almost everything all
through life, and exercising every form of control; sometimes by severe and
unpleasant methods like those of physical training and medicine, and sometimes
by milder ones” (Phaedo, 94d). Thus Socrates seems to be making the following
argument. For any x and y, where the behavior of y supervenes on the status of x,
the direction of causation will flow unilaterally from x to y, and, as such, y cannot
bear causal influence on the status of x. Since Socrates believes that the soul can,
in fact, “direct” and “oppose” the lower parts, the soul’s behavior therefore must
not supervene on the status of the lower parts.

185

The non-reductive element is an important component of Simmias’ argument,
for Simmias preserves the intuition that the soul, unlike the parts upon which it
supervenes, is nonetheless “divine”.
186
The central thrust of the argument appears at Phaedo, 86c-d: “Well, if the soul
is really an adjustment, obviously as soon as the tension of our soul is lowered or
increased beyond the proper point, the soul must be destroyed, divine though it is;
just like any other attunement, either in music or in any product of the arts and
crafts, although in each case the physical remains last considerably longer, until
they are burnt up or rot away.”
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(2) Descartes
Whereas Plato’s argument for the autonomy of the rational soul derives from
the causal relationship that obtains between the rational part of the soul and the
lower appetitive parts, Descartes’ argument for the “real distinction” of the cogito
will chiefly be epistemic in nature. Recall that in his famous thought experiment,
Descartes rejects as unreal everything he can doubt, assuming that his perception
of such objects could be the product of a dream or of an “evil demon” deceiving
him. Descartes thus finds reason to deny the reality of the external world and his
body—both of which might very well be the product of deception. Yet Descartes
finally asserts that he cannot doubt his own thinking “I”; this “I” itself cannot be
part of a demon’s deception. For, as he puts it, if he, Descartes, is being deceived,
“[i]n that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me” (Meditation II; AT
VII, 25; CSM II, 17). That is to say, some “I” must exist in order for it to be the
“subject of deception.” Descartes elaborates:
I saw that while I could pretend that I had no body and that there
was no world and no place for me to be in, I could not for all that
pretend that I did not exist. I saw on the contrary that from the
mere fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it
followed quite evidently and certainly that I existed; whereas if I
had merely ceased thinking, even if everything else I had every
imagined had been true, I should have had no reason to believe that
I existed. From this I knew I was a substance whose whole essence
or nature is simply to think, and which does not require any place,
or depend on any material thing, in order to exist. Accordingly, this
‘I’—that is, the soul by which I am what I am—is entirely distinct
from the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body.
(Discourse, Part IV; AT VI, 32-33; CSM I 127).
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Notice that in this passage Descartes offers at least three arguments in defense of
the distinct status of the “I,” the “thinking, non-extending thing” (res cogitans)
with respect to the “extended thing” of his body (res extensa).187 The first affirms
that his “I” and his body are distinct because his thinking “I” is indubitable
whereas the existence of his body is something he can doubt. Second, Descartes
suggests that the persistence conditions of his body and his cogito are different;
whereas the persistence of the “I” depends entirely on thought and is dependent
on no material substance, the persistence of the body is dependent on its
constitutive material. As such, one could exist without the other, and, as Descartes
puts: “Two substances are really distinct when each of them can exist without the
other.”188 Yet a third argument is implicit here, that is, the distinct existence
argument Descartes sets out in Meditation IV189. Here Descartes attests that he
“knows that everything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of
being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it.
Hence the fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from
another is enough to make me certain that the two things are distinct, since they
are capable of being separated, at least by God” (Meditation IV, ATVII; CSM II

187

And he offers additional arguments elsewhere, for example, the argument from
divisibility, Sixth Meditation (AT VII 86-87: CSM II 59).
188
See Geometrical Exposition in Replies to the Second Objections (AT VII 162;
CSM II 114). Descartes says, further: “Strictly speaking, a real distinction exists
only between two or more substances; and we can perceive that two substances
are really distinct simply from the fact that we can clearly and distinctly
understand one apart from the other.” Principles, Part I, Article 60 (AT VIIIA 28;
CSM I 213) Passages found in Hoffman’s intriguing discussion in “Descartes’s
Theory of Distinction,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXIV,
No. 1, January 2002, p. 58.
189
My treatment follows Matthews (1992) and Hoffman (2002).
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54). That is, Descartes believes that if he can understand clearly and distinctly any
individual object, then, since God would not imbue him with a faulty faculty of
understanding, God is capable of creating that very object just as Descartes
clearly and distinctly understands it. As such, since Descartes believes he can
clearly and distinctly understand both the “thinking, non-extending thing” of his
“I” and the “extended thing” of his body190—that is, insofar as Descartes
understands them as two distinct objects—these two objects, are, at least in
principle, distinct.

(3) Kant
Now let us briefly re-examine Kant’s argument in favor of the autonomy of the
self-conscious “I” and notice how it draws upon both Plato’s causal argument and
Descartes’ epistemic argument. Recall Kant’s assertion, as quoted in the
Introduction: “The fact that the human being can have the “I” in his
representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth” (2006,
p. 15, §127). And, further, recall his contention that “a human being really finds
in himself a capacity by which he distinguishes himself from all other things,
even from himself insofar as he is affected by objects, and that is reason” (1997a,
p. 57 4:452, bold mine). Finally, recall Kant’s assertion that this “I,” with the aid
of reason, can “of itself, independently of anything empirical, determine the will”
190

See Sixth Meditation (AT VII78: CSM II 54): “[O]n the one hand I have a
clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended
thing [that is, a mind], and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so
far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain
that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it.” (AT VII 78:
CSM II 54).
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(1997b, p. 37, 5:42). Now, inasmuch as Kant’s rational “I” can “of itself
independently of anything empirical” determine the will, I take him to be
subscribing to Platonic causal argument. And insofar as Kant believes a person
can distinguish himself from himself, i.e., his rational nature from his empirical
nature, I take him to be affirming the epistemic positions espoused by Descartes.

(4) Distinct Object Thesis and Contemporary Review
Now, I wish to suggest that the historical line of support recommending the
distinct and autonomous status of the reasoning “I” with respect to the facts of the
“me,” has drawn from one compelling, implicit, underlying assumption. That is,
inasmuch as one’s body, one’s attitudes—or, collectively, one’s “facts”— can
become for the self-reflecting “I” an object, either of the understanding or of
agential influence, then such facts must be regarded as distinct from the “I”. Let
us call this assumption the Distinct Object Thesis. More formally,
(DOT): For any x and any y, if x can become an object of y, where
y can observe or act upon x, y must to some degree possess an
existence that is distinct from x.
I will not attempt here to defend the general metaphysical merits of this thesis, as
such would exceed the scope of this thesis. But I contend that such a proposition
has been implicitly invoked in support of the historical arguments. And I believe
that DOT has reverberated through the contemporary literature. Thus we recall
Velleman’s epistemic assertion that “consciousness just seems to open a gulf
between subject and object, even when its object is the subject himself.
Consciousness seems to have the structure of vision, requiring its object to stand
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across from the viewer—to occupy the position of Gegenstand [object or thing]”
(2008, p. 179, emphasis mine). And Velleman’s claim that the agent’s
involvement is defined in terms of his “interactions with these very states and
events, and the agent’s interactions with them are such as they couldn’t have with
themselves” (2000, p. 125, emphasis mine). Of course Korsgaard has pushed for
the same claim when she affirms that “[o]ur capacity to turn our attention on to
our own mental activities is also a capacity to distance ourselves from them.” And
finally Armstrong has proposed a similar idea, viz., “it is impossible that the
introspecting and the thing introspected should be one and the same mental state.
A mental state cannot be aware of itself, any more than a man can eat himself
up.”191
Yet, notice that DOT stands in tension with the case I have been developing
over the course of the preceding chapters. For I have argued that the behaviors of
the “I” should be understood as extensions of the facts of the “me,” and have
suggested—though not yet argued—that the “I” itself should be understood as an
extension or product of such facts. But notice that if this latter proposition is
correct, then it would seem to contradict DOT. To put the point more plainly: If
the “I” can indeed regard and act upon the “me” as object—either (1) DOT is
correct and the “I” and the “me” are in fact distinct, or (2) It is possible for an x to
become an object for itself, possible for an x to know and act upon itself—thus
contradicting DOT. I will pursue (2). That is, I will argue that while the “I” can
indeed observe and act on the “me,” the “I” and the “me” should not be regarded
191

Armstrong, D.M. (1968) A Materialist Theory of Mind (Routledge: 1968), p.
324.
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as existentially distinct—rather, the “I” should be understood as consisting of
nothing but the facts of the “me”. To clarify and defend this claim, I will first
present three models intended to capture candidate relationships between the “I”
and the “me”’—Unilateral, Complimentary, and Holistic. I will advocate for the
Holistic model, as it best accommodates the proposition that the “I” and the “me”
are neither functionally nor existentially distinct. In the following chapter I will
apply this Holistic model to a set of metaphysical claims, and, in doing so,
attempt to flesh out this model, rendering it more plausible and palatable.

6.3 Three Relations
1. Unilateral Relation: Recall from Chapter 2 my characterization of “unilateral”
causal relations. I suggested that we understand such a relation as follows: X
exercises unilateral causal influence upon y insofar as the causal powers that x
bring to bear on y do not derive from y. I illustrated this relationship by way of
the behavior of billiard balls. For our present purposes, it will be more helpful to
employ the behavior of waves. Thus, imagine two distinct adjacent water bodies,
1 and 2. And imagine that each water body, when agitated, produces a wave—call
them x and y (x wave corresponds to water-body 1; y wave corresponds to waterbody 2).
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Now, when wave x strikes wave y, x will bring to bear upon y a set of causal
properties that are wholly distinct from the causal properties of wave y. That is to
say, the causal powers that x bring to bear on y will not derive in any way from y
(and vice-versa)—and this because that which gives rise to the causal powers of x
(water-body 1) is entirely distinct from that which gives rise to the causal powers
of y (water-body 2). Moreover, note that if we were to remove wave y and water
body 2 entirely, this would bear no impact on either wave x or water body 1. As
such, we may correctly say (1) That the causal influence wave x bears on wave y
and vice-versa will qualify as unilateral and (2) That a necessary condition on
their unilateral causal influence will be their status as distinct existences.

2. Complimentary Relation: Now let us consider a different, complimentary,
relation between x and y. Here we will regard x and y as two waves that both
partially feed off of the same water-body (water-body 3), but also feed off of two
distinct water-bodies (water-body 1 and water-body 2).

	
  

138

	
  
Now, again, notice that both x and y partially feed of causal source 3 but that x
and y also feed off, respectively, distinct sources 1 and 2. As such, the causal
properties that x bring to bear on y (and vice-versa) will derive in part from the
common source 3 (should the intensity of 3 increase or diminish, so also would
the causal properties of both x and y) and in part from their distinct water-bodies.
As such, in the event that x and y collide, the causal influence that x will bear on y
and vice-versa will be partially distinct, or, we might say, partially unilateral
(hence the dotted line). Furthermore, given that the content and behavior of x and
y will be partially determined by the same causal source, we may say that x and y
lay claim to partially distinct existences.

3. Holistic Relation: Finally, let us consider the Holistic relation. Again, imagine
two waves, x and y. Yet this time imagine each of them drawing on the same
water body, and, as such, arising as an expression of the same causal source,
water-body 1.

Now let us consider the causal and existential implications of this model. Note,
first, that we may be tempted to speak of two distinct waves, and, indeed, of two
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distinct waves bringing distinct causal powers to bear on each other. After all, in a
relative sense, such talk would be justified. Wave x might, for example, be much
heavier than wave y. Or wave y might be moving much faster than wave x. Yet
notice that the causal properties of each individual wave derive from and are
expressions of the same causal source: water-body 1. As such, while we might
speak of distinct causal properties belonging to each wave, such claims would be
spurious. In fact, we cannot properly speak of either wave possessing causal
properties that are in any way distinct from water-body 1, or, by association,
distinct from each other. To see this, notice that if water-body 1 were suddenly to
become still, each wave would collapse; if water body 1 were suddenly to become
much more agitated, the agitation would communicate appropriately to x and y.
To this extent, appearances notwithstanding, neither wave x nor wave y can exert
any unilateral causal force on the other. And, further, again appearances
notwithstanding, neither wave can lay claim to a distinct existence. Rather, wave
x, wave y and water-body 1, must be understood as unitary, or of-a-piece: they
rise and fall as one. Indeed, to the extent that these two waves must be understood
as expressions of the same corporate entity, we might just as well—and more
simply—make use of the following illustration.

	
  

140

	
  
Here we will understand wave x as nothing but a formal aspect of water-body y.
Having drawn out these three forms of relation, we may now turn our attention
back to the “I” and the “me” and ask which model most accurately maps their
relationship. Clearly, the conception of the “I” and the “me,” as presented by the
Rationalist thinkers, is most naturally reflected in the Unilateral or
Complimentary models. For each of these models preserves at least some of the
causal autonomy and existential distinction of the “I”. Yet the Holistic model
most clearly accommodates the relationship I have been advocating. For on this
model the “I” can neither be said to exert any unilateral causal power over the
“me,” nor to possess any existential distinction with respect to the facts of the
“me.” Here again, the “I” cannot be understood as something “over and above”
the facts; it does not possess a “transcendent” relation to the facts. Rather, it is just
an expression, or product, of the facts. Indeed, as Arpaly, following Hume,192 has
put it:
The tendency to believe that we are captains of our souls has a
rival tendency in the human heart—the tendency to believe that we
are, as it were, slaves of our souls, that we have fates and identities
and inner voices that we cannot escape with our laughable
reasoning capacities. […] But we are not the captains of our souls,
nor are we servants of our souls. Quite simply we are our souls.
(Arpaly, 2003, p. 179)
We “are” our souls, Arplay suggests. That is, what we “are” is just the
constellation of our facts. And Blackburn, responding to the charge that a Holistic

192

“I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are nothing but a
bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an
inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement” (T:1.4.6, p. 165).
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conception of the self leads to an attitude of “passivity,”193 offers this similar
claim:
We might advance this charge [that we are passive with respect to
our desires or our “parts”] because of the grip of the Kantian
picture, only now thinking of ourselves, as Captains, suddenly
subordinate to a successfully mutinous crew. Or similarly, we
might be thinking of ourselves in effect as only the shell within
which desires are lodged: the ship which a possibly alien crew is
working and directing. But this is wrong: the person is the totality
composed of body and form, or ship and crew. (1998, p. 251,
emphasis mine)
Again, as Blackburn suggests, we are “the totality”. That is, while the “I” of selfconsciousness may be capable of recognizing the facts of the “me” and even
going to work on such facts—this “I” is not itself ontologically distinct from the
sum total of the facts. Indeed, even William James, after sketching the distinct
capabilities of the “I” and the “me,” cautions against regarding these two parts of
the self as ontologically distinct. As he puts it: “I call these [the “I” and the “me”]
‘discriminated aspects,’ and not separate things, because the identity of the I with
me, even in the very act of their discrimination, is perhaps the most ineradicable
dictum of common sense.” (2001, p. 43, emphasis mine)
“Common sense” for some, perhaps. But for many of us, for a variety of
reasons, the “I” does indeed feel, and regard itself, as something very much
distinct from the facts of the “me”. For, again, perhaps nothing seems more selfevident than that “we,” that the status of our “I,” cannot be reduced to or
explained away by an enumeration of our facts. Yet I hope, in the concluding two
chapters, to (1) Make a more persuasive metaphysical case for the Holistic model

193

	
  

I will address this “passivity” charge at greater length in the next two chapters.
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and (2) Argue that the Holistic model boasts a number of practical and ethical
advantages over the alternatives.
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CHAPTER 7
METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS

7.1 Introduction
"Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?" Wittgenstein
asks.194 I anticipate that a consideration of the Holistic model will inspire this very
question. That is, if, as Arpaly and Blackburn have suggested, I just am my facts,
then how can we understand the “I” of self-reflection, the “I” that James says is
conscious; the “I” that regards itself as a “single party,” and that can observe and
attend to my facts? What sense can we make of this very “I,” so familiar to
experience, that seems so conceptually and phenomenologically incommensurable
with facticity? In this chapter I will attempt to shed some light on these problems,
exploring some ways in which the Holistic model can reconcile the “I” to the
facticity of the “me” and thereby find its “place in the world”; or, to put it a little
differently, “find its place as the world”. I will proceed as follows. First I will
revisit Dennett’s Holistic “Joycean Machine” and outline the “I”’s role as “virtual
captain,” suggesting, as he does, that the “I” should not be understood as a distinct
“single-party” but rather as a Humean bundle or corporation of “facts”. With this
in mind, I will address a series of concerns associated with “Practical Reason and
Temptation,” “Self-Integration,” “Responsibility and Incontinence” and the

194

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (trans.) D.F. Pears and
McGuiness, B.F., (intro.) Bertrand Russell, (New York: Routledge Classics,
1974). Passage from §5.633. For further treatment of Wittgenstein’s exploration
of the “I,” see Vohra (1986) and Lockhorst (1991).
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conceptual problems involved in “Subject-Object” dualism.195 In discussing such
matters, I will try to fill in the Holistic picture, and strengthen my case in support
of it.

7.2 The Joycean Machine
The question, again, is: Assuming a person is nothing over and above his facts,
how do we make sense of the unitary-seeming “I” which seems so resistant to
facticity? To address the question, let us first consider a non-human animal of the
Kantian and Korsgaardian variety, a creature which, as Kant says, does not have
an “I” in its representations and whose will, as both Kant and Korsgaard suggest,
is entirely governed by the drives or impulses of bruta necessitas. Let us suppose
that a toad, Sam, fits this description. Sam is a biological machine; a product of
evolution; a homeostatic collusion of drives and mechanisms—of, collectively,
“facts”—aimed at survival and procreation. When Sam is threatened by a
predator, he hops away, when Sam is injured he attends to his wound. Indeed,
195

My account will not attempt to dispel all of the “mysterious features” of the
“I”. Nor will it attempt to explain the “I” entirely away. My only object will be to
offer a non-monolithic characterization of the “I”. For similar accounts, see
Dennett (1991, esp. p. 288); Damasio (2010); Thomas Metzinger, Being No One:
The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), p. 403.
And Buddhist accounts, as represented, for example, by Chogyam Trungpa.
Consider Trungpa’s Hume-friendly illustration: “The experience of oneself
relating to other things is actually a momentary discrimination, a fleeting thought.
If we generate these fleeting thoughts fast enough, we can create the illusion of
continuity and solidity. It is like watching a movie, the individual film frames are
played so quickly that they generate the illusion of continual movement. So we
build up an idea, a preconception, that the self and other are solid and continuous.
And once we have this idea, we manipulate our thoughts to confirm it, and are
afraid of any contrary evidence.” The Myth of Freedom and the Way of
Meditation, (ed.) John Baker and Marvin Casper, foreword Pema Chodron
(Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1976), p. 13.
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Sam is capable of a wide variety of behaviors designed and governed entirely by
his biological processes to ensure his survival. Again, per Kant and Korsgaard’s
understanding, Sam is not self-conscious. As such, while Sam’s cognitive
apparatus registers representations of the external world—and, as such, permits
Sam to interact in manifold ways with the world—his cognitive system does not
register self-representations, and, for this reason, Sam cannot know, observe or
interact with himself196. That is, Sam does not know that “he” possesses particular
beliefs or desires; he cannot engage in self-reflection; he is just drawn to or
repelled by aspects of the world, as dictated by his biological processes and basic
cognitive skills. Recognize, further, that since Sam possesses no “I” that “stands
for” or “represents” the complex of his facts. As such, when we refer to Sam, all
we are referring to is a set of drives, desires, fears, cognitive mechanisms, etc.,
none of which involve, or spring from, or attach to, any self-aware “Sam”.
Now let us consider a self-conscious human being, a “person”. Let us call her
Joyce. Like Sam, Joyce’s behavior is governed by a network of drives, impulses
and cognitive mechanisms—collectively, “facts”. But Joyce, the “person,”
possesses a very substantial mechanism that Sam does not possess. For unlike
196

Note again that I am just stipulating, for the sake of argument, that Sam the
toad does not possess even minimal self-consciousness; I’m not suggesting that
toads do or don’t actually possess it. For an interesting treatment of the origins
and gradual development of sentience and self, see Damasio’s discussion of
“core” selves and “autobiographical selves” (2010). He says: “I am ready to
believe that whenever brains begin to generate primordial feelings—and that
could be quite early in evolutionary history—organisms acquire an early form of
sentience. From there on, an organized self-process could develop and be added to
the mind, thereby providing the beginning of conscious minds. Reptiles are
contenders for this distinction, for example; birds make even stronger contenders
and mammals get the award and then some” (p. 27). See also, Metzinger (2003)
and Baker (1998).
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Sam, who cannot assume a self-conscious perspective, Julia can assume one—
that is, Joyce can have an “I” in her representations, or assume the perspective of
“Joyce”. Not only can Joyce achieve a self-conscious perspective, but, as Kant
and Korsgaard observe, Joyce, by means of “Joyce,” can know herself, attend to
herself and “represent” or “stand for” herself. Let us then understand the process
of Joyce becoming “Joyce” as an act of Joyce “taking herself up into herself” and
thus becoming both a self-representation and self-representative.197 Indeed, when
Joyce/“Joyce” utters the sentence, “I am Joyce,”198 she is referring not just to a set
of facts in dynamic interaction, but to a unitary subject, a personal “I,”—a single
emissary or voice—who stands for, speaks for, and regards herself as, to some
extent, distinct from her facts. As Damasio puts it: “The notion of a large
collective of wills expressed through one single voice is not mere poetic fancy. It
connects with the reality of our organisms where that single voice does exist in
the form of the self in a conscious brain.” (2010, p. 39)
Now, the Rationalists contend that when “Joyce” attends to the facts of Joyce,
“Joyce” is exploiting a distance or a “space” between “her” and such facts. She
must be doing so, so DOT affirms, for when “I” observe or act upon something,
“I”, the observer and actor, cannot be identical to the object “I” am observing or
acting upon. Further, it is in virtue of the putative “distance” separating “Joyce”
197

See Metzinger here: “For the first time, system-related information now
becomes globally available as system-related information, because the organism
now has an internal image of itself as a whole, as a distinct entity possessing
global features” (2005, p. 4).
198
Recall again from 2.3: “My active employment of both pronouns I and
me/”me” to designate my objective identity will reflexively implicate the
subjective, self-identifying “I”. Or, to put the matter a bit differently, my
recognition of my objective existence as me necessarily implicates my recognition
of my subjective-reflective existence as “I”.”
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from her observed facts, that Joyce, operating as “Joyce,” can “dominate” or
assume power over such facts, and, in so doing, “insert” Joyce199 into the causal
order. Yet I have militated against such a characterization. Indeed, I have
suggested that, while Joyce, via “Joyce,” may very well subject Joyce’s facts to
analysis, while she may endorse, or identify with, or otherwise “throw her weight
behind” her facts, the course and outcome of such activity will redound not to the
autonomous wherewithal of “Joyce,” but, rather, to the total, Holistic coordination
of Joyce’s corporate facts. As such, “Joyce,” as Dennett has claimed, and as I
shall go on to elaborate, possesses no distinct unitary existence; she is just, as
Dennett avers, a “virtual captain of crew,” or emissary, that represents, at any
moment, the resultant coalition of Joyce’s dispositions.200 That is to say, at any
given moment, the self-aware person, or agent, “Joyce,” who regards herself as
the “leader” or “driver” of Joyce, will just express the resultant global orientation
of Joyce’s facts—as Damasio has put it, “a collective of wills expressed through
one single voice” (2010, p. 39). I grant that this may seem obscure; hopefully it
will become less so over the course of the following discussion.

199

Consider a puppeteer manipulating the strings of his puppet. Thus “Joyce”
manipulates the strings of Joyce, such as to dictate Joyce’s role in the causal
order.
200
See Damasio’s elaboration: “The oddest thing about the upper reaches of a
consciousness performance is the conspicuous absence of a conductor before the
performance begins, although, as the performance unfolds, a conductor comes
into being. For all intents and purposes, a conductor is now leading the
orchestra, although the performance has created the conductor—the self—not the
other way around. The conductor is cobbled together by feelings and by a
narrative brain device…” (2010, p. 25, emphasis mine).
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7.3 On Practical Reason and Temptation
Our sense of ourselves as unitary autonomous agents perhaps most saliently
presents itself in the context of practical reasoning and in our experience of the
“push and pull” of our conflicting attitudes. For it is here where we experience
ourselves as subject to the various persuasive tendencies of our nature, burdened
with the task of resolving the tensions between them, and working to achieve this
end. Indeed, it is perhaps in virtue of our phenomenology of struggling with,
overcoming, or succumbing to, our conflicting forces, that we most convincingly
regard ourselves as autonomous “operators,” intermediating among our facts.
How can the Holistic picture make sense of this phenomenology?
Notice first that when we engage in deliberation, when we must “make up our
minds” about a given matter, we commonly regard ourselves as monarchic
judges—as arbiters—perched “above the fray” and witnessing the behavior of
conflicting “attorneys”. Thus John’s “I,”—from John’s Future—operating as
John (3), wishes to regard himself as occupying a position of impartial Kantian
detachment, gazing down at the conflicting testimonies of John (1) and John (2),
such that, as Blackburn has put it, “the whole crew is then within [his] purview”
(1998 p. 260). Indeed, from such a detached position, John (3) may very well
desire to “hear” the appeals of John (1) and John (2) with an impartial,
dispassionate, ear, and he may wish to evaluate their appeals on the basis of pure,
impartial reason, such that his reason will “of itself, independently of anything
empirical, determine the will” (Kant, 1997b, 5:42). Yet, we have seen from
Chapter 3, that, in his efforts to engage pure, impartial reason, John (3) will
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encounter redoubtable, and often undetectable, opposition. Furthermore, even if
John (3) were able to engage pure, impartial reason, it remains to be seen how
such a calculative faculty, detached from John’s “contingent profile of concerns,”
could enable him to resolve his dilemma. That is, in order for John (3)—the
purely rational Kantian Captain—to evaluate the merits of each prospective career
choice, he will eventually need to appeal to John’s idiosyncratic values, desires,
fears, longings, regrets, hopes, etc. As such, the deliberative efficacy of John
(3)—Johns “I”—will be heavily contingent on the dispositions of John (1) and
John (2). And, this, again, is to be expected. For as Blackburn puts it: “You, when
you deliberate, are whatever you are: a person of tangled desires, conflicting
attitudes to your parents, inchoate ambitions, preferences and ideals, with an
inherited ragbag of attitudes to different actions, situations, and characters. You
do not manage, ever, to stand apart from all that.” (1998, p. 252)
So, the “I” that pulls back may not be as “independent” or as “unitary” as it
seems to us. And yet we are still left with the puzzling question of how to
understand our experience of “taking sides with,”

“identifying with,” or

“throwing our weight behind” a particular desire or principle. After all, when we
do such things, it certainly feels as if “I”—distinct from a particular attitude—am
interacting with, or operating upon, such an attitude. How, then, can we make
sense of this phenomenology? To address the question, I will make use of another
illustration: Cookie.
Tom is overweight and suffers from high blood pressure. His doctor has told
him that if he doesn’t reduce his blood pressure he is going to have to take
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medication that can cause “sexual problems”. One alternative means of reducing
his blood pressure is through weight-reduction. So Tom has gone on a diet. Yet
this hasn’t been easy for Tom. Indeed, after a very frustrating and depressing day
at work, Tom enters his home to see his wife pulling a tray of chocolate chip
cookies out of the oven. Tom smells the cookies and feels a powerful urge to eat
one. Let us call this urge “Desire.” Suppose “Desire ” says: “Eat the cookie.” But
just as Tom experiences the tug of desire, he remembers the doctor’s warning, and
an opposing force, “Fear” proclaims: “Don’t be an idiot, resist the cookie!” Now,
as “Fear” looms up, “Desire” begins to subside. But then Tom catches another
whiff of the cookies and “Desire” pipes up: “Oh, c’mon! One cookie won’t hurt!
After all, you’ve had a rough day. You deserve a little pleasure! It will help you
relax. And a little relaxation is also important.” So now “Desire” begins to wax
and “Fear” to wane. Then Fear responds: “You know if you eat one, you will be
very tempted to eat two. C’mon! Just stick to your resolution!” But then “Desire”
kicks in again: “Aw, c’mon, you were good all day, cut yourself a little slack.”
Then suddenly Tom’s wife calls out, impatiently: “Oh c’mon Tom! What? Are
you just gonna stand there, staring at the cookies? Just have one, it won’t kill
you!” Alarmed by his wife’s “Shaming” complaint, and encouraged by her
endorsement of “Desire” (for she is aware of his diet) Tom decides that he might
as well just eat one cookie. So he “throws his weight behind” “Desire” and takes
one.
Such, in any case, is our commonsense, rationalist, account of Tom’s
behavior. Again, in short: “Reasonable Tom” has engaged in a painful battle
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between two conflicting forces vying for his allegiance. “Tom” listens to “Fear,”
and considers its appeals; then “Tom” listens to “Desire” and considers its
appeals. The appeals of each disposition are equally strong and they exert an
equal force on “Tom”. Finally, Tom’s wife’s voice pipes in, making him feel
foolish, which prompts “Shame.” With the support of “Shame” and his wife’s
expressed endorsement of “Desire,” “Tom” decides to “throw his weight” behind
“Desire” and thereby overcomes “Fear.”
However, the Holistic model provides a different description. Here too, the
global organism, Tom, is indeed, undergoing a struggle because elements of Tom
are in conflict. And “Tom,” the representative of Tom, registers and endures this
conflict. But note, crucially, that the forces in conflict—“Desire” and “Fear” and
eventually “Shame”—aren’t merely heteronymous forces within global Tom:
They are actually parts of Tom, speaking for him and thus speaking as Tom and,
to the extent that “Tom” recognizes such voices, speaking s “Tom”. As Shariff,
Schooler and Vohs put it:
Instead of saying that my consciousness (me) is making the
decisions, we need to say that I am conscious of the parts of my
brain (still me) that are making the decisions. Instead of saying the
“I” moves the machinery of my brain, “I” am the machinery of my
brain, and “I” consequently move myself.201
That is to say, it is not merely “Desire” or “Fear” that looms up, but “Tom qua
Desire” or “Tom qua Fear” that loom up, and, in doing so, assume global Tom’s
will. But notice that, insofar as self-conscious “Tom” gives way to Tom qua
Desire or Tom qua Fear, they will be speaking for both “Tom” and Tom (because
201

Shariff, A. F., Schooler, J., & Vohs, K. D. ‘The Hazards of Claiming to Have
Solved the Hard Problem of Free Will.’ In Are We Free?: Psychology and Free
Will (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 93
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“Tom” is the representative of Tom). At this point, neither “Tom qua Desire” nor
“Tom qua Fear” has proven sufficiently powerful to completely command Tom’s
overall will and push him to action. So now Tom sends the Korsgaardian or
Frankfurtian “Tom qua Impartial Mediator” into the fray, hoping that he will
“resolve the conflict” and therefore restore the unity of Tom’s will.202 But how,
and to what extent, does “Tom qua Impartial Mediator” actually accomplish this?
Notice, first, that, as discussed in previous examples, “Tom qua Impartial
Mediator” does not act as “parade marshal” for Tom’s mental proceedings. That
is to say, “Tom qua Impartial Mediator” neither determines the appearance nor
the strength of the attitudes of “Tom qua Fear” and “Tom qua Desire”—nor,
crucially, does he determine either the appearance, or the strength, of his “own”
orientation to “Desire” or “Fear”. True, “Tom qua Impartial Mediator” may be
able to engage a sharper or more concentrated apparatus of reason. He may be
able to summon a greater data set and perform various inferences and projections.
But, crucially, the extent to which “Tom qua Impartial Mediator” can do this is
not, ultimately, up to “Tom qua Impartial Mediator”. For, again—and I suggest
that this is the critical move—the extent to which “Tom qua Impartial Mediator”
can deliberate independently of “Fear” and “Desire” will depend entirely on both
the strengths of “Tom qua Fear” and “Tom qua Desire” and on whatever
cognitive resources are available to “Tom qua Impartial Mediator” (or, for that
matter, to Tom qua global human being). As such, “Tom’s” contribution will
202

Here I am on board both with Korsgaard’s assertion that persons do indeed
strive for volitional unity, and with Frankfurt’s notion that “[i]t is a necessary
truth about us that we wholeheartedly desire to be wholehearted.” “The Faintest
Passion,” from (1998), p. 116.
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depend entirely on the composite facts of Tom. Or as I put it in Section 5.2,
“Tom” operating as the “aristocratic” self that attempts to “rule” over his parts,
will just constitute another part of the Holistic, or corporate totality of Tom, and
the role it plays in “pulling his parts together” will be no less contingent than the
roles played by the other parts. To put it a little differently: “Tom” is always a
subset or expression of Tom; Tom is never a subset or expression of “Tom”.
Indeed, as Shariff, Schooler, and Vohs have put it: “In the former [rationalist]
position, one’s “I” is understood to refer to “the me that does thing thinking” and
this self is credited with being the one that consciously controls one’s actions. The
new approach dissolves the conscious self into the larger “I” and “the me that
does the thinking” is embedded within the whole brain. “I” still control my
actions, but the “I” is reconceived to be the coalition of my brain processes.”
(2008, p.93)
Yet we have still left unexplained the question of how to account for Tom’s
feeling of “throwing his weight behind” “Desire”. This is a tricky problem, but I
believe the Holistic model is up to the challenge. Note, again, that Tom qua
global human being is invested in and represented by “Fear,” “Desire,” and
“Shame”. That is to say, “Fear,” “Desire” and “Shame” both represent Tom and
are Tom. Yet recall that while Tom and “Tom” are invested in and represented by
such contrary factions, Tom/”Tom” desires to be unified and wholehearted.203 I
suggest, thus, that “Tom’s” feeling of “throwing his weight behind” “Desire”
should just be understood as the relief Tom/“Tom” feels at the decisive resolution
203

We thus can make sense of Tom accurately expressing the view that he is “of
two minds” or even “of three minds” about a given matter.
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of the conflict. That is, Tom/“Tom”’s global system, previously in conflict or
tension, has ultimately and happily coalesced around the unity-restoring, volitionassuming disposition of “Desire.” Now, at least for the time being, as Tom takes
his cookie and enjoys it, his disposition will be harmoniously concentrated. Only
afterwards, as “Desire” reasserts itself—“Oh c’mon, just one more!”—will “Fear”
kick in again and the whole embarrassing, grinding, tearing-yearning-striving
dynamic will resume.
Yet one might still wonder, as Socrates does in the Phaedo—how to account
for the possibility of a person overriding his desires or drives, or, indeed,
overriding his physical body. As Socrates asks, in such cases, doesn’t the soul or
the “I” “[direct] all the elements of which it is said to consist, opposing them in
almost everything all through life, and exercising every form of control;
sometimes by severe and unpleasant methods like those of physical training and
medicine, and sometimes by milder ones” (Phaedo, 94d)? Yet again, I suggest the
Holistic account is up to the challenge. That is, without addressing the difficult
question of “downward causation”—how, that is, a mental attitude can causally
interact with a subvening physical substance—all the Holistic model needs to
demonstrate is that the “I” does not bring autonomous or unilateral powers to
bear on the facts of the “me,” physical or otherwise. And this it can do. For,
again, we need only understand such behavior as a product or expression of our
totality of psychophysical facts—robust inclinations, volitional necessities,
intellectual character and what have you. Someone, for example, who suffers
from tendencies toward self-hatred and masochism will more likely develop
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certain eating disorders; someone who is unusually ambitions will tend to “push
himself” harder than others and to “punish themselves” more severely when they
fail; a person who suffers from chronic depression will be more inclined, after
sustaining a personal trauma, to jump off a bridge. Viewed in this light, I suggest
that such behaviors should be understood as perfectly consistent with one’s
overall economy of personal facts—perfectly “nested,” that is to say, in the
functional holism of a person’s global psychophysical system. Indeed, as I have
repeatedly suggested, I believe we should properly understand such attempts to
alter or modify such facts as further expressions or realizations of one’s facts.

7.4 Self-Integration and Incontinence
The Holistic view will also illuminate questions concerning the nature of
identity, and, by association, questions involving incontinence or weakness of
will. Recall first that on the prevailing Rationalist view the self is both constructed
and held together by the “I” that can “have a hand in” such processes. That is,
recall James’ claim that the “I” can “appropriate” elements of the “me,” and
Frankfurt’s and Korsgaard’s assertions that we can identify with or externalize
certain desires or tendencies, establishing “intrapsychic constraints and
boundaries,” and “pulling our parts together”. Again, as I have suggested, there is
something to this view, for, unlike un-self-conscious animals, we certainly can
form an opinion of ourselves and go to work on ourselves. Yet I suggest that the
Holistic model of self will much better capture what actually goes on in such
efforts of self-integration, and, indeed, will better capture our experience.
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To begin with, as discussed earlier, note that my very decision to identify with
or externalize certain desires and attributes, and my success in doing so, will
critically be determined by a set of tendencies over which I will not be able to
exercise control. The homophobic man may very well wish to externalize or
alienate his desire for other men, but whether or not he can do so will turn on the
strength of his underlying desires. The woman who wishes to identify more with
her “love” for her father instead of her “anger” toward him may or may not
succeed, as determined by the actual strength of her actual feelings. As such,
one’s identifications and endorsements will still contribute to the overall
composure of one’s identity. But the nature and extent of their contribution will
need to be accurately assessed with respect to the overall composite, that is, the
strengths, or weights of all the facts, whether or not one is conscious of them.
That is, on the Holistic model, the workings of underlying and unacknowledged
tendencies in our nature should be accorded just as much “authority” with respect
to deciding our true identity. As Schechtman has suggested, one’s robust
inclinations “are to be given presumptive authority even when we do not identify
with them” (Schechtman, 2004, 426).
Indeed, this “reorientation” with respect to one’s identity will help make sense
of our failure to live up to our self-conceptions and will thus make sense of the
phenomena of incontinence. To see this, note that the thrust of this problem of
incontinence or akrasia, as originally introduced by Socrates in the Protagoras,
lay in the presumption that the knowledge of “our good” should exercise
incontrovertible authority with respect to our behavior. As Socrates puts it: “No
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one who either knows or believes that there is another possible course of action,
better than the one he is following, will ever continue on his present course”
(Protagoras 358b-c). And he says, further: “[T]he power of appearance makes us
wander and often change up and down with respect to the same things and change
our minds in our actions and choices.” But knowledge, on the other hand,
“renders the appearance ineffective and makes our soul remain in the truth”
(Protagoras 356c-e). As such, once we conclude, or “really know,” what is in our
best interest, we cannot do otherwise; or, to put the idea differently, if we were to
act in a way that was not in our best interest, we must not have known what was
actually in our best interest.204 Take again, Cookie. Given the ease with which
Tom’s appetite tempted him, we must conclude, per Socrates, that Tom must have
not “known,” that the best course of action was to abstain from eating it. He
might, as Davidson205 postulates, possess prima facie belief that it was a bad thing
to do, or even an “all things considered belief,” but not “all out knowledge,”
which would have pre-empted even the slightest temptation.
But, again, note that the pull of this problem lay in our endorsement of the
presumptive authority of our self-conscious rational conviction. Once, however,
we reject this assumption, we can recognize additional, equally authoritative
sources, and hence equally decisive sources of motivation.206 Again, if I may
204

See supporting accounts in Terry Penner’s “Knowledge vs. True Belief in the
Socratic Psychology of Action,” APEIRON, 1996, 29 (3), p. 199. And R. M.,
Hare, The Language of Morals, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952).
205
See Davidson “How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?” in Davidson, Essays
on Actions and Events, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 21-42.
206
See Arpaly: “A theory of rationality should not assume that there is something
special about an agent's best judgment. An agent's best judgment is just another
belief.” From “On Acting Rationally Against One's Better Judgment,” Ethics,
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borrow an episode from personal experience: As a twelve-year-old, fresh from
watching, and being terrified by, the movie “Jaws,” our family went on our
summer vacation to Lake Tahoe. We had gone several summers in a row and I
had swum every summer. But that summer I was afraid to enter the water. My
parents and all the grownups I knew assured me that “sharks are not freshwater
fish”. And I believed what they told me. Indeed, I was just as sure of the truth of
this proposition as I was that I had ten fingers and ten toes. Indeed, I would have
placed a bet on the fact—would have wagered an entire month’s allowance on it.
And yet, in spite of my knowledge, I could not as much as dip a toe in the lake.
Here Socrates might contest that, as a matter of fact, I must not have “really
known” that sharks could not swim in this water. But this seems absurd, and, in
any case, such an assertion would seem to trivialize Socrates’ claim; that is, if by
definition, one cannot act against what one knows, then no argument can be
adduced otherwise.
Indeed, according to such a view, we can also make sense of Arpaly’s analysis
of Huck Finn’s “inverse akrasia”. That is, in spite of Huck’s thoroughly
considered, rational endorsement of his desire to turn Jim in to his owner; in spite
of his self-identification as someone who respects the rights of slave-owners, and
regards slaves as property—in spite of this, he ultimately yields to his desires or
“wills” which were a source of shame and which he wished to externalize or
110: 488-513, p. 512. See also Stocker: “Motivation and evaluation do not stand
in a simple and direct relation to each other, as so often supposed.” And, further,
“their interrelations are mediated by large arrays of complex psychic structures,
such as mood, energy, and interest.” Michael Stocker, “Desiring the Bad: An
Essay in Moral Psychology,” Journal of Philosophy, 1979, 76: 738-753.
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alienate. Recall that, on Korsgaard’s account, to violate your consciously
endorsed principles “is to lose your integrity and so your identity, and to no
longer be who you are. That is, it is to no longer be able to think of yourself
under the description under which you value yourself and find your life to be
worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. It is to be for all practical
purposes dead or worse than dead” (1999: 101). Yet, again, once we have
unseated the sovereignty of the rational “I,” and allowed other parts equal
authoritative claim to our identity—parts that, as Schechtman recommends,
include even our unconsciously-held beliefs and desires—we can appreciate the
possibility that Huck’s behavior was not at all a violation of his “true” nature, but
a faithful expression and affirmation of it.

7.5 Responsibility
The above considerations lead naturally to a discussion of responsibility, that
is, the question of whether or not a person is genuinely or “ultimately” credit or
blame-worthy for their actions. Recall in Chapter 4 that I argued that persons
cannot “produce” or “author” their attitudes or actions such as to merit ultimate
responsibility; and I argued that compatibilist accounts of “assuming ownership”
failed to head off undermining worries about one’s formative causes—that is,
various conditions that give rise to the development of one’s reasons-response
mechanism or one’s character. As such, in both cases, I argued in favor of the
proposition that one should not be regarded as ultimately responsible—ultimately
blame or credit-worthy—for one’s attitudes or actions. Again, I recognize this
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may not “sit well” with our intuitions. That is, given our powerful
phenomenology of doing things, given our sense that we determine what we do,
and given our standard—and perhaps irresistible—custom of blame and praise
attribution,207 we may naturally resist such a proposal. Yet I hope that a further
discussion of the Holistic model will render it more plausible and palatable.
First, I acknowledge that a robust self-consciousness renders human persons
capable of an enormous range of behaviors that are inaccessible to non-self
conscious creatures. For example, creatures lacking self-consciousness cannot
possibly desire to “control their drinking,” “deal with their anger,” or “manage
their weight”. Moreover, self-conscious creatures will possess an incomparably
greater degree of understanding with respect to the consequences of their actions;
for example, they will be able to project how their actions will affect their
relationships, their social standing, etc. Indeed, self-consciousness will even be
required for a conceptual grasp of such practices as punctuality, promise-keeping,
and forgiveness. As such, insofar as human beings are capable of, say, entering
into agreements or showing up on time, they can and should be held accountable
for failing to do so. That said, one can hold another “accountable” for an action
without holding the other “responsible” for it. To help bring out the difference, I
will make use of an illustration, Julia and Jane.
Julia and Jane are friends and colleagues at the same real estate agency. On a
number of occasions, when Julia and Jane have arranged a time to meet socially,

207

See: Peter Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” in Gary Watson, (ed.), Free
Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
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Jane has arrived on time but Julia has arrived between ten and fifteen minutes
late. At first Jane dismisses Julia’s tardiness, attributing it to traffic conditions, or
some other circumstance, but she finds herself growing impatient. Finally, Jane
confronts Julia, informing her of the fact that she has grown frustrated with her
tardiness. In response, Julia offers a sincere apology. “I’m sorry,” she says, “It’s
just that I’m a chronically late person. It’s a problem I have and I’ve been
working really hard on it.” Moved by Julia’s sincerity—if a bit perplexed by her
explanation—Jane accepts Julia’s apology. Yet the next time they meet, Julia
again shows up late, and again offers the same apology: “I’m so sorry. It’s a real
problem I have and I’ve been working on it. It’s just really hard for me to be on
time for anything.” Again, Julia comes across as genuinely contrite, but this time
Jane is less moved by her apology. After all, it occurs to Jane that Julia almost
always arrives at work on time, and, to her recollection, Julia has never
complained of missing a flight. Finally, after Julia shows up late once again, Jane
asks for a rundown of Julia’s activities during the hour preceding their meeting.
“Well,” Julia responds, “I promise you, I had every intention of coming on time.
In fact, I even set aside an extra fifteen minutes. But just as I was about to leave, I
got a call from my friend who was having a panic attack. I was going to talk to
her on my cell on the way, but my cell was out of power and I’d misplaced my
charging cord and…” As Julia speaks, Jane suddenly realizes that at least part of
the reason Julia is late is that Julia simply doesn’t value their friendship enough to
do what is necessary to arrive on time (after all, again, Julia arrives to work on
time and never misses a flight). This upsets Jane, and it occurs to her that perhaps
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she should threaten not to meet Julia socially anymore if she can’t guarantee
punctuality. On the other hand, given that Jane enjoys Julia’s company, and given
that they need to sustain a good working relationship, Jane decides against this. In
any case, it occurs to Jane that she cannot justifiably blame Julia for her actions;
her behavior is a natural expression of her character and priorities, and these are
things that “Julia” cannot determine. At this point Jane may consider expressing
her regret that Julia does not sufficiently value their relationship, or else trying to
do something to further strengthen their friendship so as to seem more deserving
of respect, but Jane realizes that neither of these gestures may prove sufficient,
indeed, that they may backfire. After all, Jane has already made her wishes plain,
and they have already been friends for years, and it seems unlikely Jane can do
anything to render her friendship more important to Julia. As such, with a heavy
heart, Jane accepts Julia for who she is, and their friendship for what it is, and
from then on simply expects Julia to show up late to their meetings and plans
accordingly.
So, yes, individuals can recognize right and wrong, and recognize the
consequences of their actions. Moreover, individuals are capable of modifying
their behavior such as to accommodate their understanding of such norms. For
these reasons, persons can and should be held accountable for their behavior. The
motorist who has driven drunk, lost control of his car, and struck a pedestrian, has
indeed behaved irresponsibly and recklessly, and must be held to account. He
should be fined; his license should be suspended or revoked; perhaps he should
serve jail time. The sex offender has indeed committed crimes and must be
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brought to justice, sent to an institution and kept away from young children.
Similarly, those who have performed honorably, or who achieve great success,
should be praised and esteeme. After all, their actions have stemmed from them
and have expressed their agency. And yet, as Strawson, Pereboom, Smilansky and
others have argued, for a person to be ultimately responsible for his or her
actions—for them to be ultimately blame or credit-worthy—a person will need to
be seen as responsible for the extent of the agency he or she can exercise. And
this, as I have argued, is beyond human reach.

7.6 Subject and Object - The Conceptual Problem
I have tried to demonstrate how we may understand both the activity and the
identity of the “I” as an expression of the facts of the “me.” Yet nothing I have
said so far has directly addressed the problem of our phenomenology of
“observing” and “acting upon” our facts; for we certainly do experience ourselves
as “looking” at ourselves and “acting” upon ourselves. Following Descartes here,
I suggest that this phenomenology is unmistakable and unshakable: “I”—however
“I” am to be conceived—am, in fact, observing. And in the act of observing, as
DOT affirms, it seems conceptually impossible that the observer (whether unitary
or pluralistic) can be identical to that which is observed. Here, I will try to shed
some light on this problem, but I regret that I will not be able to shine very much
light.
Consider, first, that, consistent with the conceptual claim raised above, the “I,”
per subject, cannot know itself as such. That is, insofar as the “I” observes, that
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which it observes can only stand before it as object; hence, the “I” cannot, as
Hume says “catch itself” in the act of observation.208 Wittgenstein has put this
point nicely. Comparing the observing “I” to a physical eye, he says: “You will
say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you
do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is
seen by the eye” (1974, §5.633, p. 69, emphasis his). That is, while the “eye” can
view objects in the world and even view itself as object, it cannot see itself
“seeing”. As such, Wittgenstein suggests that “[t]he subject does not belong to the
world: rather it is a limit of the world” (1974, §5.632, p. 69). And since, on the
Tractarian view, “[t]he world is the totality of facts,”209 we therefore cannot
speak of the existence of the “I” and, as such, it “must be passed over in silence”
(1974, §7, p. 89). Note, also, that I have argued against the unitary conception of
the “I” and pushed instead for a view of the “I” as a contingent bundle or
“coalition” of facts. As such, insofar as we can allow for the existence of an
observing “I,” I suggest again that we should only recognize it as a transient
coalition or composite. To such an extent, either (1) We may just have to remain
“silent” on the metaphysical “I” or subject, or (2) The perceiving “I” should be
recognized as synonymous with the facts of the “me”.
Unfortunately, neither of these proposals substantially alleviates the central
worry. Indeed, no matter how much we may wish to dismiss or dispel the
208

See Hume (T: 1.4.6, p. 165): “For my part, when I enter most intimately into
what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of
heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch
myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the
perception.”
209
Wittgenstein (1974, §1.1, p. 5)
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existence of the “I,” we simply cannot escape our phenomenology. Nothing seems
more self-evident than the fact that “I,” the perceiving subject, am indeed
perceiving; that “I” am indeed feeling; that “I” am indeed thinking. Indeed, as
Kant puts it, “The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for
otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all,
which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or
else at least would be nothing for me” (1998, B132, p. 146, emphasis his).
Furthermore, even supposing that the “I” can be re-described as a “coalition of
facts,” we must still account for the possibility of a “coalition of facts” assuming a
unique perspective from which it can observe features of the “me”. Earlier, I
nodded at some clumsy explanations, such as the self “taking itself up into itself,”
and nodded to Metzinger’s proposal that: “For the first time, system-related
information now becomes globally available as system-related information,
because the organism now has an internal image of itself as a whole, as a distinct
entity possessing global features” (Metzinger, 2005, p. 4). But I recognize that
such explanations hardly illuminate. Indeed, I take consolation in the fact that
Schopenhauer regarded this problem as an inextricable, “knot of existence,” and
“miracle par excellence.”210 And so I will leave it at that.
210

He writes: “Now the identity of the subject of willing with that of knowing by
virtue whereof (and indeed necessarily) the word “I” includes and indicates both,
is the knot of the world (Weltknoten), and hence inexplicable. For to us only the
relations between objects are intelligible; but of these two can be one only insofar
as they are parts of a whole. Here, on the other hand, where we are speaking of
the subject, the rules for the knowing of objects no longer apply, and an actual
identity of the knower with what is known as willing and hence of the subject
with the object, is immediately given. But whoever really grasps the inexplicable
nature of this identity, will with me call it the miracle ‘par excellence.’”
Schopenhauer (1974, p. 211)

	
  

166

	
  
CHAPTER 8
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

8.1 Introduction
Over the course of the preceding chapters I have challenged the Rationalist
conception of the self, working to undermine the impartial, rational, unitary “I”.
In its place I have offered a Holistic model of the self, a model that assigns no
privileged, directorial authority to the “I” and indeed, understands the “I”, and its
reasoned preferences, as a transitory, mercurial expression of one’s global
coalition of empirical facts. In fleshing out this Holistic model, I have tried to
show how it can accommodate various puzzles associated with deliberation,
temptation, identity, weakness of will and responsibility. Now, in this final
chapter, I will spell out some of practical and ethical advantages of the Holistic
model.
Let us begin with this passage by Simon Blackburn, as it nicely captures what I
regard as the key ethical and practical failing of the Rationalist (or Kantian)
picture:
If we see our fellow human beings as each possessed of Kantian
control, and only succumbing to other pressures when things are
going wrong, then a dangerously optimistic politics is possible.
The implication is that because our fellows are fundamentally able
to guide themselves by rational restraint, then of course they ought
to be safe with guns, or drugs, or motor cars, or sacrosanct areas of
private behavior. They have themselves all that is required for selfcontrol and reason. The unhappily common failures, when people
shoot each other, abuse drugs, drive unsafely, or brutalize their
families show us only defectives who unaccountably will not listen
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to the voice of reason within them, and these can safely be
demonized, put away, rejected as beyond the social pale. We thus
combine unreasonable optimism about what people might be like,
with unreasonable hatred of them when they are not like that.
(1998, p. 268)
Notice how dramatically Blackburn’s claims contrast with Korsgaard’s injunction
that “[a]s a rational being, as a rational agent, you are faced with the task of
making something of yourself, and you must regard yourself as a success or a
failure insofar as you succeed or fail at this task” (2009, p. xii, emphasis mine).
Indeed, in light of Korsgaard’s passage, we may begin to appreciate Blackburn’s
warning that the Kantian/Rationalist model may give rise to a “dangerously
optimistic politics.” In this passage, Blackburn gestures at some of the
consequences of such dangerous optimism, suggesting, for example, that it is
unrealistic for us to expect of persons that they should exercise the optimal degree
of rational self-control, and that, as such, it is unfair for us to “demonize” and
“reject” such persons after they have failed to do so. In the following sections, I
will further explore the dangers of such unrealistic expectations and argue that the
Holistic model provides an approach that, while perhaps not as robustly
optimistic, is nonetheless more practical, accommodative, and compassionate.

8.2 Unrealistic Expectations
“There’s a touch of the divine in being an agent,”211 Korsgaard opines, and I
believe her comment captures a powerful, familiar, and jealously guarded,
211

Korsgaard (2009, p. 85). And see Chisholm who asserts that free agents
possess a quality “which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we
act, is a prime mover unmoved.” From “Freedom and Action,” in K. Lehrer (ed.),
Freedom and Determinism (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 11-44.
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intuition. That is, our immediate, pre-reflective, sensation of being, does not feel
restricted, does not feel empirically, or even perhaps temporally,212 bound. We
feel, in a word, “stringless”. Moreover, insofar as we take ourselves to be
essentially unconstrained and capable of directly commanding our actions, we
likewise regard ourselves as unbound Sartrean agents, fee to “make ourselves” as
we choose. From an early age, our elders reinforce this premise, assuring us that
nothing necessarily stands in the way of the achievement of our dreams. Yes, we
may run up against some resistance, and we may have to put in some hard work,
but as long as we are willing to bear down—and as long as we receive a few
lucky breaks along the way——there is nothing, at least no internal impediment,
to our progress.213 Of course there is some truth buried in these assertions. We do
set our sights on our objectives, hard work will in most cases help us achieve our
ends, we can overcome a great deal of resistance, and our confidence in our
boundless potential can serve as powerful motivation. Yet I suggest that such an
outlook, in spite of its optimism, will bear several associated costs—costs, indeed,
that, in many respects, will significantly outweigh the benefits.
Note, first—as I have argued in various forms over the course of this thesis—
that, for empirical human beings composed such as we are, our possibilities are, in
fact, quite radically constrained. Yes, hard work will in most cases help us
progress toward the realization of our goals, yet, even under the very best of
212

See Dennett’s nice description of our being “moral levitators”. Daniel Dennett,
Freedom Evolves (Penguin, 2004). And see Schopenhauer (1969, Vol. 1, p. 280)
on one’s experience of occupying the nunc stans.
213
See, for example, Malcolm Gladwell’s popularization of the “10,000 Hour
Rule,” the idea that 10,000 hours of “deliberate practice” should allow any
otherwise capable person to become an expert in a given field. Malcolm Gladwell,
Outliers, The Story of Success (Back Bay Books, 2011).
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conditions, given our native capabilities, such hard work will only pay off to a
particular extent. Anyone who has struggled to grasp a mathematical principle, or
to find the “right word” to complete a poem, or to perform the “moonwalk” dance
move, or even to ask a girl or boy out on a date, will recognize that all human
beings are not born with the same basket of talents. This, again, is not to suggest
that such difficulties cannot be overcome. But the question of whether one can
overcome them, and how quickly, and by what means, will greatly depend on a set
of antecedent factors and on an array of external conditions such as our
upbringing, our familial, educational, financial and political support structures.
Indeed, once we recognize that what we achieve is, as such, only in a very relative
sense, and only to a certain degree, “up to us,” we can begin to establish more
realistic, practical, and healthy expectations. If, for example, a student recognizes
that he struggles with writing, but excels in mathematics, he can make a better
informed judgment with respect to where to devote his energies (he can, for
example, ease up on his study of mathematics, and devote more time to working
on his writing; or else he may decide to really exploit his mathematical talent and
let his English skills languish). If one doesn’t feel attracted to the opposite sex but
to one’s own, and if one can embrace this fact, one won’t need to waste energy
fending off “alien desires” or chastising oneself for feeling them, but can begin to
engage in more natural and fulfilling relationships.214 If one is sick, and one can’t
muster a “positive attitude” toward one’s condition, one needn’t feel guilty about
214

Recall Schechtman: (2004, p.425-426) “[T]he work of shaping a life is less of
a task of micro-management. It is less about directly settling conflicts than about
establishing safe boundaries within which these conflicts can be allowed to play
themselves out.”
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it. As such, the capacity to acknowledge and accept certain core tendencies or
“robust inclinations,” can greatly serve to reduce one’s internal conflict and to
thereby render possible a more wholehearted, passionate life.
While such acts of recognition and acceptance will help establish conditions
for a healthier relationship to oneself, they can also dramatically serve to improve
one’s relationships with others. Consider, for example, the common habit of “just
ignoring” or else “trying to fix” unattractive qualities in a prospective romantic
partner. In the first case, especially after the early romantic glow has worn off,
those undesirable qualities (annoying habits, social quirks, etc.) one has tried to
deny or push out of view likely will erupt into vexing prominence. In the latter
case, one may dedicate an enormous amount of energy to amending a lover’s set
of foibles—usually with very minor success. “Fixer-uppers” often turn into
personal “breaker-downers,” and, in any case, the assumption of such a critical,
corrective approach to one’s lover may well serve to undermine his or her selfesteem, and, as such, undermine the good faith of the relationship. Consider,
second, how such an approach will beneficially apply to child raising. That is,
from a very early age, children clearly demonstrate marked differences in
character, talents, preferences, temperament, etc. One child may manifest athletic
skills and an interest in team sports, another may demonstrate more intellectual
skills and an interest in academics; one child may behave in a more domineering
or bossy manner, another in a more submissive or accommodative manner. As
such, I suggest that a “one approach fits all” policy in child rearing will prove
inferior to an approach tailored to each child’s peculiarities. Of course there is no
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harm in exposing all children to a standard spectrum of activities, but expecting
that all children respond similarly is unreasonable, just as is “forcing” a child to
enjoy or to perform well at something for which he feels no inclination and shows
minimal talent. Indeed, forcing a child to persevere at some such activity may
ultimately serve to poison the activity, predisposing him or her against it for years
to come. Finally, a deep appreciation of other peoples’ natures can render us more
capable of accepting and adjusting to their offenses. That is to say, the more we
can understand the mechanisms that give rise to a person’s behavior—childhood
trauma, dispositions of temperament, etc.—the easier it may215 become for us to
regard their offenses as symptomatic and general in nature, and not take them as
personally: The crazy neighbor lashes out at us, not because there is anything
particularly offensive about us, but because she is crazy and because we happen to
live next-door.

8.3 Some Objections and Replies
My discussion of the benefits of such “realistic expectations” may well prompt
the following multi-part objection: “Your Holistic assessment of human nature
with all its constraints is bleak and self-defeating. I mean, just consider the
following: (1) Suppose I realize that I actually don’t care for my character traits.
In that case, your Holistic model wouldn’t offer much in the way of hope. Even
worse, your view will license a complacent, or self-defeating attitude. I mean,
why bother doing anything at all to change or improve myself, if, as you say, I am
215

I say it “may” help us view people as such, but not necessarily. Consistent with
the Holistic view, the extent of our understanding may or may not allow us to
overcome or modify our reactive attitudes.
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unable to do so, since such self-transformative change isn’t actually in the cards?
Further, (2) If your view is correct, then no one is ultimately responsible for who
they are or how they act, and that just can’t be right, because of course we are
responsible for the kind of people we are, and for our actions. At least I know I
am! And even worse, that kind of thinking—that is, not holding people
responsible for who they are and how they act—is not only wrong, it is
dangerous. I mean, how else are we supposed to enforce laws if no one is
“responsible” for breaking them? (3) If your account is correct, if we are “just our
facts,” then what renders us superior, I mean, more worthy of dignity and respect,
than non-human animals? For certainly, as Kant has said before, human beings
really are in possession of a unique dignity and are uniquely deserving of respect,
such that we have an obligation to treat persons not as a means, but as ends in
themselves. And, finally, (4) No matter how persuasive your arguments may be,
your account just can’t be correct. It can’t be correct because I just know that I’m
more than a bunch of facts—physical and psychological or otherwise. I mean,
there’s a real me in here! And this real me is—in some way I admit I can’t really
explain—truly and extraordinarily special.
I will address these concerns in order. I will call them: (1) The Objection from
Complacency or Self-Defeatism, (2) The Objection from Responsibility, (3) The
Objection from Dignity and Respect, and (4) The Objection from Specialness.
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8.3.1 The Objection from Complacency or Self-Defeatism
The Objection from Complacency or Self-Defeatism expresses the following
worry. If all I am is my “facts,” and if even my efforts to change my facts will be
conditioned by more facts—then to a great degree,216 whatever I can become has
been predetermined. I mean, I may appreciate some formal transformation—just
like, for example, a caterpillar turns into a butterfly, or a tadpole turns into a
frog—but even these modifications, however dramatic, will just consist in the
general unfolding of my facts, like a photograph’s details emerging on a sheet of
paper. And this can seem awfully demoralizing to one who doesn’t approve of
one’s facts. Indeed, to embrace such a view would seem to support an attitude of
defeatism: “If I can’t change myself, then why bother doing anything at all?”217
Indeed, such conditions might even be invoked to justify unethical behavior, viz.,
if “nothing is controllable,” then “everything is permitted.”218
But the Holistic model does not license such complacency or pessimism, and
this for a number of reasons. First, recall from Chapter 3 that we rarely, if ever,
possess a sufficient grasp of our facts. That is, we neither possess an accurate
account of our present facts, nor an accurate account of any additional facts that
may emerge in the future. After all, it is not uncommon for people to realize late
216

I provide this qualification to account for indeterministic or “random” factors.
See empirical research by, for example, Kathleen D. Vohs and Jonathan W.
Schooler, that purport to show that accepting determinism encourages cheating.
“Encouraging Belief in Determinism Increases Cheating,” (Psychological
Science, 2008) Vol. 19, Number 1, p. 49-54.
218
See A. F., Schariff, J. Schooler, Kathleen D. Vohs. (2008). “The Hazards of
Claiming to Have Solved the Hard Problem of Free Will,” in Are We Free?:
Psychology and Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 182.
217
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in life that they possess certain passions or talents they never suspected they
possessed or could ever possess. Thus we find people who eventually discover
that they possess a love for the arts, or, indeed, love for members of the same
gender. Take the following episode from my own life. By the age of 40, due to a
terrible history with dogs, I had developed the conviction that I was “not a dog
person,” that I even “lacked the capacity” to feel anything but aversion in the
presence of a canine. And yet, due to the overwhelming demand of my wife and
kids, on condition that I would not be expected to take on any of the walking or
feeding duties, I eventually, begrudgingly, agreed to adopt a Springer Spaniel
puppy. Over time, in spite of my most stubborn efforts to “hold on” to my
aversion, and “fend off” any feelings to the contrary, the creature eventually won
me over, toppling one supporting, if minor, column of my self-conception. As
such, insofar as we recognize our incomplete grasp of our facts, and recognize
that latent or unexpressed facts may yet emerge, we need not yield to
complacency or pessimism.
Notice, further, that, even if one were to correctly recognize all of one’s facts,
and recognize that one will never succeed at overcoming one’s undesirable
attributes, this very understanding will not necessarily render one complacent or
despairing. For, if among our set of facts are tendencies to stubbornness,
optimism and idealistic thinking, these very tendencies may well continue to
assert themselves, overpowering our tendencies toward depression or pessimism.
As Nagel puts it: “What sustains us, in belief as in action, is not reason or
justification, but something more basic than these—for we go on in the same way
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even after we are convinced that the reasons have given out.”219 Thus, for
example, we find people who may fully recognize that they have experienced no
success with dieting—who, indeed, have chronically followed the same hapless
trajectory of hope, weight loss, lapse and weight gain—but, who, in spite of this
knowledge, start all over again with the same zealous, imperturbable optimism,
certain that “This time will be different!” Or else consider people who cycle
through the same dysfunctional romantic relationships—people who can spell out
in extraordinary detail their self-destructive patterns of behavior—and yet who,
again and again, embark on new relationships utterly convinced that “This time it
will be different!” As such, if a disposition of hope and optimism is “built into”
someone’s character—no matter how unjustified they, themselves, regard such
hope and optimism—they need not worry about losing it.220 Indeed, recall the
powerful influence of Timothy Wilson’s “psychological immune system” (2002,
p. 38) that protects us from threats to our psychological wellbeing, whose central
rule is: “Select, interpret and evaluate information in ways that make me feel
good.” (2002, p. 39)

8.3.2 The Objection from Responsibility
I have argued in defense of the proposition that to possess “ultimate”
responsibility for an attitude or an action requires of one that he can produce or
own the attitude or act in question in such a way that it redounds not to “forces at
219

Nagel, from “The Absurd,” from Mortal Questions, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979), p. 20.
220
I grant that this may generate a certain degree of cognitive dissonance, but
even such dissonance will likely fade beneath an overpowering tendency toward
optimism and idealistic thinking.
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work” in a person, but to the person “himself”. Of course, per the Holistic view,
persons can do no such thing. And yet, as I discussed in the previous chapter, the
fact that one should not be regarded as “ultimately responsible” for one’s actions
does not preclude us from holding people “accountable,” and requiring that
people “answer for” their actions. That is, the motorist who knows that drunk
driving is dangerous and illegal but who has nonetheless driven drunk, lost
control of his car, and struck a pedestrian, has indeed behaved irresponsibly and
recklessly, and must be held to account. The sex offender must be brought to
justice, committed to an institution, or otherwise kept away from young children.
Indeed, in such cases, perpetrators of such crimes are certainly exercising agency;
their actions are properly attributable to them. And yet, for a person to be deeply
or ultimately blameworthy or ultimately creditworthy for his or her actions, he or
she will need to be seen as responsible for the extent of the agency he or she has
exercised, and this, for the reasons I have enumerated, exceeds an individual’s
powers.
As such, while we must hold such people to account, and bring them to justice,
I suggest that such justice should not be administered according to “retributive” or
“punitive” principles, but rather according to “restorative” principles, with the
intent of rehabilitating the wrongdoer and establishing conditions whereby he or
she can mend relationships with his victim and community.221 Of course, justice
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Note that practices of restorative justice have shown a greater rate of success
than those of retributive justice. See, for example, Lawrence W. Sherman and
Heather Strang, Restorative Justice: The Evidence (Smith Institute: 2007). See
also Howard Zehr Changing Lenses: Restorative Justice For Our Times, (Herald
Press; 25th Anniversary Edition, 2015)
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administered in this way may not relieve our vindictive desire to inflict harm and
suffering upon the wrongdoer—to impose, as Nietzsche puts it, the “metaphysics
of the hangman”222. But once we have taken a sufficiently wide step back and
properly viewed a person in light of antecedent conditions, we should recognize
that such vindictiveness is unwarranted.223 As such, while, again, the Holistic
picture denies “ultimate” responsibility—and associated blame and credit—it has
nothing to say against accountability, the necessity and legitimacy of lawenforcement, and the capacity for rehabilitation.

8.3.3 The Objection from Respect and Dignity
A further objection to the Holistic model is that it seems to license a
dangerously reductive and disrespectful view of human beings. We may
understand such a threat coming from two directions. First, by unseating the
autonomous “I,” the Holistic model can threaten our confidence in the Kantian
proposition that all persons possess a unique dignity and are thus worthy of
unconditional respect. In the second place, one may contend that the Holistic
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Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ (trans.) R.J. Hollingdale,
(intro.) Michael Tanner (Penguin, 1990), from “The Four Great Errors,” §7, pp.
58-70.
223
Spinoza is wonderful here: “I have laboured carefully, not to mock, lament, or
execrate human actions, but to understand them; and, to this end, I have looked
upon passions, such as love, hatred, anger, envy, ambition, pity, and the other
perturbations of the mind, not in the light of vices of human nature, but as
properties, just as pertinent to it, as are heat, cold, storm, thunder, and the like to
the nature of the atmosphere, which phenomena, though inconvenient, are yet
necessary, and have fixed causes.” Baruch Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus, (ed. and
intro.) R.H.M. Elwes, (trans.) A.H. Gosset (London: G. Bell &Son, 1883), Chp. 1,
§4.
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model can give rise to prejudicial thinking, i.e., the idea that people from a certain
country, or belonging to a certain gender, or who are of a certain skin-color,
predictably present a definite set of character traits.224 I will address these
concerns in order.
Let us first flesh out the Kantian conception of universal respect for persons.
Recall Kant’s assertion, quoted in the Introduction, that “[t]he fact that the human
being can have the “I” in his representations [i.e., is self-conscious] raises him
infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person
[…] i.e., through rank and dignity an entirely different being from things, such as
irrational animals…” Indeed, Kant more directly spells out his conditions for
respect in the Groundwork, as follows:
Now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being
can be an end in itself, since only through this is it possible to be a
lawgiving member of the kingdom of ends. Hence morality, and
humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone
has dignity… for nothing can have a worth other than that which
the law determines for it. But the lawgiving itself, which
determines all worth, must for that very reason have a dignity, that
is, an unconditional, incomparable worth; and the word respect
alone provides a becoming expression for the estimate of it that a
rational being must give. Autonomy is therefore the ground of the
dignity of human nature and of every rational nature. [4:435-6]
According to Kant, thus, irrational creatures are mere expressions of brute
drives—they possess no knowledge of, and cannot legislate over, such impulses.
“Worth” is something that can only be created by creatures that are capable of
legislating over their impulses; indeed, the very act of legislation itself creates
such worth, and, as such, the capacity to legislate—that is, autonomy—is the
224

We observe this kind of thinking on particularly noxious display in Nietzsche’s
discussion of lambs and birds of prey in his Genealogy of Morality (2006). See
§13 pp. 25-28.
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precondition of all worth. Since Kant believes that human beings are uniquely
capable of autonomy, they themselves are the only “worthy” creatures, and, as
such, they alone are in possession of a dignity that is “beyond all price”225 and are
deserving of unconditional respect.
Yet I have argued at length that our exercise of “autonomy” or “selflegislation” is not as Kant—or Rationalists in general—characterize it. That is, we
certainly can “step back,” and “legislate” over our impulses, but this act of
legislation (1) Never proceeds free from our empirical nature; and, as such, (2) Is
never entirely “up to” an autonomous “I” that operates free of heteronymous
influences. That being the case, we need not relinquish our faith in the proposition
that all persons are in possession of dignity and are worthy of respect. For, after
all, why should we regard autonomy as the sole dignity and respect-conferring
virtue? Why can’t we ground it elsewhere?226 For example, why not ground
respect in the capacity for sentience? After all, it seems quite natural for us to
respect the dignity and rights of human beings who have not developed a robust
self-consciousness and who have not developed the capacity to self-legislate—or,
indeed, who have lost such capacities—and we do so in part because we do not
wish to see such human beings suffer. Further, it seems quite natural to respect the
rights, the interests and feelings, of non-human animals, to preserve their natural
habitats, to advocate against animal cruelty and the horrific conditions of factory
225

See Kant, (Groundwork: 434:32, p. 42)
Damasio is nice here: “Perhaps the most indispensable thing we can do as
human beings, every day of our lives, is remind ourselves and others of our
complexity, fragility, finiteness, and uniqueness. And this is of course the difficult
job, is it not: to move the spirit from its nowhere pedestal to a somewhere place,
while preserving its dignity and importance; to recognize its humble origin and
vulnerability, yet still call upon its guidance.” (1994, p. 252)
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farms.227 As such, we may locate the wellsprings of our respect not in our
appreciation for law-giving autonomy, but in our desire for the non-suffering of
all sentient creatures.228
With respect to the second concern about stereotyping and prejudice, it might
seem that Kant’s proposal would be especially useful in the service of forestalling
such tendencies. For, again, according to the Kantian view—and very much in
keeping with Sartre—no individual, let alone a group of individuals, can be
judged exclusively on the basis of facts. We are all, in essence, noumenal beings,
free of empirical taint, and capable of unfettered self-legislation. Yet I don’t think
we need to reach so far. First, empirical evidence, and common sense, suggests
that

stereotypes

are

overwhelmingly

just

that—prejudicial,

groundless,

generalizations. Second, we may assume as a matter of epistemic humility that we
are never justified in prejudging an individual on the basis of a social stereotype
or otherwise. Indeed, given how ignorant we are of our very own natures, we
likewise should assume that we possess an incomplete understanding of others.
Finally, once we have predicated respect on something as general as sentience,
hopefully we can see through our differences, and focus instead on our shared
concerns.
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The Sioux tribe accords an equal respect, not only to non-human animals, but
to all “living” creatures, the set of which includes water and stones. See: John
(Fire) Lame Deer and Richard Erdoes, Lame Deer, Seeker of Visions (Pocket
Books, 1994).
228
See Schopenhauer’s marvelous defense of such a “compassion-based”
foundation of ethics and his critique of Kantian deontology in Arthur
Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, (trans.) E.F.J. Payne, (intro.) David E.
Cartwright (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1995).
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8.3.4 The Objection from Specialness
Finally, there just seems to be something—something in me, or rather,
something that is me that must reside over and above my facts, something that
possesses an extraordinary, irreducible, perhaps spiritual value, that cannot simply
be explained away or reduced to facticity. I touched on this concern in my
treatment of the “conceptual problem” of subject and object in Section 7.6. In this
concluding section, I will spell out a few more proposals that seem to safeguard
the irreducibly special character of the “I”.
Consider, first, as Nagel does, the certain “primitive amazement” he feels at
recognizing the fact that “the universe should have come to contain a being with
the unique property of being me” (1986, p. 56). How is it, Nagel appears to be
asking, that, over the fathomless reaches of space and time, some combination of
insensate matter gave rise to a personal revelation of being, and not just any
personal revelation, but his personal revelation. Indeed, Nagel goes on to argue,
his personal revelation of being seems incommensurate with any objective
description of the world, any description, that is, that consists in an exhaustive
inventory of objective, impersonal facts. That is: no descriptive list of impersonal
facts seems to add up to him, to his subjective experience, and, further, any
description of the world that would omit a description of his subjective experience
would be incomplete.229 As such, one’s personal experience seems to be an
ineliminable part of the world.

229

See also Baker: “If I attribute first-person reference to myself, my sentence
cannot be adequately paraphrased by any sentence that fails to attribute firstperson reference to me. The attribution of first person reference to oneself seems
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A related puzzle touches on the previous conceptual and phenomenological
issues raised earlier. That is, if I am composed of nothing but the world—if all
that I am, and all that I perceive, should just be understood as further attributes of
the world—then how can I make sense of the experience of my observation of the
world; that is, my observation of the world as an entity that is distinct from me?
How, that is, should the locutions: “I move through the world,” “I look out at the
world,” “I try to fit into the world,” or even “I know the world,” be understood?
Again, when we spoke of ocean waves, we referred to the wave “passing over”
the ocean, but this description was really just a matter of linguistic convenience,
as we understood the wave as only an expression or “aspect” of the ocean. As
such, if what I am is just an expression or “aspect” of the world, we would expect
such self-affirming descriptions to be similarly specious. Yet, insofar as I cannot
help but regard myself as something that is at least in part distinct from the world;
as something that perceives the world, walks through the world, etc., I cannot
overcome this sense of division; my very consciousness seems to affirm my
distinct ontological status with respect to the world.230 Indeed, perhaps it is this

to be ineliminable” (1998, p. 331). And see Metzinger’s ponderous response
(2003, p. 370): “One way of paraphrasing this sentence according to the current
model would be: ‘This system currently uses a sentence in a public language to
refer to a certain capacity, namely, the capacity to access the content of certain
opaque, cognitive simulations integrated into an already existing transparent selfmodel by higher-order cognitive operations, which then in turn can be integrated
into this self-model.’”
230
Camus puts the point nicely: “If I were a tree among trees, a cat among
animals, this life would have a meaning, or rather this problem would not arise,
for I should belong to this world. I should be this world to which I am now
opposed by my whole consciousness and my whole insistence upon familiarity.
This ridiculous reason is what sets me in opposition to all creation.” Albert
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inescapable sensation of our distinction that undergirds the “burden of our
freedom” that Sartre, Kant, Korsgaard and others speak of—the fact that, try as
we might, we cannot slough off our sense of distinct “being,” cannot just dismiss
our need to “act” and “assume responsibility” for our actions. However we
contort ourselves, we cannot escape from these activities or “hand them off” to
impersonal forces working “on” or “through” us. As a result, our unique existence
may well impress us as an inescapable burden that we must “heave” through time.
Yet, we may nonetheless regard ourselves as, as Camus tells us, “stronger
than [our] rock.”231 Indeed, as the Existential thinkers have said, this burden of
consciousness, this inescapable, non-transferable burden of our distinct being,
may be regarded as a gift. Thus, Pascal writes: “Man is only a reed, the weakest in
nature, but he is a thinking reed. There is no need for the whole universe to take
up arms to crush him: a vapor, a drop of water is enough to kill him. But even if
the universe were to crush him, man would still be nobler than his slayer, because
he knows that he is dying and the advantage the universe has over him. The
universe knows none of this.”232 Man “knows,” Pascal reminds us, and, in virtue
of this knowledge, we can pursue projects, nurture relationships, and achieve
goals that are entirely inaccessible to creatures lacking in self-consciousness. No
other creature—as far as we know—can produce works of art, can practice
Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, (trans.) Justin O’Brien (New
York: Vintage, 1955), p. 51, emphasis mine.
231
Albert Camus, (1955), p. 112.	
  
232
Blaise Pascal, Pensees (trans. and intro.) A. J. Krailsheimer (Penguin: 1966),
p. 95, §200.
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philosophy, can marvel at the wonder of his own transient existence in a dazzling
universe. True, our self-consciousness may not permit us to become the masterful,
bounded, autonomous creatures we may wish to become, but it still allows us to
behave as persons in a personal world, that, for all of its limitations and darkness,
is also full of astonishing depth and beauty.
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